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student publications encouraging unhealthful student activity.2 ' Since
school officials could have suppressed the "Joint Effort" drug parapher-
nalia advertisement absent the S.R.R.P., the Fourth Circuit could have
upheld the advertisement's suppression, while finding the S.R.R.P. un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad."'
Williams v. Spencer is important for several reasons. Williams is the
first Fourth Circuit case upholding a student publication restraint
rule. 22 Thus, the case serves as a model for schools seeking to establish
such rules.2 More importantly, Williams expanded the circumstances
under which school officials may restrain student publications. Before
Williams, the Fourth Circuit had not recognized school officials' author-
ity to suppress student expression on grounds other than disruption of
school operations. The most serious problem with Williams is that the
case may authorize schools to draft student publication restraint rules
that cannot be enforced under certain circumstances. '24 To avoid the
selective enforcement of student publication restraint rules, the Fourth
Circuit should have upheld the suppression of the "Joint Effort" drug
paraphernalia advertisement, and ordered redrafting of the S.R.R.P. to
remedy the policy's vague and overbroad provisions. '25
SAMUEL N. ALLEN
VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Affirmative Misinformation and The Guilty Plea; An Extension of
the Effective Assistance of Counsel Guarantee
The sixth amendment guarantees all criminal defendants the right
to the effective assistance of counsel at every "critical stage" of aI
expression could be suppressed pursuant to a valid prior restraint rule. Id. at 1050. See also
Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 173-74 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding suppression of student
picketing absent rule prohibiting picketing); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (school officials may suppress disruptive student expression absent a writ-
ten school policy defining prohibited expression).
120 See text accompanying notes 63-79 supra.
" See text accompanying note 119 supra.
12 Compare Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding student
publication restraint rule) with Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1975) (striking
down school prior restraint rule) and Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir.
1973) (striking down school prior restraint rule) and Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60
(4th Cir. 1971) (striking down school prior restraint rule).
11 In upholding the S.R.R.P., the Fourth Circuit has established a legally acceptable
timetable for appellate review of restraints upon student publications. The Williams court
left an open question, however, as to whether appellate procedures permitting more time
for review than the S.R.R.P. can meet fourteenth amendment due process requirements in
the Fourth Circuit.
"2 See text accompanying notes 93-117 supra.
12 See text accompanying notes 119-123 supra.
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criminal proceeding.1 The Supreme Court has failed to establish constitu-
tional standards by which to judge the effectiveness of counsel's
assistance.2 However, the lower courts have promulgated minimum stan-
dards to govern the quality of assistance.3 Some courts have refused to
grant relief unless an attorney's representation constitutes a "farce and
mockery of justice."' The majority of courts, however, have adopted a
' United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-26 (1967). In Wade, the Court stated that a
"critical stage" includes any phase of the proceeding against the defendant where counsel's
assistance is necessary to assure a meaningful "defense." Id. at 224-25; U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 & 71 (1932), the Supreme Court, in construing
the right to counsel under the sixth amendment, held that a defendant accused of a capital
crime and unable to afford an attorney must have counsel appointed and present during the
adjudication of the charge against him. Id. at 71. In Powell, Justice Sutherland spoke of the
necessity for the accused to have the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceeding against him. Id. at 69. The Justice noted that even the most intelligent layman lacks
the necessary knowledge and skill in the science of the law. Id. Moreover, Justice
Sutherland maintained that an innocent defendant may be convicted because he does not
have the knowledge to prove himself not guilty. Id.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963), the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment right to counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, and
therefore made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 342. The Court
in Gideon reasoned in part that the widespread use of lawyers by those who could afford
them. was a good indication that lawyers in criminal proceedings are necessities, not lux-
uries. Id. at 344.
' See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In McMann, the Supreme Court
suggested in dictum that defense counsel must perform "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id at 771. The Court did not, however, introduce
a standard of competence that an attorney must achieve to satisfy the sixth amendment
right to counsel requirement. Id. The McMann Court left the problem of insuring effective
assistance to the discretion of the trial judge. Id.; see Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel,
16 AM. CR1m. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Effective Assistance]. Since
McMann, the Supreme Court has not defined more completely the "range of competence"
demanded of attorneys. Id. at 68.
' See Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Schaefer] Justice Schaefer asserted that the right to be
represented by counsel at a criminal proceeding is the accused's most pervasive right
because the right to counsel directly affects the accused's ability to assert any other right
he may have. Id.
See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense
CounseL- A New Look After UNITED STATES V. DECOSTER, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 756-57
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Identifying and Remedying]. Most of the circuits have adopted
standards that are based on McMann's suggestion of a reasonable competence standard to
satisfy the effective assistance of counsel requirement. Id. at 756-57 n.36; see note 1 supra.
' See United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 257-58 (10th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 444
U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872
(1977). The only circuits that retain the farce and mockery standard are the Second and
Tenth Circuits. Identifying and Remedying, supra note 3, at 757. In Bubar, the court held
that a defendant charged with racketeering and arson was not ineffectively represented.
567 F.2d at 202. The court reasoned that the defendant was not ineffectively represented
unless the legal assistaiice he recieved was so incompetent as to shock the conscience of the
court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice. Id.
1981]
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"reasonable competence" standard which requires an attorney to per-
form within the range of normal competence demanded of all attorneys
in criminal proceedings.5
Since the farce and mockery standard applies only to errors at trial,'
courts adopting the farce and mockery standard have not recognized in-
effective assistance claims based on improperly entered guilty pleas.7
The reasonable competence standard does not restrict ineffective
assistance claims to errors committed at trial.8 Some courts utilizing the
reasonable competence standard nonetheless have been reluctanct to ac-
cept ineffective assistance claims as a defense to improperly entered
guilty pleas.' In Strader v. Garrison,10 however, the Fourth Circuit ex-
In Brown, the defendant was charged with tax evasion. 600 F.2d at 250. The court
held that the defendant would be ineffectively represented only if the trial record indicated
that defense counsel's performance was so incompetent that the proceeding bad become a
farce and mockery of justice. Id. at 257-58.
The D.C. Circuit originated the farce and mockery standard in Diggs v. Welch, 148
F.2d 667, 668-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). In Diggs, a prisoner convicted
of larcency sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that he had been denied effective
assistance of counsel because he bad received incorrect advice concerning his guilty plea. Id.
at 668. The D.C. Circuit held that the prisoner was not entitled to relief on ineffective
assistance grounds unless he proved that the advice he received was so inadequate that, as
a result, the whole proceeding was a farce and mockery of justice. Id at 669. The D.C. Cir-
cuit subsequently has replaced the farce and mockery standard with a reasonable com-
petence standard. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 944 (1979).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1092 (1977); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1976; United States ex
rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975);
Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003 (1975);
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730,736 (3d Cir. 1970); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961). See generally Effective Assistance, supra note 2, at 68-70.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the reasonable competence standard in Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977). In Marzullo, the court held that the farce and
mockery standard was no longer a viable standard by which to measure a defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 543. The Marzullo court replaced
the farce and mockery standard with the reasonable competence standard. Id.
' Note, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief From Conviction: Principles
for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBLEMS 1, 32-33 [hereinafter cited as Ineffec-
tive Representation]. The language of the farce and mockery standard restricts the review-
ing court to consideration of the trial record. Id. at 33. However, an attorney's assistance to
a client often involves important advice that is not directly connected with the trial. Id.; see
text accompanying note 39 infra.
' See, e.g., Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395, F.2d 70, 71 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20, 24 (10th Cir. 1967);
Criser v. United States, 319 F.2d 849, 850 (10th Cir. 1963). see Note, Ineffective Representa-
tion, supra note 6, at 33.
SId. at 40.
See, e.g., United States ex rel Healy v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052, 1056 (7th Cir.), cert
denied sub nom., Mitchell v. Healey, 434 U.S. 874 (1977); Wojtowicz v. United States, 550
F.2d 786, 792-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); Akridge v. Hopper, 545 F.2d 457,
458-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977).
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tended the reasonable competence standard to a guilty plea made in
reliance on defense counsel's misinformation concerning parole eligi-
bility.1
In Strader, a North Carolina prisoner, Gene C. Strader, escaped
from prison while serving a forty-five to fifty-five year indeterminate
sentence for armed robbery and burglary.12 After recapture, he was
tried on charges of armed robbery and conspiracy allegedly committed
while an escapee. 3 After the presentation of the state's case, defense
counsel and the state's attorney agreed that if Strader would plead guilty
to both offenses, he would receive a thirty year sentence on the armed
robbery conviction to be served concurrently with his original indeter-
minate sentence. In addition, the agreement imposed a five to ten year
sentence for the conspiracy charge to be served consecutively with his
original sentence." Strader knew that the imposition of the five to ten
year consecutive sentence would postpone his original parole eligibility
date by one fourth of the five year minimum. Strader was concerned,
however, that the new thirty year sentence would further postpone his
parole eligibility date. 5 Counsel advised Strader that the new sentence
would not further postpone his parole eligibility. Strader accepted the
plea bargain agreement and plead guilty to both offenses. 6 Counsel in-
correctly advised Strader, however, because the published regulations
of the North Carolina Department of Corrections required the court to
recompute parole eligibility upon the imposition of a thirty year concur-
rent sentence.
Strader sought federal habeas corpus relief, contending that his
lawyer grossly misadvised him as to his parole eligibility. 8 The district
court issued Strader a writ of habeas corpus finding that Strader never
would have plead guilty to the armed robbery and conspiracy charges if
he had been correctly advised. 9 The state appealed the decision of the
'0 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979).
11 Id at 65.





11 Id. see Manual of Policy and Procedures of the North Carolina Department of Cor-
rections; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (repealed 1977). The state argued that defense counsel
should not have been expected to know of the recomputation of parole eligibility that accom-
panied the imposition of Strader's thirty year sentence. Brief of Appellant at 10-11, Strader
v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979). The state contended that the regulation that re-
quired such recomputation was published only in the policy manual of the North Carolina
Department of Corrections. Thus, such a regulation was not easily accessible to lawyers. Id.
Therefore, the state asserted that because the regulation was not readily available,
Strader's attorney could not have been expected to be aware of it. Id.
" 611 F.2d at 62-63.
19 Id.
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district court, arguing that the effect of Strader's plea on his parole
eligibility was a collateral, rather than direct, consequence of his plea."°
Therefore, the state contended that defense counsel's misinformation
would not constitute cause to invalidate Strader's guilty plea."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas corpus, vacated
Strader's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.' The court
determined that Strader was denied his sixth amendment right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel.' The Fourth Circuit applied the reasonable
Id. at 63.
21 Id. The state relied in part on Cuthrell v. Director, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973). Brief of Appellant at 6, Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th
Cir. 1979). In Cuthrel, a defendant charged with criminal assault claimed that his guilty
plea was entered involuntarily because he was not informed that upon conviction he would
be committed to an institution for the delinquent. 475 F.2d at 1365. The court held that
counsel must inform a defendant of all direct, but not collateral consequences of his guilty
plea. Id. at 1365. The court found that information about possible commitment to an institu-
tion is a collateral consequence of a plea. Id. at 1366. The court defined a direct consequence
as a consequence of a plea which has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on a
defendant's range of punishment. Id. Cf. Bell v. North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564, 566 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 956 (1978). Bunker v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1977). In
Bel, the petitioner claim that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court and
defense counsel failed to advise him of the effect of his guilty plea on parole eligibility. 576
F.2d at 565. The court found against petitioner, holding that his guilty plea was not involun-
tary because of the omission by counsel and the court. Id. at 566.
In Bunker, the petitioner sought withdrawal of his guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy
to distribute narcotics. The petitioner conceeded that he would not have entered his plea
had he been properly advised that a conviction carried a special parole term. 550 F.2d at
1156. The court held that parole eligibility was a direct consequence of a guilty plea only in
cases where the parole issue concerned a special parole term. Id. at 1158. The court
asserted, however, that ordinary parole eligibility was but a collateral consequence of the
plea. Id. at 1158-59.
In Strader, the state argued that any collateral matter concerning a guilty plea of
which the accused is not advised will not invalidate the plea. Brief of Appellant at 6, Strader
v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979). Cf. Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th
Cir. 1977) (fact that defendant not advised of possibility of parole revocation did not in-
validate guilty plea). Tindall v. United States, 469 F.2d 92-93 (5th Cir. 1972) (fact that
defendant not advised of possibility of consecutive sentences upon conviction did not in-
validate guilty plea because such possibility was collateral consequence of plea). Further-
more, the state contended that attorney misinformation with respect to a guilty plea that
concerned a collateral consequence of that plea was not grounds to render the plea constitu-
tionally invalid. Brief of Appellant at 6-7, Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979); cf.
United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Parrino, 212
F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954). In Sambro, the court denied the
defendant relief from his guilty plea. Sambro had argued that counsel had incorrectly advis-
ed him that the conviction would not render him deportable. 454 F.2d at 920. The Second
Circuit refused relief, ruling that deportability was but a collateral consequence of the
defendant's guilty plea. Id at 923-24. In Parrino, the defendant argued that counsel had
misadvised him with respect to whether he would be deported upon pleading guilty. 212
F.2d at 921-22. The court found that deportability was a collateral consequence of the
defendant's plea and thus insufficient ground for relief. Id.
" 611 F.2d at 65.
'z Id. The Fourth Circuit suggested that North Carolina could reduce Strader's thirty
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competence standard to find that the failure of Strader's counsel to
verify North Carolina law before advising his client to plead guilty was
conduct falling below the normal range of competence demanded of at-
torneys in criminal proceedings.24 The state argued that defense
counsel's mistaken advice pertained only to parole eligibility, a collateral
consequence of Strader's plea. Therefore, the state contended, the col-
lateral nature of parole information should nullify Strader's claim of inef-
fective assistance.' The court rejected the state's argument, reasoning
that since counsel's active misinformation about parole eligibility induced
Strader's plea, the ordinarily collateral status of advice concerning
parole eligibility was immaterial.26 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit
found that Strader was denied effective assistance of counsel because he
relied on his lawyer's mistaken advice concerning parole eligibility when
he plead guilty.7
Strader is significant because it broadens the scope of ineffective
assistance claims under the reasonable competence standard. The
year sentence to the extent permitted under state law. Id. The court reasoned that if the
state elected to reduce Strader's sentence to the extent that it would have no adverse im-
pact on Strader's parole eligibility, defense counsel's mistake would be harmless error, and
the state could avoid retrying Strader. Id.
24 Id. at 63 & 65.
Id. at 63.
611 F.2d at 63-65. In deciding Strader, the court relied on a Second Circuit case. Id.
at 64; see United States ex rel. Hill v. Ternullo, 510 F.2d 844, 845-46 (2d Cir. 1975). In Ter-
nullo, the prisoner alleged that he was misadvised as to parole eligibility and plead guilty in
reliance on such misinformation. Id. at 845-46. The Second Circuit remanded for an eviden-
tiary hearing. Id. at 848. The court held that if facts were found as alleged, the district court
should issue a writ of habeas corpus or grant other appropriate relief. Id. at 847. The Fourth
Circuit asserted in Strader, however, that the Second Circuit in Ternullo granted relief based
on a violation of the prisoner's right to effective assistance of counsel. 611 F.2d at 64. The
Second Circuit in Ternullo did not assert that the prisoner's relief, if so granted, would be
based on an ineffective assistance claim. 510 F.2d at 847-48.
1 611 F.2d at 65. Before Strader, defendants had to argue that counsel's incompetent
advice caused their guilty pleas to be entered unintelligently and involuntarily. See Ham-
mond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15, 19 (4th Cir. 1975). In adjudicating such claims, courts
focused on the extent of a defendant's knowledge of the direct consequences of a guilty plea.
Id. Thus, the plea was neither intelligent nor voluntary if counsel did not properly inform
the accused of the immediate consequences of his guilty plea. Id.; see Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must
enter a guilty plea in an intelligent, knowing and voluntary manner for the plea to be con-
stitutional. Id., see Ineffective Representation, supra note 6, at 43-44. Moreover, a defend-
ant must be aware of the direct and probable consequences of his guilty plea. 397 U.S. at
755. In Strader, however, the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant's conviction solely on
the basis of his ineffective assitance of counsel claim. 611 F.2d at 65. The Fourth Circuit
asserted that, alternatively, Strader's guilty plea could have been held constitutionally in-
valid on the ground that he did not enter the plea voluntarily and intelligently. Id. The
Fourth Circuit's conclusion is contrary to authority holding that inadequate advice concern--
ing collateral consequences would not invalidate a guilty plea. Id. at 65; see note 21 supra;
see also generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (defendant must under-
stand that by pleading guilty he forfeits certain constitutional rights).
1981]
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Fourth Circuit ruled that a defendant has a valid claim of ineffective as-
sistance when defense counsel's erroneous advice induces the defendant
to plead guilty.28 After Strader, the defendant has an independent claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel and is not limited to challenging his
guilty plea on the grounds that his plea was involuntarily and unintelli-
gently made. 9 Although the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson
did not permit an ineffective assistance claim to invalidate a guilty plea,
Strader is factually distinguishable from McMann.3 In McMann, three
defendants sought to have their guilty pleas declared invalid on the
ground that their attorneys' incompetent advice induced the pleas. The
defendants based their ineffective assistance claim on defense counsels'
advice with respect to the possible admissibility of their confessions at
trial." The Court held that the defendants had waived their right to trial
by pleading guilty and therefore could not complain later about mistaken
advice concerning what might have happened at trial.32 In Strader,
however, counsel's incompetent advice had nothing to do with issues to
be decided at trial. Strader's ineffective assistance claim was based on
defense counsel's advice directly concerning the plea.3 Moreover, in
McMann, defense counsels' plea bargain advice involved speculative
evaluation of how the court would rule on a question of law. 4 In Strader,
however, defense counsel's advice was objectively verifiable.
3 5
The Fourth Circuit is the first circuit to accept a defendant's argu-
ment that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel solely
because he entered a guilty plea in reliance on his attorney's mistaken
advice. Other circuits that have adopted the reasonable competence
standard have not clearly articulated the grounds for granting a new
trial to an ineffectively advised defendant. 8 The circuits have
' 611 F.2d at 64.
29 Id.
' See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 761-64 (1970). In McMann, the petitioners
confessed and received advice to plead guilty rather than to face trial and risk more severe
sentences. Id The petitioners alleged, however, that counsel had misadvised them about
the admissibility of their confessions. Id. The petitioners asserted that the ineffective
assistance they received resulted in invalid guilty pleas because the pleas were not entered
voluntarily and intelligently. Id The McMann Court asserted that even though the defend-
ant must enter his guilty plea intelligently and voluntarily, all advice offered by defense
counsel need not withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing. Id at
770-71. The Court reasoned that the defendant waives the right to trial upon pleading guilty
and thereby accepts the risk that his attorney's good faith evaluations may be incorrect. Id
at 769-70.
31 397 U.S. at 769-70.
Id at 770-71.
3 611 F.2d at 63.
397 U.S. at 770-71.
611 F.2d at 63.
See, e.g., Isble v. United States, 611 F.2d 173, 175 (6th Cir. 1979). In Isble, the Sixth
Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether counsel's advice failed to
satisfy the reasonable competence standard. Id. at 175. The court stated that the defendant
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acknowleded that defendants must be effectively represented at all
critical stages of the proceeding but have yet to go beyond McMann,
which holds that an ineffective assistance claim with respect to a guilty
plea will be upheld only on the ground that the plea was made involun-
tarily and unintelligently.7
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Strader is progressive. The right to
effective assistance of counsel is nugatory if it does not exist at every
critical stage of counsel's representation of a criminal defendant. 8 Effec-
tive legal assistance is crucial in a plea bargain case. Defense counsel's
advice that induces a guilty plea must be accurate and competent
because the defendant, upon accepting a plea bargain and pleading guilty,
waives the constitutional rights to trial by jury, to remain silent and to
confront his accuser. 9 Strader established that a defendant does not
waive his rights upon pleading guilty unless defense counsel's advice in-
ducing a guilty plea is reasonably competent legal assistance. Strader
does not apply when a defendant pleads guilty in reliance on counsel's
mistaken advice concerning an issue that would be resolved at trial.
Strader applies only when defense counsel's advice involves issues
related directly to the plea bargain. Thus, the success of an ineffective
assistance claim under Strader will depend on the type of assistance
defense counsel performs for his client.
As a result of Strader, many prisoners may file frivolous habeas cor-
pus petitions based on ineffective assistance claims in an attempt to gain
relief from their guilty pleas. An increase in petitions will exacerbate
the problems of overcrowded court dockets. Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit has adopted the view that the right to effective assistance of
counsel at the plea bargain stage outweighs the possible additional
strain the decision will impose on judicial resources."0
H. ANDERSON BERRY III
would have a valid claim for ineffective assistance if counsel had provided misinformation as
alleged. Id. However, the Court did not specify whether the ineffectiveness claim would
arise independently of a due process determination. Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit is unset-
tled as to the appropriate grounds for relief. Cf. Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717 (5th Cir.
1976) (upholding sixth amendment ineffective assistance claim) with Rutledge v. Wain-
wright, 625 F.2d 1200, 1203 (5th cin. 1980) (denying relief on due process without reference
to sixth amendment grounds).
See note 30 supra.
See generally, Schaefer, supra note 3, at 8.
Note, The Guilty Plea As A Waiver Of "Present But Unknowable" Constitutional
Rights: The Aftermath of The Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1436-37 (1974).
"0 See generally Bazelon, The Defective Assitance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 5
(1973).
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B. Are Misjoinder and Harmless Error Compatible?
Courts join defendants to promote judicial efficiency by preventing
the needless retrial of identical issues.1 When the government tries one
defendant jointly with another, however, the evidence offered against
one defendant may unfairly prejudice the case of the other defendant.2
The considerations of fairness and efficiency are balanced in Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b),3 which states that defendants who have
participated in the same criminal transaction or series of transactions
may properly be joined in a criminal trial. To further assure fairness,
joined defendants may move for severance under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 14,4 which provides that courts may order separate
trials for defendants whose joinder is prejudicial. Joined defendants
' See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968); Daley v. United
States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir. 1956). Both Bruton and Daley state that where no substan-
tial prejudice to the defendant's rights results, the government may try defendants jointly
for related offenses in the interest of judicial economy. 391 U.S. at 131; 231 F.2d at 125.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976); King v.
United States, 355 F.2d 700, 705 (1st Cir. 1966). In Whitehead, the Fourth Circuit found pre-
judicial error in the joint trial of two defendants for distribution of cocaine when the only
connections between the defendants were residence in the same apartment building and
distribution to a common third party. 539 F.2d at 1026. In King, the First Circuit held that
prejudice resulted when a trial court consolidated a joint indictment of two defendants for
the sale of narcotics with a separate indictment of only one of the defendants for a later
similar offense in which the other defendant was not involved. 355 F.2d at 705.
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 8(b) provides:
"(b) Joinder of defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same
indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act
or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense
or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count."
The Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of Rule 8(b) is to promote judicial
efficiency without prejudicing the right of defendants to a fair trial. Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968); accord, Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st
Cir. 1956). See generally Note, Harmless Error and Misjoinder Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: A Narrowing Division of Opinion, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1978)
(hereinafter cited as Harmless Error) (Rule 8 delineates absolute limits of permissible
joinder in federal criminal cases); Decker, Joinder and Severance in Federal Criminal
Cases: an Examination of Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Rules, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 147, 154-67 (1977) (general discussion of judicial interpretation of Rule 8(b)). Rule
8(b) has judicial, rather than legislative roots. See Orfield, Joinder in Federal Criminal Pro-
cedure, 26 F.R.D. 23, 25 (1960).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 provides in pertinent part:
"If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a
severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires."
The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules remark that Rule 14 is a restate-
ment of prior existing law, which stated that severance was entirely within the discretion of
the court. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14; 18 U.S.C. § 557 (repealed 1948).
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alleging that they have stood trial in violation of Rule 8(b) have argued
on appeal that a trial judge's failure to sever misjoined defendants must
result in automatic reversal.' Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)'
states, however, that judicial errors cannot result in appellate reversals
unless they affect a defendant's substantial rights. In United States v.
Seidel,' the Fourth Circuit recently considered whether misjoinder of a
defendant under Rule 8(b) can ever be a "harmless error" within Rule
52(a).
Defendants Seidel and Kaplan jointly stood trial in district court for
the illegal manufacture, installation, and explosion in June, 1976, of a
pipe bomb.' At the same trial, the prosecution charged Kaplan alone
with the manufacture of another pipe bomb, and its subsequent sale in
August, 1976, to a government agent posing as a "hit man."9
At trial, Seidel moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14
for a severance of the June and August offenses. Seidel also requested
that the court sever his trial from Kaplan's trial." The district court
5 See, e.g., United States v. Graci, 504 F.2d 411, 413-14 (3rd Cir. 1974) (misjoinder
under Rule 8(b) requires automatic reversal); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704-05 (1st
Cir. 1966) (same).
' Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) provides:
."(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not af-
fect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
The Supreme Court has stated that harmless error rules must prevent reversals of
convictions for inconsequential errors, while also guarding against the illegal introduction of
unfair evidence into closely decided trials. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967).
The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state
that Rule 52(a) is a restatement of prior existing law. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Under 28
U.S.C. § 391 (repealed 1948) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)), appellate courts were
to give judgment "without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not af-
fect the substantial rights of the parties." Id. Similarly, under 18 U.S.C. § 556 (repealed
1948) (current version at Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)), the validity of judgments was unaffected by
"any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which [did] not tend to the prejudice of
the defendant .... " Id.
In Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 351 (9th Cir., cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986
(1967), the Ninth Circuit noted that the change in wording from "technical errors" in 28
U.S.C. § 391 to "(a)ny error" in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) considerably broadened the concept of
harmless error to include any nonprejudicial error. 383 F.2d at 351. The Supreme Court has
stated that errors even of constitutional magnitude may be considered harmless if they do
not prejudice a defendant's substantial rights. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 21-22. An
error prejudices a defendant's substantial rights when there is "a reasonable possibility
that [it] might have contributed to [his] conviction." Id. at 23.
7 620 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 1007. The government charged Seidel and Kaplan with various violations of
the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 through 5827 (1976), and with unlawful
destruction of a vehicle used in interstate transportation, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976). See
United States v. Kaplan, 588 F.2d 71, 72 (4th Cir. 1978), modified, 620 F.2d 1006 (1980).
9 620 F.2d at 1007-08. Originally, the government indicted one Harris with Kaplan in
connection with the August offense for conspiracy to violate the National Firearms Act, 18
U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 1007 n.1. Harris stood trial separately after the district court granted his
motion for severance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. Id.; see note 4 supra.
10 620 F.2d at 1008.
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denied the motion, but specifically instructed the jury that any offenses
committed in August had no bearing on Seidel's guilt. 1 The jury found
both Kaplan and Seidel guilty of the June offense, and additionally found
Kaplan guilty of the August offense.
12
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit originally held that the joinder of
Seidel and Kaplan violated the provisions of Rule 8(b), and reversed
Seidel's conviction while affirming Kaplan's conviction. 3 The govern-
ment petitioned for a rehearing, arguing that even if the prosecution
misjoined the defendants, the misjoinder was not prejudicial and con-
stituted "harmless error" within Rule 52(a)."4 The government stressed
that the application of Rule 52(a) would promote judicial efficiency and
economy by preventing the needless retrial of issues already resolved.
5
Relying on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ingram v. United
States," Seidel argued at the rehearing that misjoinder under Rule 8(b)
necessarily required reversal. 7 The Ingram court relied on Professor
Wright's 8 argument that given the court's discretion under Rule 14 to
order separate trials when properly joined defendants are prejudiced, 9
Rule 8(b) can have no meaning unless the trial judge's misapplication of
Rule 8(b) automatically requires either severance or reversal.
" Id. When the trial judge denied Seidel's motion for severance, the judge stated that
he would instruct the jury that Seidel was "not charged with and did not commit any of-
fenses in August and the fact that offenses may have been committed in August can have no
bearing on his guilt in the June events." Id.
" 620 F.2d at 1008.
13 United States v. Kaplan, 588 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1978), vacated in part, United
States v. Seidel, 620 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1980). The record does not indicate whether Kaplan
also raised the issue of misjoinder on appeal, although the affirmation of his conviction in-
dicates that he did not.
620 F.2d at 1008; see note 6 supra.
15 620 F.2d at 1008-09; see note 1 supra.
x' 272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959). In Ingram, the Fourth Circuit held that a trial judge had
committed prejudicial error by jointly trying two sets of defendants for possession of non-
taxpaid liquor when the only connection between the two sets was defendant Ingram's par-
ticipation in each. Id. at 571-72; see note 24 infra.
As support for the contention that misjoinder under Rule 8(b) requires per se reversal,
Seidel also relied on the Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023
(4th Cir. 1976). The Whitehead court never specifically adverted to the relationship between
Rules 8(b) and 52(a), however, and relied largely upon Ingram as precedent. 539 F.2d at
1025-26.
620 F.2d at 1011-12.
,' Professor Wright is the author of Federal Practice and Procedure (1969).
,' See note 4 supra.
See 272 F.2d at 569. Professor Wright reasons that if courts were permitted to find
a violation of Rule 8(b) to be harmless error, defendants could obtain reversals for pre-
judicial errors only. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal, § 144 at 329 (1969).
Since Rule 14 already provides for reversal for prejudicial joinders which are nevertheless
proper under Rule 8, the draftsmen of the Rules would have had no purpose in including
Rule 8(b) unless they intended that violations of the rule would require automatic reversal.
Id. See also 8 Moore's Federal Practice, § 8.04(2) (1965).
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In rejecting Professor Wright's argument that misjoinder under
Rule 8(b) can never be harmless error, the Seidel court noted that his
reasoning ignores the possibility that misjoinder, though erroneous,
might simply be non-prejudicial." Since misjoinder may be non-pre-
judicial, the Fourth Circuit ruled that misjoinder could constitute harm-
less error.' The Fourth Circuit assumed for the purpose of argument
that the district court misjoined Seidel. Nevertheless, the court held
that Seidel's presumed misjoinder was harmless because all of the
evidence adduced at the joint trial would have been admissible against
Seidel in a separate trial.' To distinguish Ingram, the Fourth Circuit
stated that the government in Ingram introduced evidence at the joint
trial which would have been clearly prejudicial and inadmissible had the
government tried the misjoined defendants separately. 4 In addition, the
court stated that the Ingram court erroneously construed Rule 52(a) as
applying only to "technical errors."'
The Seidel court's reasoning is consistent in some respects with
Supreme Court precedent. The Fourth Circuit's rejection of Professor
Wright's contention that misjoinder requires automatic reversal is con-
sistent with Supreme Court doctrine that error even of constitutional
21 620 F.2d at 1014-15. The Fourth Circuit conceded that trial judges have no discretion
under Rule 14 to deny motions for severance when defendants are misjoined under Rule
8(b), and that failure to sever constitutes error. Id. Although conceding that such refusal to
sever constitutes error, the court nevertheless reasoned that such error need not result in
reversal if the error did not prejudice the defendant's case. Id.
620 F.2d at 1014-15.
2 620 F.2d at 1011. The Fourth Circuit explained that the government's direct
evidence concerning the August offense provided strong circumstantial evidence that
Kaplan was also involved in the June offense. Id. If the jury added the circumstantial
evidence to the other evidence linking Seidel with Kaplan, the prosecution would have a
strong case against Seidel in connection with the June offenses according to the court. Id.
Because evidence concerning the August offense helped to connect Seidel with the June of-
fense, the court concluded that the evidence would have been admissible against Seidel
even if he were tried alone, and therefore was non-prejudicial. Id.
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 states, as a general rule, that all relevant evidence is ad-
missible. FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule of evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence
which tends to prove or disprove a defendant's guilt. FED. R. EVID. 401. The evidence of-
fered against Kaplan in connection with the August offenses was therefore admissible
against Seidel alone, given that the prosecution could not prove Seidel's guilt without first
proving Kaplan's connection with the August offense. See 620 F.2d at 1011. Rule of
Evidence 403 provides that evidence should be excluded if its probative value is outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of issues. FED. R. EVID. 403. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 403 states, however, that prejudice may be overcome by an effec-
tive limiting instruction to the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Since the trial judge clearly in-
structed Seidel's jury that Seidel was in no way connected with the August offense, the
evidence of the August offense would probably have been admissible against Seidel alone as
proof of the June offense. See 620 F.2d at 1008.
' See note 16 supra. Since the evidence offered against one set of defendants in In-
gram was not relevant to the charge against the other defendants, it was patently pre-
judicial and inadmissible. See note 23 supra.
" 620 F.2d at 1012-13; see note 6 supra.
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magnitude requires reversal only when it prejudices the defendant's
substantial rights." Professor Wright's argument wrongly assumes that
misjoinder under Rule 8(b) may never be harmless. Because the govern-
ment introduced no evidence in Seidel's joint trial which was irrelevant
to the question of Seidel's guilt, the Fourth Circuit's assertion that the
trial judge heard no inadmissible evidence is consistent with the
Supreme Court's Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which states generally
that all relevant evidence is admissible.'
The Seidel court's conclusion that the Ingram court misconstrued
the scope of Rule 52(a) does not have substantial support. The only basis
for this conclusion is the Ingram court's statement that the misjoinder at
issue "was no mere technicality."' On its face, this statement may mean
only that the Ingram court did not regard the misjoinder as harmless er-
ror under Rule 52(a), and not necessarily that the court regarded Rule
52(a) as applying only to technical errors. Whether or not the Ingram
court misconstrued the scope of Rule 52(a), however, the Seidel court is
clearly correct that Rule 52(a) does not restrict harmless errors to
technical judicial mistakes.'
The Seidel court's "same evidence" test for determining when mis-
joinder constitutes harmless error is inadequate. Although the test ef-
fectively prevents misjoined defendants from suffering convictions on
inadmissible evidence, the test fails to account for the possibility that a
misjoined defendant may suffer prejudice by the mere demeanor of his
codefendant. The Supreme Court has recognized that a party's de-
meanor at trial plays a critical part in the jury's deliberation.' The
Court also has recognized the danger that a jury may unfairly transfer
guilt in cases of misjoinder.3 1
' See note 6 supra. Although the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that errors
even of constitutional magnitude may be harmless, the courts are not in agreement over the
proper standard for determining when an error was harmless. See generally Saltzburg, The
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973) (harmless error tests should be related
to standards of proof at trial).
Federal Rule of Evidence 402; see note 23 supra.
272 F.2d at 570.
See note 6 supra.
See Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 6 (1961) (witness taking stand necessarily
puts genuineness of demeanor into issue). The behavior of codefendant's counsel may also
prejudice a misjoined defendant. See 8 Moore's Federal Practice, § 8.04(2) n.12 (1965). But
see United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1974) (misjoined defendant argued unsuc-
cessfully that behavior of codefendant's counsel prejudiced case).
"' See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946). In Kotteaskos petitioner
and several other defendants were misjoined and tried for a single general conspiracy to
violate the National Housing Act. Id. at 752. The government admitted, however, that the
defendants had participated in eight or more distinct conspiracies. Id. The Court found that
the admission of evidence concerning those conspiracies in which the petitioner did not par-
ticipate prejudiced him. Id. at 771. The Court also found that the mere presence of the mis-
joined codefendants exposed petitioner to prejudice. Id. at 774; see note 32 infra.
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Two circuit courts have recognized the danger that juries may
transfer guilt where a defendant is misjoined with a codefendant charged
separately for an identical offense performed at a later date. " These
courts have specifically considered the situation in which the evidence
adduced at the joint trial would have been admissible against the mis-
joined defendant in a separate trial. " Recognizing the "natural tendency
to infer guilt by association," courts have concluded that misjoinder
under Rule 8(b) requires automatic reversal.34 Even though Seidel was
not implicated in the August offense, the jury's "natural tendency" may
have been to permit the strength of the government's case against
Kaplan in connection with the August offense to have prejudiced
Seidel's defense to the charges stemming from the June incident.
In general, the circuit courts are using misjoinder less frequently as
a basis for reversing trial court opinions." SoA'e circuits are finding
fewer misjoinders under Rule 8(b).38 Other courts are in agreement with
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and have found that misjoinder of defend-
ants may constitute harmless error if the misjoined defendant has en-
countered no prejudicial evidence from misjoinder.1 A few circuit courts
are still in agreement with Professor Wright that the legislature in-
tended misjoinder under Rule 8(b) to require automatic reversal.'
See United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1974); King v. United States, 355
F.2d 700 (st Cir. 1966). In Bova, the government charged Bova and his codefendant with
the unlawful possession and distribution of heroin on August 31, 1972. In the same trial, the
government also charged Bova with unlawful possession and distribution of heroin on or
about September 8, 1972. 493 F.2d at 33.
In King, the government jointly charged King and his codefendant on two counts of
unlawfully transferring narcotics on July 14, 1964. In the same trial, the government charged
the codefendant with two more counts of unlawfully transferring narcotics, once on June 18,
1964, and once on August 10, 1964. 355 F.2d at 702.
1 493 F.2d at 36; 355 F.2d at 704.
4 493 F.2d at 36; 355 F.2d at 704.
See notes 36 and 37 infra.
See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, 495 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Roell, 487 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1973). Although the Fifth and Eighth Circuits found that mis-
joinder under Rule 8(b) requires per se reversal, both courts have given a very broad con-
struction to the phrase "series of acts or transactions" in that Rule. See 495 F.2d at 630; 487
F.2d at 402. See also note 3 supra. The practical effect of the broad construction is that the
courts are more likely to find that defendants participated in the same series of acts or
transactions, and are therefore less likely to find that misjoinder has occurred.
-" See United States v. Turbide, 558 F.2d 1053,1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934
(1977); United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1977); Baker v. United States, 401
F.2d 958, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). The Turbide, Martin and
Baker courts all stated that misjoinder need not require automatic reversal if the defendant
has encountered no prejudicial evidence therefrom. 558 F.2d at 1061; 567 F.2d at 854; 401
F.2d at 973-74.
" See United States v. Graci, 504 F.2d 411, 413-14 (3rd Cir. 1974); King v. United
States, 355 F.2d 700, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1966). The First and Third Circuits have both stated
that misjoinder under Rule 8(b) requires automatic reversal because the Rule sets the
statutory limits beyond which the legislature considers joinder inherently prejudicial. Id.
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The trend against using misjoinder as a basis for reversal presents
no danger to joined defendants, so long as the courts can accurately
determine when misjoinder results in prejudice. In determining whether
misjoinder has prejudiced a defendant's substantial rights, the Seidel
court's approach is insufficient. Before an appellate court can conclude
that a misjoinder constituted "harmless error," it must find on a case by
case basis not only that a misjoined defendant encountered no inadmissi-
ble evidence, but also that he suffered no prejudice from his codefend-
ant's demeanor.
RICHARD J. KAHN
C. The Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus Review to State
Prisoners: The Effect of the Cause and Prejudice Test
Federal courts are authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus to
prisoners in state custody upon a finding that the prisoners' constitu-
tional rights have been violated.1 Federal habeas corpus relief is normally
granted upon a showing that a state court failed to acknowledge a de-
fendant's constitutional rights during trial.2 Traditionally, a state
prisoner was barred from federal habeas review if he had failed to comply
with state procedural requirements for direct review of his claim. The
Warren Court, however, gradually broadened the availability of federal
habeas review to state prisoners.
Beginning in 1953, the Court began the development of the deliber-
ate by-pass standard as announced in Fay v. Noia.4 Under the Fay stand-
ard, a state prisoner was permitted to obtain federal habeas corpus
review of his constitutional claim if he had not deliberately by-passed
any of the available state remedies.' If the defendant met the broad
The Seventh Circuit has held similarly to the First and Third Circuits. See United States v.
Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1967). More recent dicta, however, indicate that the
Seventh Circuit may be abandoning this precedent. See United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d
735, 747 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally Harmless Error, note 3 supra.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1976).
2 See Developments In The Law-Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1040 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Habeas Corpus]. Defendants convicted in state court frequently prefer
a federal forum in a collateral proceeding because federal court insures a more uniform ap-
plication of constitutional principles. Id
' Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1050, 1050 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hill]; see Ex Parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660-61
(1913).
372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
Id. In Fay, respondent sought federal habeas review on the ground that his convic-
tion in state court had been vitiated by the introduction of evidence obtained from a coerced
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criteria of the Fay standard, the federal courts were required to pass on
the validity of the state prisoner's claim.6 Recent cases, however, in-
dicate that the Court is becoming more reluctant to grant habeas corpus
review to state prisoners.7
The Burger Court has introduced a new test for determining the
availability of federal habeas corpus in response to the problems caused
by the breadth of the Fay standard.' The new standard was applied in
Wainwright v. Sykes and is referred to as the cause and prejudice test.'
confession. Id. at 395-96. Respondent failed to appeal his conviction and, thus, was not eligi-
ble to seek collateral relief in state court. Id. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the
doctrine under which state procedural defaults constitute an adequate and independent
state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review does not limit the power granted the
federal courts under the federal habeas corpus statute. Id. at 399. The Court then held that
if a prisoner exhausts state remedies available to him at the time federal relief is sought,
and has not deliberately by-passed state procedures available for seeking review of his
claim, he should not be denied federal habeas corpus review. Id. at 435-36. In Fay, the Court
defined deliberate by-pass as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Id. at 439; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also
Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 497-98 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Spritzer].
5 Spritzer, supra note 5, at 499. The Warren Court recognized that Fay could have a
drastic effect on judicial resources by expanding the availability of federal habeas corpus
review. Id. at 497. However, the Court deemed the opportunity for resolution of constitu-
tional claims in a federal forum more important than the preservation of judicial resources
and the finality of state court decisions. Id. at 499-500.
1 Id. at 500; see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 542 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 245 (1973).
" See note 6 supra. The deliberate by-pass or Fay standard required the courts to
determine whether or not the prisoner's procedural default had been defense counsel's
deliberate strategy and whether the prisoner had participated in defense counsel's decision
to waive the prisoner's constitutional rights. Comment, Habeas Corpus: The Sixth Circuit
Interprets the Cause and Prejudice Test of Wainwright v. Sykes, 48 U. CINN. L. REv. 862,
864 n.11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Sixth Circuit]; see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
312-318 (1963) (fact finding in federal habeas corpus proceeding requires evidentiary hear-
ing).
, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); see Michael, The "New Federalism" and the Burger Court's
Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IOWA L. REv. 233, 267 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Michael]. The cause and prejudice test of Sykes originated in two
Supreme Court cases, Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) and Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976).
In Davis, a federal prisoner raised a challenge to his grand jury indictments for the
first time on federal habeas corpus review. 411 U.S. at 235. Davis failed, however, to comply
with the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, which required that a challenge be made
before trial. FED. R. CRmZ. P. 12(b)(2). The Davis court held failure to comply with Rule
12(b)(2) precluded his obtaining federal habeas corpus review unless he could show cause for
his noncompliance. Id. at 242. See The Sixth Circui4 supra note 8, at 864. The Court
developed the cause requirement from the language of Rule 12(b)(2). Id. at 864. Rule 12(b)(2)
states that failure to make timely objection to jury instructions constitutes a waiver of the
petitioner's right to objection. FED. R. CIaM. P. 12(b)(2).
In Francis, a state prisoner failed to make timely objection to the composition of his
grand jury, and raised the objection for the first time on federal habeas corpus review. 425
U.S. at 537-38. The Court in Francis extended the cause rule formulated in Davis to include
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The Sykes test provides that a state prisoner who has failed to comply
with state procedure for direct review of his constitutional claim is barred
from asserting the claim on federal habeas corpus, absent a showing of
cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice resulting therefrom."
Since the Court has failed to define specifically the terms and application
of the Sykes standard, the lower courts have attempted to determine
when a state prisoner may be precluded from federal habeas corpus
review." Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit, in Cole v. Stevenson," focused
on whether an independent state procedural ground bars consideration
of a subsequent but retroactively cognizable constitutional claim on
federal habeas corpus review. 3
In Cole, the petitioner, James Lewis Cole, was convicted in a North
Carolina state court of second degree murder." During Cole's prosecu-
tion and direct appeal, defense counsel failed to object to jury instruc-
tions given in Cole's trial. 5 Cole appealed his conviction on other
grounds and his conviction was affirmed. 8 Cole's subsequent petition for
collateral relief in state court was also denied. Cole did not appeal from
this denial. 7 Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Mullaney v.
Wilbur 8 and held that jury instructions containing presumptions that
shift the burden of proof to a defendant are unconstitutional. 9 After the
state prisoners. Id at 542. The Court held that in order for the petitioner to gain federal
habeas corpus review of his claim, he must show cause for failing to make timely objection
in state court, and actual prejudice resulting from the forclosure of other remedies. Id
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977), the Court announced that the cause
and prejudice standard developed in Francis was not limited to cases challenging grand
jury composition or indictment. Id.; see The Sixth Circuit, supra note 8, at 865. In Sykes,
the prisioner was convicted of murder in a Florida state court on the basis of his confession.
433 U.S. at 74. The prisoner's incriminating statements were admitted at trial without ob-
jection by defense counsel. Id. at 75. While the Fifth Circuit granted the prisoner's petition
for federal habeas corpus review, the Supreme Court reversed and denied federal review of
his claim. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 528 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977). The
Court ruled that the petitioner's failure to comply with Florida's contemporaneous objection
rule barred federal habeas corpus review of his claim. Id at 90-91. The Court noted, how-
ever, that the prisoner could gain federal habeas review upon a showing of cause and pre-
judice. 433 U.S. at 87.
Id.; see The Sixth Circuit, supra note 8, at 862.
1 Spritzer, supra note 5, at 508. The Sykes Court asserted that the cause and pre-
judice test was narrower than the Fay standard. 433 U.S. at 87. The Sykes Court did not
specifically overrule Fay; see id. at 87-88. The Court asserted, however, that it had express-
ly rejected the sweeping language of Fay which made federal habeas corpus review general-
ly available to state prisoners absent deliberate by-pass of state remedies. Id
12 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1059.
" State v. Cole, 280 N.C. 398, 401, 185 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1972).
11 620 F.2d at 1057.
18 State v. Cole, 280 N.C. 398, 403, 185 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1972).
17 620 F.2d at 1057.
16 421 U.S. 684, 703-704 (1972).
1, Id. at 703-704.
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Supreme Court's decision in Hankerson v. North Carolina,° establishing
the retroactivity of Mullaney, Cole filed a petition seeking habeas corpus
relief in state court.21 Cole argued that the jury instructions at his trial
were constitutionally invalid under Hankerson.' Cole's petition for relief
in state court was denied.' The court refused to grant the petition on
the ground that Cole failed to raise the issue of his jury instructions in
his previous state trials and, therefore, the claim could not be ad-
judicated for the first time in a post-conviction hearing.2
Cole then sought and received habeas corpus relief in federal district
court.' The district court reasoned that Cole should not be barred from
federal habeas corpus review under the Sykes standard because Sykes
was not applicable to the facts in Cole." In the alternative, the court held
that even if the Sykes standard were applicable to Cole, the petitioner
had met the cause and prejudice exceptions and, therefore, should not be
barred from asserting his claim for federal habeas corpus relief."
432 U.S. 233, 240-44 (1977). In Hankerson, the petitioner argued that the jury in-
structions at trial improperly required him to carry the burden of proof with respect to self-
defense. Id. at 238. The North Carolina Supreme Court argued that the instructions had
violated the rule of Mullaney but declined to reverse Hankerson's conviction. Id. at 239. The
North Carolina court concluded that Mullaney was inapplicable to Hankerson because the
rule announced in Mullaney was handed down after the conclusion of Hankerson's state
trial. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Hankerson's petition to decide whether
Mullaney should be applied retroactively. 429 U.S. 815 (1976); 432 U.S. at 240. The Court
held that the North Carolina Supreme Court erred in declining to hold Mullaney retroac-
tive. The Court recognized that in deciding whether a new constitutional rule should be ap-
plied retroactively, the potential impact on the administration of justice may be considered.
Id. at 243. The Court also recognized that North Carolina was concerned about the impact of
Hankerson on judicial resources in the state. Id The Court concluded, however, that when a
new constitutional rule is introduced to overcome an existing rule which has substantially
impaired the truth finding function of the courts, the new rule should be given full retroac-
tive effect. Id. at 204. The Court held that the Mullaney rule overcame an existing rule
which substantially impaired the truth finding function and should be applied retroactively.
Id. at 244.
" 620 F.2d at 1057.
2 Id.
2 Id.
24 Id. The state court relied on the North Carolina Post Conviction Hearing Act. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (repealed 1979; see State v. White, 274 N.C. 220, 228, 162 S.E.2d 473,
480 (1968). In White, the court held that errors in petitioner's trial which could have been
reviewed on appeal could not be asserted for the first time in post-conviction proceedings.
Id. at 480. Because Cole failed to preserve the issue of his jury instructions for appeal, the
court reasoned that he could not raise them for the first time in a collateral proceeding
under § 15-217. Id.; Cole v. Stevenson, 447 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (E.D.N.C. 1978); see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-217 (repealed 1979).
" 620 F.2d at 1058.
447 F. Supp. at 1272.
" Id. at 1272-73. The district court relied on Hankerson v. North Carolina to hold that
the Mullaney issue was raised properly in Cole's case. Id at 1271. The court asserted that
the Sykes standard did not apply to Cole's federal habeas petition. Id at 1271-72. The court
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The Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
held Cole was barred from seeking federal habeas corpus review.' The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Cole's failure to preserve his objection
precluded any collateral review of his federal claim.' The court ruled
that Cole was forclosed from seeking federal habeas corpus review on
the grounds introduced in footnote eight of the Hankerson opinion. 0 In
footnote eight, the Hankerson Court explained that states which
recognized burden-shifting presumptions could insulate convictions by
reasoned that the Sykes test applied only to cases involving a contemporaneous objection
rule. Id. at 1272. The court noted that North Carolina had a qualified contemporaneous ob-
jection rule, citing N.C. App. R. 10(a). Id. The court asserted that under Rule 10, a defendant
did not have to object to jury instructions at trial if the instructions were presumptively
prejudicial. Id at 1272; see N.C. App. R. 10(a). See State v. Johnson, 227 N.C. 587 589, 42
S.E.2d 685, 686, (1947); State v. Gause, 227 N.C. 26, 30, 40 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1946). The district
court also stated that in the event that the Sykes standards was applicable, Cole had met
the cause and prejudice exceptions to the standard. 447 F. Supp. at 1273. The court reason-
ed that North Carolina case law was so firmly established against sustaining objections to
such jury instructions that most lawyers did not object to them. Id. at 1273. The court ruled
that if the bench and bar did not perceive Cole's present constitutional claim at the time of
Cole's trial, Cole had established sufficient cause for the procedural default. Id. The court
also determined that Cole had met the prejudice exception. Id- at 1274. The court reasoned
that Cole was prejudiced because he had the burden of proving self-defense in his trial. Id
' 620 F.2d at 1063. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court misjudged the pro-
cedural default in Cole and, therefore, erred in asserting that the Sykes standard was inap-
plicable to Cole. Id. at 1058. The Fourth Circuit found error in the district court's finding
that the only procedural default in Cole was the petitioner's failure to exhaust his state
remedies. I& Cole had not appealed from his original denial of post-conviction relief in state
court and, therefore, had not exhausted his state remedies. Id. The Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed that the procedural default at issue was Cole's failure to preserve for appeal his objection
to the jury instructions. Id. at 1059. The Fourth Circuit held that even if Cole's failure to ex-
haust state remedies was excusable, the Sykes test was still applicable to bar federal
habeas corpus review of Cole's constitutional claim. Id at 1059. See text accompanying note
17 supra.
. 620 F.2d at 1058-59. The Fourth Circuit described Cole's procedural failure as two
fold. Id. at 1058. Cole was denied post-conviction relief because he had not presented the
issue on direct appeal. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (repealed 1979), note 24 supra. Even
if Cole had attempted to present the issue for the first time on direct appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated his attempt would have been futile. 620 F.2d at 1059. The court reasoned that
Cole was forclosed from presenting his claim on appeal by failing to comply with North
Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a) and (b). Id; see N.C. App. R. 10. The court con-
cluded that Cole's procedural default was an adequate and independent state ground to bar
direct review of his claim. 620 F.2d at 1059. The Fourth Circuit held, under the Sykes stan-
dard, that an adequate and independent state ground precluded federal habeas corpus
review of Cole's claim. Id. at 1063.
' Id. In footnote eight, the Court asserts that the effect of Mullaney's retroactivity on
the administration of justice in North Carolina would not be as severe as the state contended.
Id. at 244 n.8. The Court stated that if the validity of burden-shifting presumptions had been
as well settled as North Carolina claimed, many defense attorneys would not have objected
to such jury instructions before Mullaney. Id. The Court asserted, therefore, that states
recognizing burden-shifting presumptions could insulate past convictions by enforcing the
normal and valid rule that failure to object to jury instructions constitutes a waiver of any
claim of error. Id.
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enforcing the normal and valid rule that a defendant's failure to object to
jury instructions at trial constitutes a waiver of any claim of error." The
Fourth Circuit asserted that the Hankerson Court intended footnote
eight to protect the states from the necessity of retrying numerous
prisoners following the retroactive application of Mullaney.32 The Fourth
Circuit recognized that the states could not avoid a "flood of new trials"
if the standard of review were based on the broad criteria of Fay.s
Therefore, the court ruled that the Sykes test was applicable to situa-
tions such as found in Cole.' The Fourth Circuit maintained that the pro-
tection of state judicial resources was a vital concern of the Hankerson
Court.3 5 Thus, the court explained that the protection provided in foot-
note eight, in conjunction with the Sykes standard, would insulate past
convictions and protect the judicial resources of North Carolina.36
To support the application of Sykes, the court reasoned that the
Supreme Court's introduction of the Sykes test had limited the effect of
the Fay standard.3 7 Although recognizing that the Supreme Court had
not expressly replaced the Fay standard with the Sykes test, the Fourth
Circuit held that the new standard was applicable to the facts in Cole.8
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit ruled that in view of Cole's non-
compliance with North Carolina's appellate requirements, he was barred
from asserting his constitutional claim on federal habeas corpus under
the Sykes standard. The court maintained that Cole could avoid the re-
quirements of the Sykes standard by showing cause for his procedural
default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom. 9 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that Cole had failed to show cause for his procedural default
and, therefore, was precluded from seeking collateral review of his
claim."0
31 432 U.S. at 244 n.8.
Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that the Hankerson Court was aware of the possible
strain on judicial economy in the wake of its decision. 620 F.2d at 1060. As a result, the
Fourth Circuit asserted that the last sentence of Hankerson's footnote eight provided a
means for states such as North Carolina to insulate past convictions from retrial on
Mullaney-Hankerson grounds. Id.; see 432 U.S. at 244 n.8.
620 F.2d at 1061.
Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that if the Sykes standard did not apply in cases
similar to Cole, the protection from numerous retrials on Mullaney-Hankerson grounds pro-
vided by footnote eight would be nugatory. Id. The Court noted that the Fay standard,
unlike the Sykes test, would permit federal habeas review of a petitioner's claim despite
some unintentional procedural defaults. Id. see note 5 supra.
See note 32 supra.
620 F.2d at 1060.
Id. at 1059.
Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected Cole's argument that the Sykes test was confined to
the facts of the Sykes case. Id. at 1061-62. The court asserted that Hankerson was decided
six days before Sykes and concluded that the Court must have decided Hankerson in view
of Sykes. Id. at 1062.
620 F.2d at 1063.
,o Id. at 1062-63. The Fourth Circuit held that Cole failed to show cause for not comply-
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Cole reflects the Fourth Circuit's intention to support the finality of
state court judgements and to preserve the administration of justice in
North Carolina."' The Cole court interpreted Hankerson's footnote eight
as reflecting the Supreme Court's intention to reduce the burden of new
trials caused by the retroactive application of Mullaney.2 Although the
meaning of footnote eight has not been clearly established,4" the Fourth
ing with state procedural requirements. Id. The court reasoned that the change of law an-
nounced in Mullaney was not sufficient cause for Cole's procedural default. Id. at 1063. In
reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that the change of law announced in Mullaney
was not sufficient cause for Cole's noncompliance with state procedure. Id. at 1063. In
reaching its conclusions, the Court determined the Cole had not cited any authority to the
effect that a subsequent change of law was cause to excuse a procedural default. Id. Since
Cole had failed to show cause, the Fourth Circuit determined that it was unnecessary to
reach the prejudice issue. Id.; see Hill, supra note 3, at 1060-62, 1088-96. The Supreme Court
has not defined cause. Id. at 1060. The Court has determined, however, that cause in habeas
corpus proceedings will not be found where there is sufficient evidence that the procedural
default was deliberate on the part of counsel. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89
(1977). Cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S 501, 514 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (cause not
found if procedural default may be interpreted as deliberate tactical choice).
The Court has stated that the trial should be the main event and that subsequent col-
lateral review should have the narrow function of preventing a miscarriage of justice. 433
U.S. at 91; Hill, supra note 3, at 1062. The Court has recognized that while a trial judge has
broad discretionary power to permit a petitioner to raise a belated constitutional claim at
trial, judges adjudicating a petitioner's claim seeking collateral relief have limited discre-
tionary authority to disregard a petitioner's procedural default. Id. Thus, the Court has in-
dicated that cause must be defined narrowly when a petitioner alleges it as a ground for
relief from his procedural default in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id.; see Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
The Sykes standard not only requires a showing of cause, but also requires a showing
of actual prejudice. 433 U.S. at 87; Hill, supra note 3, at 1088. The reference to prejudice is
derived from Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 363 (1963). In Shotwell, the
Court held that in addition to requiring a showing of cause to excuse a procedural default,
courts should determine whether petitioner was prejudiced by the loss of the alleged con-
stitutional right. Id. at 363; see Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 245 (1973). In Davis,
the Court held that the petitioner was presumed to have been prejudiced by the loss of a
constitutional right. Id. at 245. Despite such a presumption, the Court maintained that the
petitioner must show prejudice to obtain relief from his precedural default. Id.
"3 See note 32 supra. The Fourth Circuit stated that the effect of a retroactive applica-
tion of a rule of law on the administration of justice was a proper concern for the court. 620
F.2d at 1060; see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1965).
42 See note 32 supra.
'3 620 F.2d at 1068 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit asserted that the
procedural bar recognized in footnote eight of Hankerson is vital to the preservation of
judicial resources in North Carolina, since numerous new trials on Mullaney grounds would
burden the state court system. Id. at 1062. The court reasoned that footnote eight was "part
and parcel" of Hankerson. Id.; see Graham v. State of Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 645-47
(D. Md. 1969). In Graham, the petitioner was convicted of murder in 1970. 454 F. Supp. at.
645. Graham claimed that he was forced to prove the validity of his alibi defense in violation
of the retroactive application of Mullaney. Id. The district court recognized the Fourth Cir-
cuit's reliance on Hankerson's footnote eight. Id. The court, however, upheld the Maryland'
practice of treating burden-shifting presumptions as error, even though the trial in question
predated the decision in Mullaney. Id. The court ruled, therefore, that petitioner's failure to
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Circuit asserted that footnote eight was dispositive of the issue of
whether the Sykes standard applied to Cole."
In reaching its decision in Cole, the Fourth Circuit relied primarily
on the language in footnote eight which states that a defendant's failure
to timely object may constitute a waiver of any claim of error. 5 The
district court had asserted, in contrast, that Hankerson's footnote eight
should not bar federal habeas corpus review in cases such as Cole."
Under North Carolina law, Cole did not waive his claim of error by fail-
ing to make timely objection to the jury instructions at his trial. The
state's appellate rules permitted a petitioner to raise an objection to
jury instructions for the first time on appeal, if the jury instructions
were incorrect as a matter of law. 7 Thus, the type of procedural rule
object to jury instruction was not a waiver of the petitioner's claim of error. Id. Further, the
district court found that the Fourth Circuit's treatment of Hankerson's footnote eight did
not apply to petitioner's case. Id. See also Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); Robertson v. Warden, 466 F. Supp. 643, 645-47 (D. Md.
1978).
In Berrier, the petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief on grounds identical to
those in Cole except that petitioner's trial was conducted under Michigan's contem-
poraneous objection rule. 583 F.2d at 522; see 620 F.2d at 1056. The Sixth Circuit rejected
the state's argument that the Sykes standard should apply to bar review. Id. at 519-522. The
court held that the jury instructions at petitioner's trial violated his right to due process.
Moreover, the court maintained that defense counsel's failure to object to the jury instruc-
tions did not bar federal habeas review. Id. at 522. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the con-
stitutional error in Berrier directly affected the determination of petitioner's guilt or in-
nocence and, therefore, infected the fairness of the trial. Id. at 522. Thus, the court granted
petitioner habeas corpus relief. Id. But see 583 F.2d at 525 (6th Cir 1978) (Engle, J., dissen-
ting). Justice Engel asserted that Berrier's claim was barred under the Sykes test because
Berrier had not complied with Michigan's contemporaneous objection rule. Id. at 524-525.
Justice Engel stated that the Sykes test was applicable to the facts in Berrier, citing foot-
note eight in Hankerson v. North Carolina. Id. at 525. Hankerson's footnote eight asserts
that a state may insulate a past conviction by enforcing a valid rule that failure to object to
a jury instruction constitutes a waiver of any claim of error. Id. at 525. Justice Engel con-
cluded that since Berrier had failed to object to his jury instructions and had not shown
cause for his failure to object, he was barred from federal habeas review of his claim under
the Sykes test. Id. at 525.
In Robertson, the petitioner raised numerous claims of error for the first time in his
petition for federal habeas corpus, including a claim that the trial court had permitted jury
instructions retroactively invalidated by Mullaney and Hankerson. 466 F. Supp. at 264, 266.
Although the court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus on other grounds, the peti-
tioner's failure to make timely objection to jury instructions did not bar federal habeas
review. Id. Despite Maryland law holding failure to object to jury instructions at trial a
waiver of error, the district court asserted that the rule was not applicable to a pre-
Mullaney case. Id. The court reasoned that petitioner could not have been expected to an-
ticipate either Mullaney or Hankerson. Id.
" 620 ,F.2d at 1061.
'5 620 F.2d at 1061-62; see 432 U.S. 233, 244 n.8 (1977).
" See Cole v. Stevenson, 447 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
1, Id; see N.C. APP. R. 10(a). Rule 10(a) states that errors of law in jury instructions are
so prejudicial that a petitioner's objections to them may be raised for the first time on ap-.
peal. See id. Such an error is appealable, therefore, notwithstanding the defendant's failure
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discussed in footnote eight was simply not present in Cole.48 Further-
more, Cole sought review of a constitutional claim of error that was not
recognized until several years after his trial and conviction.49 Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit did not have a basis to conclude that Cole's
attorney should have objected to the jury instructions." In fact, Hanker-
son's footnote eight indicates that few attorneys at the time of Cole's
trial would have objected to the jury instructions.-"
In deciding Cole, the Fourth Circuit expressed concern about the ef-
fect of Hankerson on the administration of justice in the state 2 Footnote
eight, however, indicated that the Hankerson decision should not have a
devastating impact on the judicial resources of North Carolina.' Fur-
ther, the denial of an opportunity to have a claim adjudicated in federal
as well as state court is a severe penalty for a prisoner's unintentional
procedural default.5 4 Adherence to the Fourth Circuit's position,
therefore, may create an unduly harsh result in cases similar to Cole
where a petitioner's claim does not arise until after his trial and convic-
tion.
5
In addition to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of footnote eight,
the court's reliance on the Sykes standard is arguably improper. The
Sykes standard was developed for the purpose of protecting the efficacy
of state contemporaneous objection rules. 6 In Cole, however, such a rule
was not at issue since North Carolina has a very limited contem-
to make timely objection to the jury instructions during or immediately after trial. See note
46 supra.
' See Cole v. Stevenson, 447 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
"9 620 F.2d at 1068 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); Defense counsel's procedural default
may act as a waiver of petitioner's a claim of error. Spritzer, supra note 5, at 507-508. In
Cole, however, the claim of error was not recognized at the time of his trial. 620 F.2d at 1071
n.25 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The Mullaney decision, from which Cole's claim arose, was
announced eight months after Cole's appeal had been decided. Id.
620 F.2d at 1071 n.25 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
5' 432 U.S. at 244 n.8.
5 620 F.2d at 1060.
432 U.S. at 244 n.8.
See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy For State Prisoners, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 461, 278-79 (1960).
See 620 F.2d at 1071 n.25 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977). The Sykes Court reasoned that a
contemporaneous objection rule insures that the state trial will be the "main event." Id. at
90. Further, the Court asserted that a contemporaneous objection rule contributes to the
finality of criminal litigation in state court because the rule leads to exclusion of a claim that
could be asserted later on federal habeas. Id. at 88-89. In contrast, the Court stated that the
deliberate by-pass standard detracts from the finality of state judgments and circumvents
the purpose for which a state legislature promulgates a contemporaneous objection rule. Id.
at 90. Further, the court noted that the Fay standard permitted attorneys to "sandbag" con-
stitutional issues in state criminal trials. Id. at 89. The Court reasoned that counsel may
"take chances" on a guilty verdict in state court, aware that he may pursue federal habeas
corpus later if the initial "gamble" fails. Id.
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poraneous objection rule. 7 Although the Supreme Court limited the ef-
fect of the Fay standard when it introduced the Sykes test, the court did
not declare that the Sykes test should apply to all petitioners requesting
federal habeas corpus review." Furthermore, even if the application of
the Sykes standard is correct, the Fourth Circuit did not explain ade-
quately why Cole did not qualify under the standard's cause and pre-
judice exceptions. 9 Cole established cause on the ground that any objec-
tion to the jury instructions at the time of his trial would have been
futile.0 Before Mullaney and Hankerson, the instructions were clearly
valid.6 Thus, Cole was clearly prejudiced by having the burden of prov-
ing self-defense in his murder trial.2 Accordingly, Cole should have been
excused from the preclusive effect of the Sykes standard because he had
met the cause and prejudice exceptions.
In Cole v. Stevenson, the Fourth Circuit precluded review of a state
prisoner's constitutional claim in order to preserve judicial resources.
While the court was justifiably concerned with the effect of its decisions
on judicial economy, the efficiency of the judicial system should not take
priority over the opportunity of a prisoner to vindicate a constitutional
right. Although state prisoners should not be able to circumvent state
procedural requirements, the purpose of federal habeas corpus is to pre-
vent the miscarriage of justice.3 The effect of the Fourth Circuit's deci-
' See 447 F. Supp. at 1271; note 27 supra.
See 433 U.S. at 87; note 11 supra.
" See 620 F.2d at 1063. The Fourth Circuit asserted that the change of law introduced
in Mullaney and applied in Hankerson did not constitute cause for failing to comply with
state appellate procedures. Id. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit noted that Cole failed to
cite any authority to support his contention. Id.
I See Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 648 (D. Md. 1978). In Graham, the court
defined cause as a reasonable and valid explanation for a procedural default other than
counsel's tactical decision to forego an available means of redress. Id. at 648. See note 40
supra.
" See 432 U.S. at 239.
" See Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979);
Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643, 648 (D. Md. 1978). In Wynn, the Fourth Circuit
asserted that any error in instructing the jury concerning self-defense is necessarily pre-
judicial. Id. at 450.
In Graham, the court asserted that prejudice involves "actual and substantial detri-
ment, bearing on the fairness of the trial." Id. at 648; see note 40 supra; Goodman & Sallett,
Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Courts Respond, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1683, 1694-1707 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Goodman and Sallett].
I See Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
The Sixth Circuit held in Berrier that failure to timely object should not bar federal habeas
review if the underlying constitutional error is so prejudicial as to infect the fairness of the
trial. Id. at 522; see Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 202-204 (6th Cir. 1978). In
Bordenkircher, the Sixth Circuit granted federal habeas review to a state prisoner con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 200. During the trial, the prosecution had made
comments in violation of the petitioner's fifth amendment rights. However, defense counsel
defaulted under Kentucky's contemporaneous objection rule. Id. at 203. The Sixth Circuit
held that the habeas corpus claim should not be barred, despite counsel's procedural default.
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sion in Cole, however, is to limit the scope of federal habeas corpus
review. Nevertheless, Cole is in accord with recent Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the availability of federal habeas corpus relief.64
H. ANDERSON BERRY III
D. Emergency Search and Third Party Consent Search Doctrines
The fourth amendment guarantees the right of every individual to
be free from unreasonable government invasions of personal liberty and
private property.1 Evidence that is the product of an unreasonable
search or seizure must be excluded at trial.2 The reasonableness of a
search or seizure must be determined, whenever practicable, by a
neutral and detached magistrate.' Magistrates may issue search war-
Id. at 204. The court reasoned that the petitioner had satisfied the Sykes cause and pre-
judice exceptions. Id. In the alternative, the court stated that the claim should be valid on
the ground that the error infected the fairness of the trial. (See Berrier) Id; see Goodman and
Sallett, supra note 62, at 1689. Most lower federal courts have expressly adopted the Sykes
standard, and many have adhered to a strict interpretation of cause and prejudice. Id. at
1689-90 n.35. The majority of lower courts apply the Fay standard whenever the petitioner
failed to effect a direct appeal. Id. Sykes is applied, however, when the petitioner failed to
appeal the specific issues later raised in the habeas proceedings. Id. See, e.g., Boyer v. Pat-
ton, 759 F.2d 284, 286 (3d Cir. 1978); Ennis v. LeFevre, 560 F.2d 1070, 1075-76 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978).
See Michael, supra note 9, at 233-34 & 272-73.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
561, 565 (1976) (fourth amendment protects sanctity of private dwellings); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,367 (1976) (fourth amendment protects against unreasonable searches
of automobiles); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (fourth amendment protects
against unreasonable invasions of business premises).
2 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence obtained from unconstitutional
search and seizure excluded from state criminal prosecution); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence obtained from unconstitutional search and seizure excluded
from federal criminal prosecution). The exclusionary rule serves two purpose. First, the rule
preserves judicial integrity by preventing convictions based on illegally obtained evidence.
367 U.S. at 654. Second, the rule deters unlawful conduct by law enforcement officials. Id. at
657.
One critic of the exclusionary rule has suggested that the rule should not apply when
the officers that obtained the evidence had a reasonable and good-faith belief that their con-
duct was lawful. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has continued to apply the exclusionary rule without modifica-
tion. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (confession suppressed even though
22 states filed amicus curiae briefs arguing for abolition of exclusionary rule). See generally
Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test. A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10
GA. L. REV. 1 (1975); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027
(1974).
1 See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 (1971); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1970). A magistrate must 'determine from the
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rants only upon a policeman's showing that there is probable cause to
believe that an object sought is within the place to be searched.' A war-
rantless search is presumptively unreasonable,' subject only to a few
narrow and well-delineated exceptions.'
One exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement is an
emergency search.7 The emergency search doctrine permits a law en-
forcement officer to enter private premises without either a search war-
rant or an arrest warrant, to preserve life or to render first aid and
assistance.8 The warrantless search must be strictly limited in scope to
the emergency which justified its initiation." An officer may not enter
private premises with a predetermined intent to search or arrest.10 He
evidence presented to him by the officer seeking a warrant whether there is probable cause
to believe that the object sought is in the place to be searched. See 362 U.S. at 267-68; FED.
R. CRib. P. 41(a).
' See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 23 (1925).
' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment's reasonableness stand-
ard has varied over the years. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court
determined that the requirement that warrantless searches be reasonable was the focal
point of the amendment. Id. at 63-66. The Rabinowitz Court stated that the reasonableness
of a search must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 63. Ac-
cording to Rabinowitz, courts should consider whether the search was incident to a lawful
arrest, whether the place searched was under the defendant's control, and whether the
place searched was a public place. Id. at 63-64. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),
the Supreme Court overruled Rabinowitz and stated that the reasonableness of a search
depended on whether officers obtained a search warrant. Id. at 768. Chimel held that a war-
rantless search incident to a lawful arrest could extend only to the arrestee's person and the
area within his immediate reach. Id. at 763.
' E.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (hot pursuit); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433 (1973) (inventory search); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (con-
sent search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest). See
generally W. Ringle, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions 202-05 (1972).
1 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (acknowledging right of
police to make warrantless entries and searches in emergency situations); Root v. Gauper,
438 F.2d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1971) (sheriff's warrantless entry into home after victim
removed not justified under "emergency doctrine"); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543,
545 (2d Cir. 1964) (police authorized to make warrantless entry of premises upon hearing
screams in dead of night).
a See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (dictum); Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure and
the Fourth Amendment, 43 FORD. L. REV. 571, 584 n.102 (1975).
Courts have used the emergency doctrine to sanction warrantless entries for purposes
other than administering first aid or assistance. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
509 (1978) (inspection to determine cause of fire); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770
(1966) (imminent destruction of evidence); United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273, 1274 (6th
Cir. 1973) (protection of premises against felony in progress).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968); text accompanying notes 10, 12-14 infra.
,0 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (emergency doctrine did not
permit police to return to house in which murder occurred with intent to conduct war-
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must have reason to believe that immediate action is urgently needed
and that there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant.1 Once the officer
has entered, he may not conduct a general search of the premises,12 but
is limited to seizure of articles in plain view which he believes to be
evidence of a crime."3 If exigent circumstances cease to exist the officer
may not engage in further search and seizure activity until he obtains a
warrant."'
Consent searches are another exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. A warrantless search conducted pursuant to the
searched individual's consent is valid under the theory that an individual
may waive his fourth amendment rights."6 A warrantless search may
also be valid if based on the consent of a third party. 7 The Supreme
Court formulated guidelines to determine when a third party consent
rantless search for evidence); United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132, 1334 (8th Cir.), cerL
denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977) (emergency doctrine did not permit evidence technicians to enter
defendant's house with predetermined intent to conduct warrantless search).
"I See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1979) (emergency
search doctrine did not permit officers to conduct warrantless general search of home after
fire was contained); United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 1977) (emergency
search doctrine did not permit general search of house after defendant was arrested and
house secured).
" See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (dictum); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (fireman properly inside burning building could lawfully seize evidence
of arson in plain view); note 51 supra.
" E.g., United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 1977) (search warrant re-
quired after officers had arrested defendant and secured his home); Sample v. Eyman, 469
F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1972) (search warrant required after police had arrested defendant
and taken him to station); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1971) (search warrant
required after police had removed shooting victim from premises).
" E.g., Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 330 U.S.
800 (1947); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946). The government may rely upon a
defendant's voluntary consent to a search of his personal property. 328 U.S. at 628. The
government may persuade, but may not coerce the defendant to consent to a search. See
328 U.S. at 593. The government may rely upon a defendant's freely given consent to search
as a valid waiver of his fourth amendment rights. See 328 U.S. at 623; 328 U.S. at 593.
1' Id.
17 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1975). Some early third party consent
cases relied on the theory that the third party consented to the search as an agent of the
defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1962) (bailee of car
had authority to consent to search of trunk); United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847,
850 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (partner in control of company records had authority as company's agent
to consent to search of records). In dicta the Supreme Court rejected this implied agency, or
"apparent authority" analysis in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). In Stoner, the
Court held that a hotel clerk was not authorized to consent to a search of a guest's room. Id.
at 488-90. After Stoner, courts began to emphasize the consenting party's relationship to
the premises or effects searched, rather than to the owner. See, e.g., United States v.
Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Carlton v. United
States, 391 F.2d 684, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 1014 (1969); Galbraith v.
United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968).
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search is valid in United States v. Matlock.8 The Matlock Court held
that a warrantless search is valid when based on the consent of a third
party with common authority over the premises or effects which officers
wish to inspect. 9 Courts have consistently interpreted Matlock to re-
quire that the third party must have enjoyed access to or control over
the place or item to be searched.2 1 In addition, some courts have held
that the third party's access or control must have been sufficient for the
searching officers to reasonably conclude that the owner of the searched
premises or property assumed the risk that the third party might con-
sent to a search.
2'
In United States v. Presler," the Fourth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's attempt to justify two warrantless searches and seizures under
the emergency and third party consent exceptions. At trial, the govern-
ment alleged that the defendant, representing himself as a loan broker,
fraudulently obtained $50,000 from a real estate developer named
Altman.' The defendant received the money in Chicago and transported
it to Charlotte, North Carolina, and then to San Diego.24 To support the
charge that the defendant transported fraudulently obtained money in
interstate commerce, the prosecution introduced First Union National
Bank of Charlotte money wrappers into evidence, over defense objec-
tions.2 Altman testified that $35,000 of the money was in the original
'a 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
" Id. at 171. In Matlock, the Supreme Court upheld a search of the defendant's house
based on the consent of a woman who lived with the defendant. Id. at 166-71. The Court
found that the woman's common authority over the premises authorized her to consent to
the search. Id. at 170-77.
The Supreme Court had previously upheld a third party consent search of an object in
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). The Frazier Court stated that the petitioner's cousin's
consent to the search of a jointly used duffel bag in the cousin's home could validate the
seizure of the petitioner's clothing from the bag. Id. at 740. The Court reasoned that the
cousin's joint use of the bag authorized him to consent to the search. Id..
11 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801, 803-04 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 973 (1977) (owner of truck operated by defendant had sufficient access to consent to its
search in defendant's absence); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1056 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 110 (1977) (owner of apartment occupied jointly with defendant had
sufficient control over and access to apartment to consent to its search); United States v.
Cook, 530 F.2d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 909 (1976) (owner of chicken
house used jointly with defendant had sufficient access to consent to its search); United
States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284, 1288 (8th Cir. 1974) (third party who did not have joint ac-
cess to defendant's room had no authority to consent to its search).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801, 804 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
973 (1977) (defendant assumed risk that owner of truck had sufficient access to consent to its
search); United States v. Piet, 498 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069
(1974) (defendant assumed risk that his room might be searched when he gave key to third
party).
2 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1208.
' Id. at 1208-09.
23I1&
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bank wrappers when the defendant received the money in Chicago.2
Police in San Diego discovered the money wrappers in a warrantless
search of the defendant's apartment.' In addition, the defendant ob-
jected to the prosecution's introduction into evidence of loan applica-
tions which sheriff's deputies in Imperial County, California, obtained
from a warrantless search of two briefcases belonging to the defendant.'
A jury convicted the defendant of fraud by wire' and of transportation
in interstate commerce of fraudulently obtained property worth more
than $5,000.0
On appeal, the defendant maintained that the district court erred in
failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his room
and briefcases. 1 The government's evidence showed that local police
authorities entered the defendant's apartment without a warrant at the
request of his landlady.2 The landlady was concerned for the tenant's
safety, because she had not seen him for some time and had detected an
unusual odor coming from his apartment.- The officer found the defend-
ant lying on his bed covered with vomited blood.u The officer examined
the defendant and determined that he was ill or intoxicated. 5 While
waiting for an ambulance, the officer noted what appeared to be buck-
shot damage above the door."' After the defendant was taken to the
hospital, the officer searched the apartment exhaustively for a shotgun
and located a .25 caliber pistol round on the floor." In addition, the of-
2 Id at 1208.
' Id. at 1209.
Id. At trial, the defendant argued that the court's admission into evidence of loan ap-
plications received from other persons was error, because the evidence was not related to
his alleged dealings with Altman. See id. at 1215.
Id. at 1208; see 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
o 610 F.2d at 1208; see 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976). The trial court opinion was unpub-
lished.
31 610 F.2d at 1209. The defendant also argued that the district court had erred in per-
mitting the prosecutor's improper jury argument and in refusing to grant the defendant's
motion to dismiss the section 2314 count of transporting fraudulently obtained property
worth more than $5,000 in interstate commerce for failure of proof. Id.
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had erred in failing to suppress the
evidence procured from the two searches. Id The court remanded the case for a new trial
on the fraud by wire charge. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the evidence of similar trans-
actions was admissible on the issue of intent and motive. Id. at 1215; see note 28 supra. The
court dismissed the jury argument claim, because the defendant had failed to object to the
argument at trial. 610 F.2d at 1215. Finally, the court found error in the district court's
failure to dismiss the section 2314 count. Id. at 1214. After the Fourth Circuit ordered the
money wrappers suppressed, there was no evidence that the defendant had transported the
money to San Diego as charged. Id at 1215.
610 F.2d at 1209.
3 Id.
Id. The defendant had not been shot or otherwise injured. Id
3 Id
Id.
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ficer discovered a small, black plastic box which he thought could have
contained a pistol.' The officer opened the box and found the money
wrappers which the government admitted into evidence against the
defendant. 9
The government claimed that the warrantless apartment search was
valid under the emergency exception.0 The Fourth Circuit, however,
held the search unconstitutional under Mincey v. Arizona." In Mincey,
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a general warrantless search of
an apartment in which a narcotics agent was killed." The Mincey Court
acknowledged the propriety of warrantless entry in an emergency situa-
tion, but noted that the officers conducted the general search after the
emergency had ended. 3 The Fourth Circuit stated that Mincey sup-
ported the officer's entry into the defendant's apartment to render aid to
the defendant.4 As part of the initial search the officer could have seized
any evidence of a crime in plain view."5 The Presler court found,
however, that the emergency ended when the ambulance crew removed
the defendant. After that time, the officer was not authorized to engage
in a further warrantless search." The Fourth Circuit held unconstitu-
tional the continued search which led to discovery of the money wrap-
pers.48
Id. at 1210.
Id. The searching officer found neither a shotgun nor a pistol. Id.
O Brief for Appellee at 5-6; see 610 F.2d at 1210. The government argued that the of-
ficer lawfully entered the defendant's apartment under emergency circumstances, because
he reasonably believed the defendant was in need of aid. Brief for Appellee at 5; see United
States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (right of police to enter and investigate in
emergency inheres in their duty as police officers). The Fourth Circuit did not address the
government's argument that the officer was authorized to search the defendant's room
under Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). See Brief for Appellee at 6. Tyler held that a
fireman's warrantless inspection of a burned building after the fire was extinguished was
reasonable under the fourth amendment because of the exceptional circumstances created
by a fire and the possibility that evidence of the fire's source might disappear. 436 U.S. at
509. The exceptional circumstances surrounding a fire investigation do not correspond to
the Presler facts. See id. The officer in Presler had no reason to investigate further once
the ambulance crew removed the defendant, because there was no chance that evidence
would be destroyed. See 610 F.2d at 1211.
' 610 F.2d at 1210; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978).
437 U.S. at 392-93.
See id. at 393.
" 610 F.2d at 1211; see text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
610 F.2d at 1211; see 437 U.S. at 393.
610 F.2d at 1211.
47 Id.
"I&. The Fourth Circuit indicated that Presler was a weaker case on the facts than
Mincey for upholding an emergency search. Id In Mincey, the house searched was the scene
of a recent murder, and the officers were anxious to investigate before evidence disap-
peared. Id.; see 437 U.S. at 389. InPreser, on the other hand, the officer did not have prob-
able cause to believe a crime had been committed in the apartment, nor was the officer in-
vestigating a crime. 610 F.2d at 1211. The court stated that the officer's observation of the
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The Fourth Circuit next addressed the government's argument that
the warrantless search of the defendant's briefcases was valid under the
third party consent exception.49 The defendant had given the briefcases
to his friend Houghton for safekeeping. 0 Houghton informed officers of
the Imperial County Sheriff's Department that the briefcases were at
the home of an acquaintance.51 The officers located the defendant's brief-
cases, opened them, and discovered records of other loan applications
solicited by the defendant.2
The Fourth Circuit ordered the records suppressed as the fruits of
an unconstitutional search. The court noted that the fourth amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches of briefcases. 4 Finding that Houghton
buckshot damage did not justify his search, since there was no indication that the damage
was recent or that any person had been shot. Id. Therefore, no exigency required an im-
mediate search to preserve evidence. Id.
The Fourth Circuit also found that the plain view doctrine did not apply to the apart-
ment search. Id. According to the plain view doctrine, an officer conducting a legal war-
rantless search may seize a suspicious article in plain view if he recognizes it to be evidence
of a crime, though not of the crime under investigation. Id.; see Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 153-54 (1947). It must be "immediately apparent" to the officer that the article is
evidence of a crime. See Mapp v. Warden, 531 F.2d 1167, 1170-72 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 982 (1976); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). Assuming that the
officer's search of Presler's apartment was lawful, and that he found the box containing the
money wrappers lying in plain view, the officer could not have recognized the wrappers as
evidence of a crime. 610 F.2d at 1211. The court noted that at the time of the search the San
Diego police did not know of the defendant's criminal behavior. Id. Therefore, since the
defendant's possession of the money wrappers was not itself a crime, the officer acted
unlawfully when he seized the wrappers. Id.
"' 610 F.2d at 1212-14; see text accompanying notes 18-21 supra. The government
argued that the search of the defendant's briefcases fell within the rationale of Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1973). Brief for Ap-
pellee at 7-8; see note 19 supra.
The Fourth Circuit did not address the government's argument that the search was
valid under the theory of self-exculpation. See Brief for Appellee at 8. Under the self-
exculpation theory, a third person suspected of being involved in the defendant's criminal
activities and having joint control over or access to the defendant's property may consent to
a search of the property. United States v. Diggs, 544 F.2d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937 (1967). In
Presler, the person who possessed the briefcases was not suspected of participating in the
defendant's criminal activities. See 610 F.2d at 1212. In addition, the person in possession of
the briefcases did not have access to the locked briefcases, since he did not have a key. Id.
610 F.2d at 1212.
51 Id. The officers had questioned Houghton about certain articles belonging to the
defendant. Id. Houghton told the officers that the articles were in the briefcases and denied
ownership of any of the articles. Id. Houghton telephoned his acquaintance and told him to
let the officers see the articles. Id. The acquaintance gave the briefcases to the officers. Id.
62 Id.
53 Id.
Id. at 1212-13. The Supreme Court had applied the fourth amendment to suitcase
and luggage searches prior to Presler. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761-66 (1979)
(warrantless search of suitcase seized in search of car held unconstitutional); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1977) (warrantless search of footlocker seized in search of car
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lacked any general right of access to the locked briefcases, the court ruled
that his mere possession of the briefcases did not give him authority to
consent to the search.5 According to the court, the defendant's act of
locking the briefcases and retaining the key demonstrated that he did
not assume the risk that Houghton might consent to a search of the
briefcases. 6 Since Houghton's possession did not vest him with common
authority over the contents and power to consent to the search, 7 the
court held the search invalid and ordered the evidence suppressed."
Although the Fourth Circuit had not previously considered an emer-
gency search similar to Presler, the court's strict interpretation of the
emergency search doctrine is in .harmony with that of other circuits. 9
Reasoning that the urgent need for an officer to respond quickly to an
emergency takes precedence over the warrant requirement, courts
agree that police may make a warrantless emergency entry of private
premises.5 Most courts also agree, however, that when police enter
private premises under emergency conditions, they may not extend the
emergency search to a warrantless investigative search. 1 When the
held unconstitutional). The fourth amendment therefore protects all personal luggage, in-
cluding briefcases. See United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1978) (barring
exigent circumstances, warrantless search of locked briefcase invalid under fourth amend-
ment).
' 610 F.2d at 1214. The court recognized that a person having common authority over
or general access to the object could validly consent to a search. Id. at 1213; see 415 U.S. at
717 n.7; United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 539-50 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Presler court did not discuss the fact that the briefcases were not in Houghton's
possession, but in the possession of his acquaintance. See 610 F.2d at 1212. The fact that
Houghton did not possess the briefcases appears to strengthen the court's conclusion that
he lacked authority to consent to the search. See note 57 infra.
See 610 F.2d at 1214; 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
s Id. at 1214; see United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801, 803-04 (4th Cir. 1977) ("com-
mon authority" not implied from property interest but from "mutual use" of object).
The Presler court distinguished United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976), holding that a mother could consent to the search of her
son's room in her house. Id. at 180. The Presler court reasoned that the mother in Peterson
had "absolute control" of the room and authority to control its use. 610 F.2d at 1214. In
Presler, the person consenting to the search did not have sufficient control over or access to
the property searched. Id.
610 F.2d at 1214.
52 See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra; notes 60 & 61 infra.
See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (officer lawfully entered defendant's house without search warrant to
assist ambulance attendants with drug overdose victim); United States v. Goldenstein, 456
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974) (emergency doctrine permit-
ted officers to enter defendant's hotel room without search warrant after learning from
desk clerk that defendant had been shot).
1 See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra; e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d
280, 284 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006,1010 (8th Cir. 1972). But
see United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1964).
In Hoffman, the court found that fireman had lawfully entered the defendant's burning
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emergency has ended, the officer's continued search becomes investi-
gative.2 The investigative search is not justified by the exceptional cir-
cumstances that prompted the emergency search. 3 While an officer's
purpose in conducting an emergency search is to preserve life or to
render aid,"' the purpose of an investigative search is to gather evidence
of a crime.65 Before Mincey, courts disagreed as to whether police could
conduct a warrantless investigation search following an emergency en-
try.6 Mincey established, however, that an officer who conducts a valid
emergency search may not extend that search beyond the scope of the
emergency without first obtaining a warrant.
7
The Fourth Circuit's third party consent analysis is consistent with
other circuits that have found valid third party consent only upon the
government's showing that the consenting third party had common au-
thority over the premises or object searched." Prior to Matlock, many
courts considering the validity of third party consent searches had em-
phasized the consenting party's relationship to the property searched. 9
In Matlock, the Supreme Court formalized the relationship analysis by
stating that a third person's authority to consent had to be grounded in
mutual use or joint access and control of the premises or object searched.76
home without a warrant. 607 F.2d at 283. The Hoffman court held, however, that police who
entered a home to conduct a warrantless investigative search for evidence of a crime after
termination of the emergency violated the defendant's fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 607 F.2d at 284. The Goldenstein court held that
officers making a warrantless emergency entry into the defendant's hotel room could treat
the defendant's wound but could not conduct a warrantless investigative search of the room
and of a suitcase found there. 456 F.2d at 1010.
In Brand and Barone the officers entered private premises under emergency condi-
tions and conducted a warrantless investigative search. 556 F.2d at 1317; 330 F.2d at 544-45.
The courts upheld the warrantless searches, reasoning that since the initial emergency en-
try intruded upon the defendant's right to privacy, there was no reason for the officers to
obtain a warrant for further search activity. 556 F.2d at 1317; see 330 F.2d at 544-45.
62 Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The Investigative Search and The
Issue of Re-Entry, 55 N.D. L. REV. 7, 16 [hereinafter cited as Emergency Searches]; see note
61 supra.
Emergency Searches, supra note 62, at 16; see note 61 supra.
See note 8 supra.
Emergency Searches, supra note 62, at 16; see, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
392-93 (1978); United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1979); notes 10, 48 & 61
supra.
" Compare United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 1977) and United
,States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972) with United States v. Brand, 556
F.2d 1312, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 544-45 (2d Cir.
1964).
67 437 U.S. at 392-93; text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
e See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Cook, 530 F.2d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Novella, 519 F.2d 1078,
1078-80 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1060 (1976).
6 See note 17 supra; note 70 infra.
0 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; see note 67 supra. Before Matlock some courts applied a mutual
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Under Matlock, a third party who possesses an object, but does not
share with the defendant joint use or access to the property, may not
consent to its search."' A third person's proprietary interest in the
premises or object does not give that person authority to consent to its
search.7 Matlock demanded a stricter analysis than mere application of
property law by requiring expressly that the consenting third party
have enjoyed mutual use or joint access to the premises or object suffi-
cient to enable him to consent to a search in his own right.73 The Fourth
Circuit, therefore, reasoned consistently with the Supreme Court's
clarification of the relationship between a consenting third party and the
premises or object searched. 7
The Fourth Circuit's conclusions concerning the emergency and
third party consent exceptions are in harmony with the principles enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Mincey 5 and Matlock.8 Presler's emer-
gency analysis imposes strict constraints on police officers' warrantless
activity in an emergency situation.7 7 The Fourth Circuit's use of the
Matlock analysis circumscribes a warrantless third party consent
search,78 but indicates the court's willingness to sanction consent
searches.79
JAMES REESE SHOEMAKER
E. The Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the public from unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring law en-
use/access analysis. See, e.g., Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied sub nom. Castaldi v. United States, 384 U.S. 944 (1966) (third party with joint
access to house could consent to its search); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1955) (where two persons shared equal right to use or oc-
cupy premises either could consent to search). Other courts, however, did not rely on
mutual use or joint access but found valid third party consent where the consenting party
merely owned the premises. See, e.g., United States v. DiPrima, 472 F.2d 550, 551-52 (1st
Cir. 1973) (mother who owned apartment could consent to search of son's room); United
States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970)
(landlord of premises had authority to consent to search). Matlock apparently rejected the
ownership analysis. See 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; text accompanying note 70 infra.
71 610 F.2d at 1213-14.
415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
See 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; notes 17 & 69 supra.
' See 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; note 69 supra.
7' See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
7' See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
See text accompanying note 66 supra.
s See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
See 610 F.2d at 1213-14. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Houghton's consent to
the briefcase search would have been effective if the government had shown that Houghton
had a right of general access to or mutual use of the briefcases. Id.
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forcement officials to show probable cause to obtain warrants.1 The
courts, however, have recognized certain exceptions to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement In United States v. Truong Dinh
Hung,' the Fourth Circuit applied a judicially created exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement for government investigations
of foreign intelligence activities. The Truong court also examined the
concurrent sentence doctrine, which allows an appellate court to affirm
summarily a conviction carrying a shorter sentence if the court affirms
another conviction carrying a longer term.'
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The fourth amendment probable cause standard for a search warrant differs from the stand-
ard for an arrest warrant. Probable cause for a search warrant requires substantial
evidence that the items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and that those
items may be found in the place to be searched. An arrest warrant may issue when a crime
is committed or attempted in the presence of an officer or when the arresting officer has a
reasonable belief that the person to be arrested has committed a felony. See generally,
Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment,
28 U. CHI. L. REv. 664 (1961). The fourth amendment's oath or affirmation requirement is
satisfied by evidence presented under sworn testimony such as an adequate affidavit. See,
e.g., Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1971); Gillespie v. United States, 368
F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1966); FED. R. GRIM. P. 41(c).
The Supreme Court no longer requires trespass or actual physical intrusion into the
privacy of an individual for the amendment's protections to apply. Fourth amendment pro-
tections apply whenever the privacy upon which a person justifiably relies is violated. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The amendment, therefore, applies to all situa-
tions in which a person has a justifiable expectation of privacy. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Accordingly, the amendment protects people from intrustions resulting from
wiretaps, eavesdropping and other electronic surveillance devices. See, e.g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49-53 (1967). See generally
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976,
Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979); Dash, Katz- Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH.
U.L. REV. 296 (1968).
2 Federal courts have held that exigent circumstances may require an exception to
the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973) (war-
rant unnecessary for body search incident to valid arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (warrant not required when subject of search consents); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (items in plain view may be seized without warrant);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1968) (police officer may lawfully stop and frisk suspect
without warrant); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604-07 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (electronic surveillance for gathering
foreign intelligence information does not require warrant).
629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
The concurrent sentence doctrine is a discretionary doctrine based on judicial
economy and fairness to other litigants on the court's docket. In order for an appellate court
to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine, the defendant must have received concurrent
sentences on two or more counts of a multi-count indictment. Initially, the appellate court
must affirm at least one of the convictions. If a reversal of the companion conviction would
not reduce the defendant's prison sentence or result in any other adverse collateral conse-
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Truong Dinh Hung, a Vietnamese citizen, came to the United States
in 1965.1 In 1976, Truong met Dung Krall, a Vietnamese-American, who
worked as a confidential agent for the CIA and the FBI." Since Krall had
extensive contacts in Paris, Truong convinced Krall to carry certain
packages to representatives of North Vietnam in Paris during the 1977
Vietnam war peace negotiations.' The packages contained copies of con-
fidential United States Government papers and cables dealing with
Southeast Asia that Truong had received from Ronald Humphrey,' an
employee of the United States Information Agency.' Krall informed the
FBI and the CIA of her activities as a courier, and the FBI monitored the
transactions between Krall and Truong. ° Although the Government
never obtained a warrant or a court order, the FBI kept Truong under
surveillance by tapping his phone and bugging his apartment from May,
1977 until January, 1978." Through this electronic surveillance, the
Government learned that Humphrey was supplying Truong with the
confidential information. The FBI arrested both Truong and Humphrey
on charges that included espionage and conversion of government prop-
erty."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
tried and convicted Truong and Humphrey of espionage, conspiracy to
commit espionage and conversion of classified government documents.13
quences, the court may refuse to review the merits of the companion conviction. See text ac-
companying notes 23, 35-41 & 58-70 infra. See generally Note, The Concurrent Sentence
Doctrine After Benton v. Maryland, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 282 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine].
629 F.2d at 911.
'Id.
Id. Truong claimed that he sent the papers to Paris in order to strengthen United
States-North Vietnamese relations. Truong hoped to be reunited with his girl friend who
was a prisoner in North Vietnam. Id. at 912.
' Ronald Humphrey was a co-defendant in the case and also appealed to the Fourth
Circuit. The cases were consolidated in both the district and circuit courts. See United
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Humphrey,
456 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D. Va. 1978).
629 F.2d at 911-12.
10 Id. at 912. Krall not only communicated with the CIA and the FBI but also allowed
the FBI to inspect and copy the contents of the package that Truong gave to her. Id
"1 Id. The FBI videotaped Humphrey in his office at the United States Information
Agency. Id. at 912 n.1. Although the FBI did not have a warrant, the Attorney General, act-
ing as a delegate of the President, authorized the electronic surveillance of Truong and
Humphrey. Id. at 912.
, 629 F.2d at 912.
, Id. The defendants were convicted of espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 791(a)(c) (1976). The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to con-
vert classified government documents to their own use under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 641 (1976).
They were also convicted of acting as foreign agents without registering with the Secretary
of State in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 951, 2 (1976), delivering national defense material to
unauthorized personnel in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e), 2 (1976), and conspiring to violate
50 U.S.C. § 783(b), (c) (1976). Id. The court sentenced the defendants to prison terms which
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Prior to trial, the district court had suppressed a portion of the evidence
obtained from the surveillance as being in violation of the defendants'
fourth amendment rights.14 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defen-
dants claimed that the prolonged surveillance violated their fourth
amendment rights because the Government did not obtain a warrant or
a court order. 5 The defendants argued that the trial court should have
suppressed all of the evidence obtained from the electronic
surveillance."6 The Government argued that the foreign intelligence ex-
ception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless
surveillance. 7 The foreign intelligence exception is a judicially created
ranged from two years for the unlawful conversion conviction to fifteen years for each of the
espionage convictions. Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1326 (1978). All
the prison terms were to run concurrently. Id
After Truong's conviction, his bail was revoked by the trial court pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3148 (1976). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the bail revocation in an unreported opin-
ion. Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1327 (1978). The circuit court noted
that Truong had no permanent residence in the United States and that the United States
could not extradite Truong should he flee to North Vietnam. Id. at 1327. Truong appealed to
the Supreme Court Justice for the Fourth Circuit, Justice Brennan, who reversed the
Fourth Circuit. Id. at 1330. Justice Brennan noted that there was not sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk that Truong would flee and concluded therefore that bail revoca-
tion under § 3148 was inappropriate. Id. at 1329.
Justice Brennan also commented on the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 1327. Brennan noted that the Supreme Court had never directly ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the exception and that the circuit courts were divided on
the issue. Id. Brennan indicated that the fourth amendment might require a warrant in
these cases and also that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 might control in espionage cases. Id. at 1328.
" The district court held that all the evidence obtained from the warrantless surveil-
lance after July 20, 1977 should be suppressed. The court concluded that the FBI had
directed the surveillance primarily at criminal prosecution on July 20, 1977, and therefore,
the foreign intelligence exception did not shelter the evidence gathered after that date.
United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 59 (E.D. Va. 1978). See also notes 16 & 30 infra.
" 629 F.2d at 912. The defendants appealed all of their convictions and asserted
numerous errors in addition to their fourth amendment claim. The defendants questioned
the applicability of the espionage statutes to their case, alleged various Jencks Act viola-
tions, claimed a denial of due process, and challenged numerous evidentiary decisions of the
trial court. Id. at 911; see note 24 infra.
11 Id. at 912. The FBI bugged Truong's phone for 268 days and eavesdropped by means
of another electronic device for 255 days. Id. The defendants preserved the fourth amend-
ment issue for appeal by filing a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence gathered from
the surveillance. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D. Va. 1978). At the sup-
pression hearing, Truong successfully argued that the FBI's search of two sealed envelopes
obtained from Krall violated his fourth amendment rights. Id. at 63-64. The trial court,
however, denied Truong's motion to suppress all the evidence from the electronic
surveillance. Id. at 59.
" 629 F.2d at 912; see text accompanying notes 24-31 infra. The defendants argued
that even if the court did recognize a foreign intelligence exception, the exception should
not apply to their case. They argued that the exception should apply only for surveillance
conducted solely for foreign intelligence reasons, but not for surveillance conducted primar-
ily for foreign intelligence purposes. 629 F.2d at 915-16; see text accompanying notes 29-31
infra.
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exception to the warrant requirement which allows the President to con-
duct warrantless surveillance for the purpose of protecting the United
States from possible foreign threats or for the purpose of conducting
foreign policy. 8
The defendants also appealed their conviction for conversion of
valuable United States property." The defendants noted that the tort of
conversion requires that the rightful owner actually lose possession of
the property. 0 The defendants, therefore, reasoned that the conversion
conviction was improper because the United States had never lost pos-
session of the original documents." In response, the Government argued
that the concurrent sentence doctrine would preclude the court from
considering the defendants' argument on the conversion conviction if the
court affirmed any of the other convictions.' The concurrent sentence
doctrine may apply when a defendant appeals his convictions on several
counts of a multi-count indictment. In such a situation, the concurrent
sentence doctrine provides that an appellate court need not review all
the convictions if the court affirms at least one of the convictions and if a
reversal of the unreviewed convictions would not reduce the defendant's
total prison sentence.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the appellants' fourth amendment
argument" on the basis of the foreign intelligence exception to the war-
I" See Note, The Fourth Amendment and Judicial Review of Foreign Intelligence
Wiretapping, 45 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 55, 66 n.54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign In-
telligence]. See also note 1 supra.
19 629 F.2d at 922-28, 931-32. The defendants were convicted under a statute that pro-
hibits the conversion of valuable United States property for personal use. 18 U.S.C. § 641
(1976).
" 629 F.2d at 922. The defendants relied on Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969), for the proposition that the tort of conversion requires that
the owner lose actual possession. 629 F.2d at 922. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d at 706-08;
see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971).
II 629 F.2d at 922. The defendants argued that the United States never lost possession
of the documents because Krall's documents were copies and therefore, the United States
Information Agency never lost access to the documents. Id. Alternatively, the defendants
argued that information is not covered by the statute since information is an intangible. The
defendents relied on Chappell v. United States, 270 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959), for the proposi-
tion that under § 641 covers only tangible things of value. 629 F.2d at 922 n.14.
629 F.2d at 931.
Id. See also note 4 supra; text accompanying notes 35-41 & 58-70 infra.
2' 629 F.2d at 914. Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision on
the surveillance issue, the court remanded the issue of whether the Government violated
the Jencks Act to the trial judge. Id. at 921. The Jencks Act allows the defendant to inspect
written statements of Government witnesses after the witnesses have testified on direct ex-
amination. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Fourth Circuit remanded the case because the trial
court did not make an explicit finding on whether the Jencks Act required the Government
to disclose certain statements to the defendants. 629 F.2d at 920-21.
' 629 F.2d at 913. In applying the foreign intelligence exception in Truong, the Fourth
Circuit held that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and Title I of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 were inapplicable. Id. at 913 n.2, 914 n.4.,
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rant requirement.25 In applying the foreign intelligence exception, the
court recognized the delicate balance between individual privacy rights
and the President's foreign affairs power." The court noted that the ex-
ception endangered personal privacy rights 7 and emphasized restric-
tions on the application of the exception.28 The court held that the excep-
tion for warrantless surveillance applies only to activities involving a
foreign power, its agents and collaborators, and only when the
surveillance is directed primarily at foreign intelligence gathering
rather than criminal prosecution.29 Emphasizing these constraints on the
exception, the Truong court held that the FBI had directed the war-
rantless surveillance primarily towards criminal prosecution on July 20,
1977, the date that the Attorney General concluded the United States
had probable cause to charge the defendants with espionage. 0 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that although the evidence gathered after July
20 was inadmissible under the fourth amendment, the evidence seized
prior to July 20 was admissible under the foreign intelligence exception
to the warrant requirement."
The Fourth Circuit noted several reasons for upholding the overall
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 permits warrantless foreign intelligence
surveillance provided that the surveillance is directed at communication among foreign
powers, does not intercept communications involving a United States citizen or an alien ad-
mitted for permanent residency, and incorporates certain minimization procedures specified
in the Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (Supp. II 1978). The court in Truong gave only limited consid-
eration to the statute because the surveillance of the defendants occurred prior to its enact-
ment. 629 F.2d at 914 n.4.
Similarly, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 does
not apply to the facts of Truong. The court noted that Congress did not intend Title III to
restrict the President's power with regard to foreign intelligence surveillance. 629 F.2d at
913 n.2. See also United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308
(1972); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614-15 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976); note 1 supra.
629 F.2d at 915. See also text accompanying notes 34 & 45 infra.
The fourth amendment protects the privacy upon which an individual justifiably
relies. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See also note 1 supra.
629 F.2d at 915-16.
Id.,
' Id. at 916. At their suppression hearing, the defendants argued that surveillance not
directed solely at foreign intelligence gathering requires a warrant. United States v. Hum-
phrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 57-58 (E.D. Va. 1978). See also note 17 supra. After the court had re-
jected this argument, the defendants argued that the surveillance became primarily
criminal in May, 1977, when a government attorney from the Criminal Division became in-
volved in the investigation. 456 F. Supp. at 58. Alternatively, they argued that the focus of
the surveillance became criminal when a criminal file was opened. Id.
S 629 F.2d at 916. After deciding that the limited foreign intelligence exception ap-
plied to Truong, the court held that the surveillance was within the fourth amendment's
reasonableness requirement. Id. at 916-17. The court noted that the FBI needed to intercept.
all of Truong's calls during this time since the purpose of the surveillance was to determine
Truong's source of information. Id. The court also affirmed the trial court's holding that the
video-taping of Humphrey's activities in his office was reasonable. Id. at 917 n.7. See also
note 11 supra.
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validity of the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant require-
ment. The court indicated that a warrant requirement in foreign in-
telligence situations would destroy the President's ability to deal with
foreign affairs with the necessary speed, secrecy and flexibility.2 The
court also supported the foreign intelligence exception because an unin-
formed judiciary is unable to make intelligent determinations of prob-
able cause for foreign affairs surveillance.3 Finally, the court noted that
the separation of powers doctrine required the President to make impor-
tant foreign affairs decisions, including the decision whether to conduct
foreign intelligence surveillance.'
After upholding the validity of the foreign intelligence exception,
the Fourth Circuit focused on the appellants' appeals of their convictions
for conversion of government property." The majority in Truong ac-
cepted the Government's argument that the concurrent sentence doc-
trine precluded the need to consider the merits of the conversion ap-
peals." The majority held that since a reversal of the conversion convic-
tions would not affect the length of the appellants' prison sentences, the
concurrent sentence doctrine allowed the court to affirm summarily the
conversion convictions. 7 The court also noted that the appellants' oppor-
tunity for parole would not be affected by the refusal to consider the con-
version appeals.' A strong dissent by Judge Winter noted that the
629 F.2d at 913.
Id. The Truong court indicated that courts should defer to the President's expertise
in the area of foreign affairs. Id.
' Id. at 914. The President's power to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence
surveillance is derived from his constitutional power to appoint ambassadors, make treaties,
and command the armed forces. See Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976, 978 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Security
Surveillance]. The Supreme Court has suggested that these expressed constitutional
powers authorize the President to conduct foreign affairs without judicial interference so
long as the President's actions do not conflict with other expressed constitutional provi-
sions. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937) (conduct of foreign rela-
tions is executive power not subject to judicial inquiry); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (executive's foreign relations power not subject to judicial review). But
see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (president subject
to constitutional limitations when he uses his foreign affairs powers in essentially domestic
situation).
629 F.2d at 922-28, 931-32.
Id. at 931. See also note 4 supra; text accompanying note 23 supra.
629 F.2d at 932.
Id. The Parole Commission uses a "salient factor score" to determine a prisoner's
eligibility for parole. The Commission considers factors such as the prisoner's prior convic-
tions and terms of imprisonment, his parole and probation history, his employment history,
his possible addiction to drugs, and the nature of his crime. See United States v. Rubin, 591
F.2d 278, 281 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979).
In addition to the effect on a defendant's prison sentence and parole eligibility, applica-
tion of the concurrent sentence doctrine may also have other adverse collateral conse-
quences. Other adverse collateral consequences of applying the doctrine include the follow-
ing: the possible use of the unreviewed conviction to impeach the defendant at a subsequent
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Fourth Circuit had previously rejected the concurrent sentence doc-
trine." Judge Winter, therefore, considered the merits of the conversion
convictions and concluded that the convictions should be reversed."0
Winter reasoned that the statute in question could not be interpreted to
include the unauthorized diclosure of government information."
The Fourth Circuit's application of the foreign intelligence exception
in Truong has a constitutional basis despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has never expressly decided whether the exception is constitu-
tional."2 The Supreme Court suggested that the foreign intelligence ex-
ception is constitutionally permissible in United States v. United States
District Court (Keith)."3 In Keith, the Court held that the Government
must obtain a warrant for domestic security surveillance but noted that
the Constitution does not necessarily mandate a warrant for foreign in-
telligence surveillance." The Keith Court advocated a balancing ap-
proach that requires a court to weigh society's interest in domestic
trial; the possible effects of the conviction when applying a recidivist statute; the stigma
that attaches to an individual convicted of a crime; the possible effects of the conviction in a
deportation hearing of an alien; and the possible forfeiture of property because of an
unreviewed conviction. See United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 892-94 (5th Cir. 1980); The Concurrent Sentence Doc-
trine, supra note 4, at 301.
629 F.2d at 922-28. Judge Winter wrote the majority opinion in Truong, but he was
the only judge who thought the concurrent sentence doctrine did not apply in Truong. The
majority opinion on the concurrent sentence doctrine issue is in the dissent. See 629 F.2d at
931-32. In his dissent to the majority's reliance on the concurrent sentence doctrine, Judge
Winter relied on Close v. United States, 450 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1068 (1972), for the proposition that the Fourth Circuit has rejected the concurrent sentence
doctrine. Id. at 922-23. See also text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.
40 629 F.2d at 923-28.
Id. at 928.
42 See Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1327 (1978); United States v.
United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308-09 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967). See also text accompanying notes 43-45 infra and note 1 supra.
" 407 U.S. 297 (1972). One member of the Supreme Court had also suggested that the
foreign intelligence exception was permissible in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364
(1967) (White, J. concurring). In his concurrence, Justice White suggested that the Presi-
dent or the Attorney General should not be required to obtain a warrant to authorize
surveillance for national security purposes. Id.
" Id. at 308-09, 321. In Keith, the defendants were charged with conspiracy to destroy
government property and with bombing a CIA office. The Supreme Court's inquiry focused
upon whether a warrant requirement would frustrate the President's ability to protect the
country from acts of subversion. Id. at 315. In holding that a warrant was required before
the federal government could engage in domestic security surveillance, the Supreme Court
emphasized that post-surveillance judicial review in domestic security situations would not
provide an adequate check on the President's discretion. Id. at 317-18. The Court also in-
dicated that the judiciary could evaluate and understand the issues involved in internal
security matters and therefore could make probable cause determinations. Id. at P20. Finally,
the Court noted that domestic security surveillance infringed upon substantial freedom of
speech rights that could not be adequately protected without a warrant requirement. Id.
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security against the individual's fourth amendment right to privacy.45
Several federal circuit courts have implicitly, if not expressly,
recognized a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement."
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals delivered one of the most im-
portant opinions concerning the validity of the exception in Zweibon v.
Mitchell.' In Zweibon, members of the Jewish Defense League sued At-
torney General John Mitchell for damages and claimed the electronic
surveillance of their New York headquarters violated both their fourth
amendment rights and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.8 The Government claimed that the foreign in-
telligence exception justified the warrantless surveillance since the ac-
tivities of the Jewish Defense League threatened United States-Soviet
relations as well as the lives of Americans living in Moscow. 9 The
District of Columbia Circuit held that since no agents or collaborators of
foreign powers were involved, the electronic surveillance of domestic or-
ganizations that may affect foreign affairs required prior judicial ap-
proval.w
The Fourth Circuit in Truong correctly applied a limited foreign in-
telligence exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. The
court followed the balancing approach advocated by the Supreme Court
in Keith.1 The Truong decision is also consistent with the District of Co-
'5 Id. at 314-15. See also note 51 infra.
Three circuits have expressly held that the foreign intelligence exception to the
warrant requirement is constitutional. See United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977) (foreign security wiretaps established exception to
fourth amendment warrant requirement); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 606 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (warrant not re-
quired when surveillance solely for gathering foreign intelligence information); United
States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974) (cir-
cumstances that require warrant in domestic surveillance cases not present in foreign in-
telligence surveillance situations). One circuit, however, has held that the President must
obtain a warrant or a court order before initiating domestic surveillance that may affect
foreign affairs. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976); text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
4' Id. at 605-06.
41 Id. at 607.
Id. at 651-55.
, In Keith, the Supreme Court used an analysis that balanced the society's interest in
national security against the individual's rights of privacy and free speech. United States v.
United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972). See also text accompanying
notes 26-31, 45 supra. Commentators have suggested that the balancing approach is the ap-
propriate method of analyzing the problem faced by the Truong court. See generally
Foreign Intelligence, supra, note 18; Comment, Present and Proposed Standards for
Foreign Electronic Surveillance, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Standards]. One commentator applied a cost and benefit analysis and concluded that a
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement is inappropriate. Foreign Secur-
ity Surveillance, supra note 34 at 992. The commentator identified the chief costs of a war-
rant requirement as delay, risk of security leaks, and risk of error by the judge or
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lumbia Circuit's decision in Zweibon." Although Zweibon suggests that
the Constitution may require a warrant for purely foreign intelligence
surveillance,O the District of Columbia Circuit specifically limited the
Zweibon holding to surveillance not involving agents or collaborators of
a foreign power." The Fourth Circuit justifiably relied on this limitation
to distinguish Truong from Zweibon." Although the Truong court never
concluded that Truong was an agent of the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment, the court held the evidence to be sufficient to establish that
Truong had collaborated with the North Vietnamese. 6 Truong, there-
fore, is an appropriate application of the foreign intelligence exception to
the warrant requirement.-"
The Truong court's application of the concurrent sentence doctrine
is suspect. The federal courts are divided on the issue of whether the
concurrent sentence doctrine is valid." Several circuits have taken the
magistrate. Id. at 981-85. Nevertheless, the commentator would require a warrant because a
warrant would lessen the inherent offensiveness of foreign security surveillance and help
prevent unreasonable surveillance. Id. at 895-89.
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also notes 46-50
supra.s 516 F.2d 594, 637-51 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Although the
court in Zweibon limited its holding to surveillance of domestic organizations that may af-
fect foreign affairs, the opinion contains dicta that discusses the foreign intelligence excep-
tion in general. The court concluded that no surveillance in the area of foreign affairs should
be exempt from prior judicial scrutiny. Id. at 651. The court, however, limited the holding in
Zweibon to Government surveillance of American citizens involved in domestic organiza-
tions. Id. at 641, 651.
Id. at 614, 651. See also text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
" 629 F.2d at 915. Even if the court in Zweibon had not excluded surveillance involv-
ing foreign agents or collaborators, Zweibon would not control Truong. The cases are fac-
tually distinguishable. Zweibon involved surveillance of American citizens who were
members of a domestic organization. Although Truong involved domestic surveillance in the
sense that the surveillance took place in the United States, the case more accurately involved
surveillance of an alien against whom there was strong evidence of collaboration with a
foreign power. See 629 F.2d at 915, 916. But see note 57 infra.
629 F.2d at 915-16.
5 Several commentators have concluded that a foreign intelligence exception should
not exist even if the subject is a foreign agent or collaborator. See Foreign Intelligence,
supra note 18, at 98-99; Foreign Security Surveillance, supra, note 34, at 992-94; Proposed
Standards, supra note 51, at 132-35. See also note 51 supra.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Vasquez, 609 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1979) (concur-
rent sentence doctrine applicable if no substantial likelihood of adverse collateral conse-
quences); United States v. Smith, 601 F.2d 972, 973-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829
(1979) (doctrine applicable if not prejudicial to defendant). But see United States v. Ruffin,
575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978) (doctrine is exception rather than rule); United States v.
McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir. 1974) (doctrine inapplicable if even small possibility of
adverse collateral consequences). See generally The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, supra
note 4, at 289-95.
The Supreme Court has often relied on the concurrent sentence doctrine. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 848 (1973); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359
(1958); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943). Nevertheless, the Court in Ben-
ton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,(1969), indicated that the doctrine may be suspect. The Court
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approach of automatically vacating the concurrent conviction rather
than summarily affirming the concurrent sentence. 9 Prior to Truong,
the Fourth Circuit had considered the applicability of the concurrent
sentence doctrine in Close v. United States.0 In Close, the trial court
sentenced the defendant to two consecutive terms for armed bank rob-
bery and one concurrent term for interstate transportation of stolen pro-
perty." On a motion to vacate the sentences, the district court refused to
vacate the interstate transportation sentence on the basis of the concur-
rent sentence doctrine.2 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court
ruling, noting that a court should not apply the doctrine if there is even a
slight possibility of adverse collateral consequences to the defendant as
a result of the failure to review a conviction."
The dissent in Truong relied on Close to criticize the majority opin-
ion. The dissent interpreted Close to hold that courts should never apply
the concurrent sentence doctrine because the doctrine always adversely
affects the defendant." Although Truong is factually distinguishable
from Close, 5 the majority's conclusion that the application of the doc-
trine would not cause adverse consequences is unsatisfactory.
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that no adverse collateral conse-
quences would result from the doctrine's application in Truong conflicts
noted that the doctrine has never been satisfactorily justified and that the Supreme Court
and other federal courts have applied the doctrine haphazardly. Id. at 789-90. The Benton
Court indicated that the doctrine is not jurisdictional, and therefore, the doctrine may be in-
voked at the discretion of the court. Id. at 791. The Court suggested, however, that the bet-
ter practice is to invoke the doctrine only on collateral rather than direct attack. Id. at 793
n.11. See also note 66 infra.
'" See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 538 F.2d 461, 466 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v.
Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); United
States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
450 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068 (1972).
Id. at 153.
62 Id.
Id. at 155. The Supreme Court has suggested that virtually all criminal convictions
carry some adverse collateral consequences. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968);
note 38 supra; text accompanying notes 66-70 infra.
629 F.2d at 922-23. The majority in Truong distinguished Close and chose to follow
the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979), which similarly refused to review a concurrent conviction based
on 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976). The decision in Truong, however, is consistent with pre-Close deci-
sions in which the Fourth Circuit applied the concurrent sentence doctrine. See, e.g., United
States v. Powell, 407 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 966 (1969); United States
v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344, 348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968). But see text ac-
companying notes 66-70 infra.
" The Truong majority distinguished Truong from Close by holding that there was no
substantial possiblity of harm to Truong as a result of applying the doctrine. 629 F.2d at
932. But see text accompanying notes 66-70 infra. In addition, unlike Truong, Close involved
a concurrent sentence that the defendant had already served and which the court held to be
unconstitutional on fourth amendment grounds. See 450 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1068 (1972).
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with the Supreme Court precedent that a court should presume the
presence of adverse collateral consequences unless the Government can
clearly prove the contrary." The Truong court not only failed to
presume adverse collateral consequences, but also failed to consider all
of the possible adverse collateral consequences. The court considered
only the effect that application of the doctrine would have on the ap-
pellants' confinement and parole."7 The court failed to consider the effect
of recidivist statutes on a later conviction, the possibility of deportation
as a result of the unreviewed conviction, or the possible stigma that may
attach to the appellants as a result of the unreviewed convictions."
Another factor which the Fourth Circuit failed to consider is that ap-
plication of the concurrent sentence doctrine may substantially curtail a
defendant's right to appeal.69 In order to preserve adequately the right
to appeal, the court in Truong should have followed the approach taken
in several circuits of vacating rather than summarily affirming the con-
curent convictions." Vacating has the advantage of promoting judicial
economy without undercutting a defendant's right to appeal.
In Truong, the Fourth Circuit correctly applied an exception to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement for surveillance of foreign in-
telligence activities. The Fourth Circuit carefully balanced the in-
dividual's fourth amendment rights against society's interest in protect-
ing national security.71 The proper balance is reflected in the limitation
of the foreign intelligence exception to defendants who are clearly
agents or collaborators of foreign powers and to surveillance directed
primarily at gathering foreign intelligence information.2 The Fourth Cir-
In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Supreme Court indicated that most
criminal convictions result in adverse collateral consequences and that the mere possibility
of adverse collateral consequences is sufficient to prevent a concurrent conviction from be-
ing moot. Id. at 55. Sibron, coupled with the decision in Benton that the concurrent sentence
doctrine is not an absolute jurisdictional bar, indicates that courts should presume that
adverse collateral consequences exist. The Sibron Court cited Pollard v. United States, 352
U.S. 354, 358 (1957), for the proposition that appellate courts should make this presumption.
392 U.S. at 55. See United States v. Febre, 425 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
849 (1970) (Hays, J., dissenting); Note, The Federal Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 70 Col-
UM. L. REV. 1099, 1111 (1970). See also United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 895-96 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Roney, Hill, Clark, Fay & Vance, J.J., concurring and dissenting).
67 629 F.2d at 932.
See note 38 supra.
69 A defendant convicted in a United States District Court may appeal as of right to
the proper Circuit Court of Appeals. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1962).
Although a defendant need not petition the appellate court for leave to appeal, the defen-
dant must comply with the various time limitations and procedural provisions before the ap-
pellate court accepts his appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 3, 4(b). Compliance with these provi-
sions is a jurisdictional prerequisite for pursuing an appeal in federal courts. 369 U.S. 438,
442 n.5 (1962); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960).
0 See note 59 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 26-31 & 51 supra.
See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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cuit's decision on the concurrent sentence doctrine issue, however, is
suspect. The court's analysis of the possible adverse consequences that
may befall the appellants as a result of the application of the doctrine is
dangerously incomplete."' The court's application of the doctrine in
Truong also unfairly restricts the appellants' right to appeal all of their
convictions.74
DOUGLAS J. CHUMBLEY
F. Misapplication of the Constitutional Rights to a Speedy Trial
Constitutional and statutory speedy trial provisions protect a
criminal defendant from unreasonable delay by government
prosecutors.1 While statutes of limitation2 provide the primary safe-
guards against unreasonable prosecutorial delay s the fifth and sixth
See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
7, See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
See Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Triak Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. Rv.
525, 531-32.
Both the fifth amendment due process clause and the sixth amendment speedy trial
clause of the United States Constitution provide speedy trial protection to criminal defen-
dants. See note 4 infra. The fifth amendment protects a defendant from unreasonable
Government delay in the pre-accusation period. See text accompanying notes 14-19 infra
(defendant must show actual prejudice and unreasonable delay to establish due process
speedy trial claim). The sixth amendment speedy trial clause protects a defendant from
post-accusation delay. See text accompanying notes 8-13 infra (courts balance defendant's
assertion of right and resulting prejudice against Government action to determine whether
delay between accusation and trial violates sixth amendment protections).
The statutes of limitation limit the time within which the Government may bring
charges for non-capital offenses. See note 2 infra (federal criminal statute of limitations).
Procedural rules allow a trial court to dismiss an indictment upon defendant's showing of
unfair Government delay. See note 5 infra (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) allows
federal trial court to dismiss for delay). The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§
3161-3174 (1976), governs the time within which the Government must try a defendant after
accusation. See notes 6-7 infra (Speedy Trial Act protects criminal defendants from post-
accusation delay).
I Title 18, Chapter 213 of the United States Code sets forth the periods of limitation
applicable to federal criminal prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3291 (1976). The statute of
limitations represents the legislative determination of a reasonable period within the
Government may bring charges for an offense. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322
(1971).
1 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966). Accord, Toussie v. United States,
397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970) (purpose of statute of limitations in criminal cases is to protect
defendant from having to defend against stale charges and to encourage Government to in-
vestigate quickly); United States v. Cerrito, 612 F.2d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1979) (statute of
limitations determines period within which Government may bring charges unless pro-
secutor violated defendant's speedy trial rights).
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amendments of the United States Constitution protect the defendant's
speedy trial right for delay during the limitation period.' Rule 48(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 under which a judge may
dismiss an indictment because of unnecessary delay by prosecutors, pro-
vides further protection to a defendant. The Federal Speedy Trial Act of
1974 is a legislative enactment of the sixth amendment protections ap-
plicable to periods of post-accusation delay.'
The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial attaches at the time the
Government accuses a defendant of a crime. In United States v. Marion9
the Supreme Court determined that a suspect becomes an "accused" for
sixth amendment purposes only at the time of indictment or arrest.1 °
' The fifth amendment prohibits the Government from depriving any person of liber-
ty without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment provides that in
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
I FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b). Rule 48(b) provides that unnecessary Government delay in
presenting a charge to the grand jury, or delay in bringing the defendant to trial is grounds
for dismissal of charges.
a 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976). The provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 apply
to individuals arrested or served with summonses after June 30, 1976. Id. § 3163.
Id. § 3161; see United States v. Bullock, 551 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir. 1977) (Speedy
Trial Act is congressional effort to implement sixth amendment goal of ensuring that
Government not delay bringing accused to trial; Act not designed to provide new substan-
tive defenses to accused). Governmental compliance with the Speedy Trial Act does not bar
a defendant from asserting a sixth amendment speedy trial claim. 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1976).
' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). The sixth amendment specifically
states that the "accused" in a criminal prosecution shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth amendment speedy
trial right in a relatively small number of cases. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 315 n.7.
In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Supreme Court extended the sixth
amendment speedy trial right to state criminal prosecutions. The Court held that a North
Carolina procedure by which the state could indefinitely postpone prosecution on an indict-
ment violated the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a speedy trial. Id.
at 219-26. In Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), the Court held that the sixth amendment
requires that a state make a diligent, good faith effort to bring a prisoner in federal custody
to trial on pending state charges. Id. at 383. In Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), the
Supreme Court held that a delay in prosecution that results in substantial prejudice to the
defendant violates the sixth amendment if the prosecution were delayed solely for the
state's convenience. Id. at 38.
Although Marion involved delay which preceded indictment or arrest, the Supreme
Court established the rule that the sixth amendment speedy trial right attaches only at ar-
rest or indictment. 404 U.S. at 313. The Court developed the balancing test to measure post-
accusation sixth amendment delay in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528-30 (1972); see text
accompanying notes 11-13 infra.
404 U.S. 307 (1971).
10 Id. at 313. In Marion, the Federal Trade Commission had investigated the defend-
ants' company at the time of the alleged crimes, and had subjected the company to a cease-
and-desist order. Id. at 309. The Court found, however, that the defendants were not "ac-
cused" until the the Government brought the indictment, three years after the last of the al-
leged criminal acts occurred. The Court held that any constitutional speedy trial violation
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Therefore, sixth amendment speedy trial protections apply only to the
period between the accusation and trial. The Supreme Court established
a four part balancing test in Barker v. Wingo11 to determine when post-
accusation delay violates a defendant's sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial.12 Under the Barker test, a court considers the length of
delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial
right, and the resulting prejudice to the defendant."
In cases of pre-arrest or pre-indictment delay, the due process clause
of the fifth amendment protects a defendant's right to a speedy trial." In
Marion the Supreme Court held that delay before indictment or arrest
violates due process only if the defendant proves that prosecutorial
delay resulted in actual prejudice."1 The Court clarified the Marion rule
in United States v. Lovascol6 by stating that proof of prejudice is
before the time of accusation was a fifth amendment due process violation rather than a
sixth amendment violation. Id. at 324-25; see note 14 infra.
The defendants in Marion were not under arrest prior to indictment. 404 U.S. at 309.
In Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per curiam), the Court held that the sixth
amendment speedy trial right attached at the time of the defendant's arrest, even though
the Government did not obtain an indictment until twenty-two months later. Id. at 64-65.
The Dillingham Court relied on the Marion rationale that the sixth amendment applies at
arrest because to arrest and detain a defendant, the Government must show probable cause
that the defendant committed a crime. Id. at 65 (citing 404 U.S. at 320-21). The Marion Court
had reasoned that arrest pursuant to probable cause is a public act which might interefere
significantly with the defendant's liberty. 404 U.S. 320-21. The interference with the defend-
ant's liberty, therefore, caused the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial to attach. Id.
n 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
" Id. at 528-30. The Barker Court refused to find that a specific period of delay was
per se violative of speedy trial rights, but found that courts should approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis, applying a balancing test. Id. at 529-30.
13 Id. at 530. The Barker Court stated that the length of delay is a triggering
mechanism to determine whether the court should inquire into other factors. Id. The Court
stated that the reason for the delay determines whether the court should weigh the factor
heavily against the Government. Deliberate delay weighs heavily against the Government,
but negligent delay does not. Id. at 531. The Court found that absent the defendant's asser-
tion of the right to a speedy trial, a speedy trial violation would be difficult to prove. Id. at
532. The Barker Court noted that a court should consider pretrial incarceration, anxiety and
concern of the accused, and the effect of delay on the defense at trial to evaluate the pre-
judice to the defendant. Id. The Supreme Court noted that none of the four factors was a
sufficient or necessary condition to finding a violation of the defendant's speedy trial right.
Id. at 533. Rather, a court should balance all the factors. Id.
" In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that
the statute of limitations does not define fully a defendant's speedy trial right to be pro-
tected against pre-indictment prosecutorial delay. Id. at 324. The Marion Court noted that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires dismissal of the indictment if the
defendant shows actual and substantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial and
intentional Government delay. Id.; accord, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790
(1977).
15 404 U.S. at 325-26; see generally Lite, The Pre-Accusation Delay Dilemma, 10
SETON HALL L. Rav. 539, 541-45 (1980) (interpreting Marion speedy trial requirement).
" 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
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necessary but not sufficient to establish a due process speedy trial
claim.1 The defendant also must show that the Government's delay was
unreasonable." The Lovasco Court emphasized that prosecutorial delay
for investigative purposes does not violate a defendant's due process
right. 9
The determination whether fifth or sixth amendment speedy trial
protections apply during a period is particularly important in cases that
involve two distinct phases of a prosecution."0 Even if the sixth amend-
ment speedy trial right attaches at the time of an arrest or indictment,
the sixth amendment protections do not apply after termination of the
initial prosecution because the defendant is no longer "accused."'" The
fifth amendment due process protections should apply to the period be-
tween the end of the first phase of prosecution and the beginning of any
subsequent prosecution which the double jeopardy clause does not bar.'
Prior to the arrest or indictment beginning the second prosecution, the
statutes of limitation and the due process clause protect the defendant
against unreasonable delay. 3
In United States v. MacDonald'4 the Fourth Circuit recently con-
sidered whether the Government's delay during the nine year period
between the commission of the murders and the trial violated the
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.' The case involved an
Army investigative proceeding and a subsequent prosecution by the
" Id. at 790.
"Id.
" Id. at 790-91. The Lovasco court noted that in considering a due process speedy trial
claim, judges may not impose their personal notions of fairness but should find a due pro-
cess violation only if the Government's delay violates "fundamental conceptions of justice."
Id. at 790 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). The Lovasco Court expressly
found that delaying an indictment for the purpose of establishing probable cause does not
violate due process. Id. at 791-95.
In Lovasco, the defendant was indicted for possession of firearms stolen from the
United States mails and for dealing in firearms without a license. Id. at 784. The indictment
was not filed until eighteen months after the alleged crime, even though a Postal Inspector
filed an investigative report within one month of the crime and an assistant United States
Attorney indicated that the Government did not obtain significant additional information in
the ensuing seventeen month period. Id. at 784-85. The Lovasco Court noted that recom-
mending an indictment on less than probable cause is unprofessional conduct, and that the
Government does not have to begin prosecution immediately upon determining probable
cause. Id. at 791.
See text accompanying notes 180-209 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 123-26 infra.
= See text accompanying note 194 infra.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971).
" 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980) (MacDonald II) rehearing en banc denied, 635 F.2d 1115
(4th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. (U.S. March 18, 1981) (No. 80-1582). The
Fourth Circuit first considered MacDonald's speedy trial claim in an interlocutory appeal in
1975. 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976) (MacDonald 1), rev'd, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (on procedural
grounds); see text accompanying notes 42-46 infra.
" 632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald II panel).
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United States Department of Justice.2 Since the statute of limitations
did not limit the time within which the Government could prosecute for
murder,2 the Fourth Circuit decided the case on constitutional grounds.
In a split decision, a Fourth Circuit panel decided that prosecutorial
delay violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.'
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit denied the Government's petition for
rehearing en banc.'
Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald, an Army physician, was stationed at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, in 1970. On February 17, 1970, military police
found MacDonald's wife and two children clubbed and stabbed to death
at the MacDonald residence on Fort Bragg.30 The Army's Criminal- In-
vestigation Division (C.I.D.) had initial responsibility for the investiga-
tion because the Army had jurisdiction to prosecute." The Army formally
charged MacDonald with the murders on May 1, 1970.2 Army pro-
cedures, as specified in Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), required a prompt hearing to investigate the charges."
The hearing resulted in the recommendation that the Army drop the
charges against MacDonald.' Following dismissal of the charges, the Ar-
my granted MacDonald an honorable discharge in December, 1970, thus
" See text accompanying notes 31-40 infra.
632 F.2d at 267 n.1 (Bryan, J., dissenting) (MacDonald II panel). The Government
may bring an indictment for a capital offense at any time without limitation. 18 U.S.C. §
3281 (1976); see note 2 supra.
632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald I panel).
2 635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980) (petition for rehearing en banc denied). Chief Judge
Haynsworth issued a dissenting statement to the denial of the petition for rehearing, id. at
1116, tentatively agreeing with the dissenting opinion issued by the four additional judges
who voted to grant rehearing en banc. Id. at 1116-23. All future references to Judge
Haynsworth's dissenting statement will be cited as 635 F.2d 1115 (rehearing denial)
(Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting). All future references to the joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Russell, Widener, Hall, and Phillips will be cited as 635 F.2d 1115 (joint rehearing
dissent). Judge Murnaghan issued a statement in response to the dissenting opinions. 635
F.2d at 1123-24. All future references to Judge Murnaghan's statement will be cited as 635
F.2d 1115 (Murnaghan statement).
531 F.2d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 1976).
01 531 F.2d at 200. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) art. 16-21 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-821 (1976)) (court-martial jurisdiction). The military police, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Fayetteville, North Carolina police department jointly
began investigating the crime immediately after it occurred. 531 F.2d at 200.
", 531 F.2d at 200. The C.I.D. first informed MacDonald that he was under suspicion for
the murders on April 6, 1970. On that day MacDonald's commanding officer relieved him of
his medical duties and restricted him to his quarters. The Army did not formally charge
MacDonald until May 1, 1970. Id.
I U.C.M.J. art. 32 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976)). Article 32 requires that the Ar-
my conduct a thorough and impartial investigation of all charges against an individual
before referring the charges to a general court-martial for trial. Id.
531 F.2d at 200. At the conclusion of the hearing, the investigating officer in charge
of the Article 32 hearing filed a report recommending that the Army drop the charges
against MacDonald. MacDonald's Commanding General reviewed the report and dismissed
the charges on October 23, 1970. Id.
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ending any Army jurisdiction over MacDonald. 5 MacDonald resumed
the practice of medicine in California shortly after his discharge from
the Army."
At the request of the Department of Justice, the C.I.D. continued the
investigation of the murders. In 1972 the C.I.D. forwarded a thirteen
volume report on the case (the C.I.D. report) to the Department of
Justice. 7 The C.I.D. filed supplemental reports in November, 1972 and
August, 1973.38 The Government began the presentation of the case to a
federal grand jury in August, 1974, and the grand jury returned an in-
dictment against MacDonald for murder on a military installation on
January 24, 1975."9 Federal authorities immediately arrested MacDonald
in California and released him on bail a week later.
4
1
Although the trial court denied MacDonald's pretrial motion to
dismiss the indictment on fifth and sixth amendment speedy trial
grounds,41 the Fourth Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal (Mac-
Donald 1)42 and found that the Government's delay had violated Mac-
Donald's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.4 3 The Fourth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the
prosecution with prejudice.44 The Government appealed, and the
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision on the ground
that a defendant cannot appeal the denial of a sixth amendment speedy
trial claim until the trial court enters final judgment.4" The Supreme
Id. at 201 & n.4 (citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)). Following MacDonald's
discharge from the Army, the federal district court had jurisdiction because the crimes
were committed on a military base. 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 1111, 3231 (1976); 531 F.2d at 198 n.1.
531 F.2d at 201.
Id. The C.I.D. completed the field investigation in December, 1971, and filed the in-
itial, thirteen volume report with the Justice Department in June, 1972. Id.
632 F.2d at 268 (Bryan, J., dissenting) (MacDonald 11 panel). The MacDonald I panel
stated that the C.I.D. suggested that the Government convene a grand jury to continue the
investigation. 531 F.2d at 201. The MacDonald 11 opinion implies that the Fourth Circuit did
not resolve the question of whether the C.I.D. recommended prosecution or further in-
vestigation. 632 F.2d at 261 (MacDonald 11 panel).
" 531 F.2d at 201. The indictment charged MacDonald with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1111 (1976). See Schuman, Did Captain MacDonald Receive a Speedy Trial?, 54 CONN. B.J.
69, 70 n.6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Schuman] (interpreting MacDonald I opinion). Mac-
Donald ultimately was convicted for the second degree murder of his wife and one of his
children and the first degree murder of his other child. 632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald II panel).
5 31 F.2d at 201.
,1 Appendix of the Appellant, Vol. I at 46-47, United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258
(4th Cir. 1980) (MacDonald I1) [hereinafter cited as Appendix of the Appellant] (district
court's pre-trial order denying MacDonald's motion to dismiss indictment on speedy trial
grounds; court reasoned that sixth amendment did not attach until return of indictment).
,2 531 F.2d at 199.
4 Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
'5 United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 863 (1978). The Supreme Court reviewed
cases in which interlocutory appeal was proper and concluded that a denial of a motion to
dismiss on speedy trial grounds is not appealable because the denial is not a complete, for-
[Vol. XXXVIII
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Court did not reach the merits of MacDonald's speedy trial claim, but
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion.46
The Government brought MacDonald to trial in the Eastern District
of North Carolina in 1979. The jury found MacDonald guilty of two
counts of second degree murder and one count of first degree murder.7 ,
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit (MacDonald II), MacDonald claimed that
the prosecution had violated his fifth and sixth amendment speedy trial
rights. 8 Without addressing the fifth amendment claim the Fourth Cir-
cuit panel concluded that the Government's delay had violated Mac-
Donald's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, vacated the sentences
and dismissed the indictment. 9 The Government requested a rehearing
en banc." The Fourth Circuit denied the Government's petition by a 5-5
vote." The judges who favored rehearing the case issued a dissent to the
denial of the petition (rehearing dissent).2
The MacDonald II panel relied heavily on the reasoning of the Mac-
Donald I decision. The MacDonald I panel had determined that the 1970
military arrest of MacDonald was the functional equivalent of civilian ar-
rest, and that MacDonald's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial at-
tached at the time of the military arrest." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
in MacDonald I applied the Supreme Court's balancing test enunciated
in Barker v. Wingo"l and determined that the Government's delay in ob-
mal, and final rejection of the defendant's claim. Id. at 859. The Court examined the pre-
judice factor of the Barker balancing test, see note 13 supra, and found that the trial court
could determine whether delay impaired the defense better after the trial. Id. at 858-59.
" 435 U.S. at 863.
'" 632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald II panel); see note 39 supra.
" 632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald II panel); see note 24 supra.
11 632 F.2d at 267 (MacDonald II panel).
635 F.2d at 1115 (rehearing denial). The Government filed the petition requesting
rehearing en banc on August 18, 1980. Id.
Id
'z Id. at 1116-23; see note 29 supra.
531 F.2d at 203. MacDonald was "confined to quarters" during the Army Article 32
proceeding. MacDonald's confinement met the technical definition of military arrest because
the Army relieved MacDonald of his military duties pending the investigative proceeding.
See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 20(a) & (b) (1969 ed.). The district court judge pointed
out that MacDonald's status was not equivalent to "pretrial incarceration" because Mac-
Donald was able to go to and from meals, play golf, have a female companion visit his
quarters, and receive full pay without having to fulfill the required military duties. Appen-
dix of the Appellant, supra note 41, Vol. VII at 1585. Judge Craven, dissenting in Mac-
Donald I, argued that McDonald's status during the Article 32 proceeding was not
equivalent to "accusation" for sixth amendment purposes because the arrest was not made
pursuant to a finding of probable cause. 531 F.2d at 212 (Craven, J., dissenting); see text ac-
companying notes 72-75 infra.
" 531 F.2d at 204. The MacDonald I majority noted that the Supreme Court had held
in Marion that the sixth amendment speedy trial right could attach at arrest or indictment,
and that the Supreme Court had reaffirmed Marion in Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S.
64 (1975). 531 F.2d at 202; see note 10 supra.
53 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see note 12 supra.
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taining the grand jury indictment violated MacDonald's sixth amend-
ment right.
5 1
To determine the length of delay, the first Barker factor, the Mac-
Donald I court considered the four and one half year period between the
original Army charge and the return of the grand jury indictment in
1975.1" MacDonald acknowledged that the Government was not responsi-
ble for any delay after the bringing of the indictment." The MacDonald I
panel reasoned that the Army proceedings and the Department of
Justice prosecution involved the same charge and that the sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy trial protected MacDonald against delay by the
Government regardless of the number of executive departments
participating in the prosecution. 9 The MacDonald I court found that the
four and one half year delay was sufficiently long to inquire into the
other Barker factors."
Considering the reason for the delay, the second Barker factor, the
MacDonald I court found that only the two year period between the time
the Department of Justice received the first C.I.D. report and the return
of the indictment was unreasonable. 1 The Fourth Circuit determined
that the C.I.D.'s delay in completing the investigative report was ex-
cusable.2 The court found, however, that the delay following the Justice
Department's receipt of the C.I.D. report resulted from the
Government's negligence and should weigh against the Government.
3
The third Barker factor, the defendant's assertion of the right to a
speedy trial, weighed in favor of MacDonald because the MacDonald I
panel found that the defendant had cooperated with the Government and
repeatedly had requested completion of the investigation. 4
The MacDonald I panel also weighed the fourth Barker factor, pre-
judice to the defendant, in favor of MacDonald.15 To determine prejudice,
the Fourth Circuit examined the purposes of the sixth amendment
speedy trial right 6 which the Supreme Court identified in United States
531 F.2d at 205-08.
1? 531 F.2d at 205. The MacDonald I panel considered the period between May 1, 1970,
when the Army formally charged MacDonald with the murders, and the January, 1975 in-
dictment to be the period of the Government's delay for purposes of calculating the length
of delay under the Barker balancing test. Id. at 201-02, 205.
Id. at 202.
59 Id. at 204; see text accompanying notes 190-93 infra.
'o 531 F.2d at 205; see note 13 supra.
531 F.2d at 206-07.
6 Id. at 206.
Id. at 206-07. The MacDonald I court characterized the Government delay between
the receipt of the initial C.I.D. report in 1972 until the grand jury indictment in 1975 as in-
different, negligent, or inept. Id. at 207. The United States Attorney had stated at a bail
hearing that delay in obtaining F.B.I. analysis of evidence had been the result of govern-
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v. Ewell.7 The purposes are to protect the accused against undue and op-
pressive pretrial incaraceration, to minimize anxiety resulting from a
public accusation, and to limit the possibility that delay will impair the
defense at trial. 8 Although MacDonald was not subject to pretrial in-
carceration, 9 the MacDonald I court found prejudice in the anxiety
resulting from the threat of prosecution and in the potential loss of
testimony at trial."° Therefore, the first Fourth Circuit panel that con-
sidered MacDonald's speedy trial claim weighed all of the Barker factors
in favor of the defendant and concluded that the Government had
violated MacDonald's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.7
Judge Craven dissented from the MacDonald I decision, arguing
that the military arrest did not give rise to a sixth amendment speedy
trial right. 2 Analyzing the nature of the military investigation of Mac-
Donald, Judge Craven reasoned that the Army did not arrest and detain
MacDonald pursuant to probable cause."3 Consequently, the military
"6arrest" was not equivalent to lawful civilian arrest.74 Judge Craven con-
cluded that the only constitutional speedy trial right available to Mac-
Donald prior to indictment was the due process speedy trial right, and
that the potential prejudice was insufficient to establish a violation of
the due process right."
Reversing the Fourth Circuit's decision in MacDonald I, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the denial of a speedy trial trial motion is
not a complete, formal, and final rejection of the motion.6 Although the
Court did not consider the merits of MacDonald's speedy trial claim,7
the basis for the decision was that an evaluation of. the extent to which
delay impairs the defense can only be speculative before trial.78 The
Court emphasized that the denial of a pre-trial motion to dismiss an in-
dictment on speedy trial grounds does not show conclusively that the
trial court would deny the motion after trial.79 The Supreme Court
383 U.S. 116 (1966).
Id. at 120.
531 F.2d at 207-08.
70 Id. at 208. The MacDonald I court found that the threat of prosecution during the
period between MacDonald's discharge from the Army and the grand jury indictment was
the cause of anxiety to MacDonald. The court found further prejudice because MacDonald
bore the cost of retaining counsel during the period. The Fourth Circuit considered the-
potential of loss of witnesses and faded memories to be sufficient to constitute impairment
to the defense. Id.
T' Id. at 208.
Id at 209-10 (Craven, J., dissenting).
Id. at 211-12.
7, Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
78 435 U.S. 850, 858 (1978); see note 45 supra.
435 U.S. at 859.
T' Id. at 858-60.
Id. at 859-60.
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remanded the case, and in 1979 a jury found MacDonald guilty of the
murders of his wife and children."0
Following the conviction and sentencing, the district court judge
considered MacDonald's speedy trial claim. 1 In a lengthy order, the
district court judge focused on whether the Government's delay had pre-
judiced the defendant, and concluded that any prejudice to MacDonald
had been minimal.82 The district court judge found that MacDonald was
not subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration and did not suffer great
anxiety and concern as a result of the pre-indictment delay. 3 Analyzing
the prejudice to MacDonald's defense at trial, the district court judge
found that MacDonald did not lose the testimony of any witnesses dur-
ing the delay. 4 The judge found, however, that MacDonald was able to
produce additional defense witnesses who had not been available in
1970.85 Therefore, the district court judge concluded that the events at
trial did not support a finding of prejudice for purposes of MacDonald's
speedy trial claim.6
On appeal, the MacDonald II court reversed MacDonald's conviction
solely on sixth amendment speedy trial grounds." Applying the Barker
balancing test, the MacDonald 11 majority stated that the only Barker
factor which required reconsideration following the trial was the pre-
judice to the defendant.88 Thus, MacDonald I1 purportedly adopted the
reasoning of MacDonald I with respect to the length of delay,89 the
reason for the delay, 0 and the defendant's assertion of his right to a
speedy trial. 1 Nevertheless, the MacDonald 11 opinion addressed each of
the four Barker factors.
2
The threshold determination in an application of the Barker test is
See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
81 United States v. MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (district court order
discussing reasons for not allowing bail pending appeal of MacDonald's conviction).
Id. at 1090.
Id The district court judge noted that the restrictions on MacDonald's liberty dur-
ing the brief Army incarceration were minimal. Id.; see note 53 supra. The district court
judge found that the anxiety and concern caused MacDonald were not significant. Mac-
Donald had moved to California, resumed a medical practice, and was established socially
and professionally. 485 F. Supp. at 1090.
" 485 F. Supp. at 1090. The district court judge noted that the only material witness
who had died was a government witness. Id.
'7 Id. The district court judge found that MacDonald benefitted from the testimony of
a defense witness and several expert witnesses who became available during the period of
delay. Id.
8 Id.
' 632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald II panel).
" Id at 260-61. The Supreme Court had found that the trial court could evaluate pre-
judice more accurately after trial. 435 U.S. at 858-59; see note 45 supra.
632 F.2d at 261-62 (MacDonald 11 panel); see text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
632 F.2 at 262 (MacDonald 11 panel); see text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
632 F.2d at 262-63 (MacDonald 11 panel); see text accompanying note 64 supra.
632 F.2d 261-66 (MacDonald 11 panel).
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the identification of the precise period of delay.93 The MacDonald I ma-
jority had considered the period between the beginning of the Army pro-
ceedings in May, 1970 and the return of the grand jury indictment in
January, 1975 to be the relevant period of delay.94 The MacDonald II ma-
jority identified the Government's delay as the nine year period bet-
ween the military arrest on May 1, 1970 and the 1979 trial. In a state-
ment attached to the denial of the Government's petition for rehearing,
Jude Murnaghan corrected an "error in language"9 in the MacDonald 11
opinion. Judge Murnaghan stated that the relevant delay occurred in the
period between the conclusion of the military proceedings in October,
1970 and the 1975 indictment.7
Discussing the reason for the delay, the MacDonald II majority
characterized the Justice Department's delay between the receipt of the
initial C.I.D. report in 1972 and the bringing of the indictment in 1975 as
the result of bureaucracy and the prosecutors' indifference.98 In Lovasco,
the Supreme Court held that investigative delay by the Government
before return of an indictment was not unreasonable for due process
speedy trial purposes.9 The MacDonald 11 majority distinguished
Lovasco by finding that MacDonald was a sixth amendment rather than'
due process case, and that pre-indictment publicity which had not ex-
isted in Lovasco was present in MacDonald.' The MacDonald.1I court
noted that MacDonald had requested a speedy trial and that his coopera-
tion with the Government and requests for a resolution of the case were
sufficient to weigh the third Barker factor, the defendant's assertion of
the speedy trial right, heavily in MacDonald's favor.
10'
In spite of the Supreme Court's decision that the trial court should
determine the prejudice element after the trial,9 ' the MacDonald II
court found that the events at trial had only confused the question of
prejudice to the defense.' 9 The court noted that the difference between
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530.
531 F.2d at 205; see text accompanying note 57 supra.
632 F.2d at 261 (MacDonald II panel).
635 F.2d at 1123 (Murnaghan statement).
Id. Judge Murnaghan stated that he was correcting an error in the language of the
MacDonald II panel opinion to which the joint rehearing dissent had called attention. Id
The joint rehearing dissent had questioned whether the MacDonald II majority had meant
to state that the end of the period of delay was the trial in 1979 rather than the 1975 indict-
ment. 635 F.2d at 1117 n.6 (joint rehearing dissent). In the correcting statement, however,
Judge Murnaghan changed not only his erroneous statement regarding the end of the
period, but inexplicably changed the language regarding the beginning of the period from
the "military arrest" to "the conclusion of the military proceedings." 635 F.2d at 1123 (Mur-
naghan statement); see text accompanying notes 175-79 infra.
632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald 11 panel).
431 U.S. at 795; see note 19 supra.
632 F.2d at 261-62 (MacDonald 11 panel).
"4 Id. at 262-63.
1 435 U.S. at 861; see text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
632 F.2d at 263 (MacDonald H panel).
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the pretrial expectations of prejudice as expressed in MacDonald I and
the events at trial was insignificant. 4 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit
found a likelihood that the faded memories of witnesses resulted in pre-
judice to MacDonald.' The court focused on the loss of Helena
Stoeckley's testimony that she was unable to remember anything re-
lated to the crime."' The MacDonald I court considered the period of
delay to have increased the possibility that Stoeckley would not support
MacDonald's defense." 7 Thus, the court found only a possibility of pre-
judice to MacDonald's defense at trial.'0 The MacDonald 11 court also
considered the personal prejudice to MacDonald that the delay caused.",
Noting that MacDonald suffered anxiety and incurred personal expense
as a result of the threatened prosecution, the court concluded that the
prejudice factor of Barker weighed in MacDonald's favor." Applying the
Barker balancing test, the MacDonald II panel reversed MacDonald's
conviction for murder.'
Dissenting from the MacDonald II decision, Judge Bryan argued
that the only relevant period of delay was the two year period between
the C.I.D.'s initial filing of the investigative report and the convening of
the grand jury."' In considering the reason for the delay, Judge Bryan
concluded that the Government was correct to gather all of the neces-
sary evidence against MacDonald before convening the grand jury."'
While recognizing that delay because of government bureaucracy war-
ranted disapproval, Judge Bryan emphasized that the amount of
1 Id. at 263.
101 Id. The MacDonald II court reasoned that the Justice Department's two year delay
in obtaining the grand jury indictment contributed to the fading of witnesses' memories and
triggered the sixth amendment speedy trial protection. Id. at 263 n.2. The MacDonald II
court found that only a substantial possibility of prejudice is necessary for a sixth amend-
ment speedy trial claim. Id. at 264. Earlier in the opinion, however, the court stated that a
probability of prejudice is necessary proof for a valid sixth amendment speedy trial claim.
Id. at 260. The court later stated, however, that substantial proof of prejudice is an element
of a sixth amendment speedy trial claim. Id. at 266.
1 Id. at 264-65. The MacDonald II court found a "substantial possibility" that had the
trial been earlier, Stoeckley would have testified to knowledge to the crime. Id. at 264. The
record revealed that Stoeckley had indicated when questioned in the initial stages of the in-
vestigation that she was one of a group of intruders who committed the murders at the Mac-
Donald house. Id. As Judge Bryan pointed out in the dissent, however, Stoeckley could not
remember details of the crime within several days of the crime, and attributed her inability
to recall to the use of drugs rather than the passage of time. Id. at 269 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting). The majority acknowledged that a likely reason Stoeckley did not testify to hav-
ing knowledge of the crime was that she was not at the scene of the crime. Id. at 264 n.5.
10 Id. at 264.
' Id. at 265.
SId. at 265-66.
", Id. at 266.
111 Id.
SId. at 268 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
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evidence and the time required to assess the evidence in the case caused
the delay.114
Based on the Supreme Court's finding that the court should deter-
mine prejudice only after trial,"1 , Judge Bryan argued that the Fourth
Circuit should avoid speculation in assessing the prejudice to Mac-
Donald."'6 The MacDonald II majority, rather than examine the events at
trial, speculated that the delay may have prejudiced MacDonald's
defense.17 Judge Bryan agreed with the district court judge's determina-
tion that the trial record did not support a finding of prejudice to Mac-
Donald's defense.1 Therefore, under Judge Bryan's evaluation of the
Barker factors, the prosecutorial delay did not constitute a violation of
MacDonald's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
An evenly divided Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc on
December 18, 1980.119 The judges who favored rehearing considered
whether the period between the Army hearing and the grand jury in-
dictment was relevant to MacDonald's sixth amendment speedy trial
claim.120 The dissenting judges concluded that the court should not have
included the period of investigation between the dismissal of military
charges in 1970 and the 1975 indictment in determining the length of delay
under Barker.2 The judges reasoned that MacDonald did not have a
sixth amendment speedy trial claim during the period because Mac-
Donald was not under accusation by either the Army or the Department
of Justice.1"
The rehearing dissent relied on the Sixth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Martin.1" In Martin the federal government indicted the
defendant in August, 1972 and dismissed the charges in January, 1973.
The Government obtained a second indictment in December, 1974 and
brought the defendant to trial in December, 1975.124 Although the
defendant in Martin claimed that the sixth amendment speedy trial right
I" Id Judge Bryan noted that the period between the C.I.D.s filing of the final in-
vestigative report and the convening of the grand jury was less than one year. The dissent
pointed to the complexity of the MacDonald case. For example, the Justice Department
prosecutors had to become familiar with the C.I.D. report which included almost 700 inter-
views as well as extensive scientific analysis of evidence. Id. (Bryan, J., dissenting).
21 435 U.S. at 861; see text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
632 F.2d at 269 & n.4. (MacDonald II panel) (Bryan, J., dissenting).
632 F.2d at 263-64 (MacDonald II panel); see note 105 supra.
,, 632 F.2d at 270-71, 270 n.5 (MacDonald 11 panel) (Bryan, J., dissenting); see text ac-
companying notes 82-86 supra.
... 635 F.2d at 1115 (rehearing denial); see note 29 supra.
" 635 F.2d at 1116 (rehearing denial) (Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting); id. (joint rehear-
ing dissent).
635 F.2d at 1117-20 (joint rehearing dissent).
ALI at 1117-18.
II 543 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977); see 635 F.2d at 1117-18
(joint rehearing dissent).
'2 543 F.2d at 579.
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applied to the entire period between the first indictment and trial, the
Sixth Circuit did not include the time between the dismissal of the first
indictment and the return of the second indictment in calculating the
length of delay under Barker." The Martin court measured the delay only
between the second indictment and trial because the defendant was not
"accused" and the Government could not have tried the defendant be-
tween the dismissal of charges and the return of the second
indictment."'
The rehearing dissent noted that the Speedy Trial Act of 1974"1 pro-
vides that a court should not consider the period between the dismissal
of the first indictment and the return of a second indictment in
calculating the delay of trial."8 Although the Speedy Trial Act did not
apply in MacDonald," the rehearing dissent argued that the congres-
sional determination in the Speedy Trial Act supported the Sixth Cir-
cuit's analysis in Martin."'0 The dissent noted that both MacDonald
panels had applied the sixth amendment speedy trial protections to the
period between the Army proceedings and the indictment because the
prejudice to the defendant continued during the period."1 The dissent
contended that fifth amendment due process protections applied during
the pre-indictment period, but that the sixth amendment did not apply. 32
The rehearing dissent concluded that the length of the post-
indictment delay was insufficient to require consideration of the other
Barker factors. 3' Nevertheless, the dissent briefly addressed the three
additional factors. 3' Considering the reason for the delay, the rehearing
dissent noted that the MacDonald panels had found the Justice Depart-
ment's delay in obtaining the indictment unreasonable.'35 While the Mac-
Donald panels had found that the Justice Department had not continued
to investigate between June, 1972 and the convening of the grand jury in
1974,136 the rehearing dissent noted that the delay was for investigative
purposes and was a reasonable length of time for the Justice Depart-
ment to become familiar with the C.I.D. evidence." 7 The dissent relied on
'" Id. at 578-79.
,Id. at 579.
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976); see notes 6 & 7 supra.
128 635 F.2d at 1118 (joint rehearing dissent).
'" 531 F.2d at 204 n.15. MacDonald was first arrested in 1975 for a crime committed in
1970. See text accompanying note 40 supra. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 applies to persons
arrested after June 30, 1976. See note 6 supra.
'10 635 F.2d at 1118-19 (joint rehearing dissent); see text accompanying notes 122-25
supra.
31 635 F.2d at 1119 (joint rehearing dissent).
132 Id.
11 Id. at 1120.
1 Id. at 1120-23.
13 Id. at 1120-21.
11 632 F.2d at 261 (MacDonald II panel); 531 F.2d at 206 (MacDonald I panel).
11 635 F.2d at 1120-21 (joint rehearing dissent) (noting that Justice Department twice
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Lovasco for the proposition that prosecutorial delay to investigate
thoroughly and to establish probable cause is reasonable and protects
the defendants from having to defend against unsupported charges.
Since the Supreme Court found investigative delay reasonable in
Lovasco under a due process analysis,'3 9 the rehearing dissent concluded
that the court should not weigh the Justice Department's delay between
June, 1972 and August, 1974 against the Government in evaluating Mac-
Donald's sixth amendment claim.'
Considering MacDonald's assertion of the speedy trial right, the
rehearing dissent noted that an individual has no right to arrest or to de-
mand that the Government abandon a pre-indictment investigation."'
MacDonald was not under arrest or indictment during the period be-
tween the end of the Army proceedings and the 1975 indictment. There-
fore, the rehearing dissent considered his requests for a speedy trial ir-
relevant to the sixth amendment speedy trial claim."'
The rehearing dissent also considered the prejudice element of the
Barker test and focused on the interests which the sixth amendment
speedy trial right protects.1 43 The dissent noted that MacDonald was not
subject to pretrial incarceration, and found that the anxiety resulting
from the delay was not prejudicial to MacDonald."' Analyzing whether
the delay impaired MacDonald's defense at trial, the rehearing dissent
adopted the test which the Fifth Circuit announced in Hill v. Wain-
wright."' In Hill, the court required that the defendant show "actual" pre-
judice at trial to establish a speedy trial violation. 4 ' Referring to the
requested C.I.D. to re-open investigation during two year period; complexity of case re-
quired extensive, further investigation).
Id at 1121-22 (joint rehearing dissent).
" 431 U.S. 783, 790-96; see note 19 supra.
... 635 F.2d at 1117-18 (joint rehearing dissent).
". Id. at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at
790-96; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)).
"' 635 F.2d at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent). Before the indictment and arrest in 1975,
there were no charges pending against MacDonald on which he could demand that the
Government bring him to trial. Id at 1116-17.
l' Id. at 20; see text accompanying notes 66-68 supra (discussing purpose of sixth
amendment speedy trial right set forth by Supreme Court in Ewell).
" 635 F.2d at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent); cf. text accompanying notes 82-87 supra
(district court judge's post-trial evaluation of prejudice to MacDonald).
'" 617 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980). Hill involved a habeas corpus petition based on a claim
of denial of the petitioner's right to a speedy trial. Id- at 376. The defendant's conviction for
robbery occurred almost three years after his arrest. Id. Considering prejudice resulting
from the delay, the Fifth Circuit found that the witnesses' failure to remember the descrip-
tions they gave police immediately after the crime did not constitute significant prejudice to
the defendant. Id. at 379. The court also found that the loss of prosecution witnesses did not
prejudice the defendant. Id. Therefore, the Hill court concluded that in the absence of "ac-
tual" prejudice, the Government did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment speedy
trial right. Id.
"1 635 F.2d at 1122-23 (joint rehearing dissent).
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testimony of Helena Stoeckley,147 the rehearing dissent concluded that
the delay did not cause her failure of memory and, therefore, did not pre-
judice MacDonald's defense.1 8 After evaluating each of the Barker fac-
tors, the rehearing dissent found that the MacDonald panels had not ad-
dressed the dispositive issue whether the sixth amendment applied to
the period prior to the indictment."' Upon consideration of the issue, the
dissenting judges concluded that since MacDonald had not established a
sixth amendment speedy trial violation and no court had addressed his
fifth amendment claim, the Fourth Circuit should have granted the
rehearing en banc.1
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in MacDonald II conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent and speedy trial decisions of other circuit
courts.",' Prior case law suggests that an Army Article 32 proceeding
does not necessarily constitute "accusation" giving rise to the sixth
amendment speedy trial right."2 Therefore, the court should not have ap-
plied the Barker sixth amendment test.'5 Even if the sixth amendment
right had attached in 1970, the Fourth Circuit was incorrect in applying
the Barker test to the period between the time the Army dropped the
military charges and the return of the federal grand jury indictment.'
The court should have relied on the Marion-Lovasco due process test 1 5
to determine whether the Government's pre-indictment delay violated
MacDonald's right to a speedy trial.
The Fourth Circuit never adequately addressed the critical speedy
trial question of when MacDonald was "accused" for sixth amendment
purposes. 56 To determine whether the Article 32 proceeding constituted
" Id.; see text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
' 635 F.2d at 1122-23 (joint rehearing dissent).
149 Id.
1W Id. at 1123.
" The Fourth Circuit's application of the Barker sixth amendment test in MacDonald
I conflicts with the Supreme Court's rule that only the fifth amendment due process protec-
tions are relevant to pre-indictment delay. See text accompanying notes 152-210 infra. The
MacDonald H panel's application of the Barker test is inconsistent with the manner in which
other circuits have interpreted the test. See text accompanying notes 211-56 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 156-68 infra (military arrest not equivalent to civilian
arrest under Marion rule).
1 See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra (Barker test applicable only to period be-
tween arrest or indictment and trial).
'u See text accompanying notes 202-05 infra.
1W See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.
1 The MacDonald I panel addressed the question of when "arrest" occurred as part of
the discussion of "length of delay" under the Barker test. 531 F.2d at 202-04. Judge Craven
closely analyzed military arrest to conclude that MacDonald's sixth amendment rights did
not attach until the federal indictment and arrest in 1975. Id. at 210-14 (Craven, J., dissent-
ing). The MacDonald II panel adopted the reasoning of MacDonald , without addressing the"
question of whether the fifth or sixth amendment should apply. 632 F.2d at 260-61 (Mac-
Donald II panel). The rehearing dissent, without addressing the question whether Mac-
Donald's sixth amendment rights had attached, argued that even if the sixth amendment
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accusation, the Fourth Circuit should have applied the Supreme Court's
rationale in Marion for finding that the sixth amendment speedy trial
right attaches at arrest. '57 The Marion Court found that "arrest and
holding to answer a criminal charge" engages the protections of the
sixth amendment because arrest based on probable cause may interfere
with the defendant's liberty and subject the defendant to public accusa-
tion. '
The military proceedings involving MacDonald differed significantly
from civilian arrest or indictment. The limited restrictions on Mac-
Donald's liberty were in accordance with military disciplinary pro-
cedures 59 but were not equivalent to civilian incarceration. 6 ' Although
MacDonald was technically under military arrest during the period of
the Article 32 proceeding,161 the purpose of the hearing was to determine
whether the Army had probable cause to court-martial MacDonald.' A
military officer had charged MacDonald with the murders,'6 3 but the Army
failed to find probable cause and never initiated a prosecution by court-
martial. 6 ' The MacDonald I majority suggested that publicity resulting
from the Army hearings constituted public accusation giving rise to the
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.16 5 Publicity resulting from pre-
had attached, the court should exclude the time between the dismissal of the Army charges
and the federal indictment in calculating the period of delay. 635 F.2d at 1116-18 (joint
rehearing dissent).
" 404 U.S. at 320.
1 Id. The Marion Court reasoned that to arrest and detain an individual legally, the
Government had to assert probable cause that the arrestee had committed the crime,
thereby subjecting the defendant to public accusation. Id. The negative effects which the
Marion Court noted would result from arrest were the interference with the defendant's
liberty, whether the defendant was in jail or released on bail, and the financial and personal
costs to the defendant. The Court made clear that the sixth amendment rights did not ex-
tend to any period prior to actual arrest and holding to answer charges. Id at 321.
"' See notes 53 supra. Paragraph 20(a) of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL defines the
status of a person in arrest as a moral restraint which a military authority imposes on a per-
son pending the disposition of charges. Paragraph 20 specifies that the person under
military arrest is not under restraint by physical force, but is subject to restraint because of
the moral and legal obligation to obey the military order of arrest. MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL 20(a) (1969 ed.). If any military status were equivalent to civilian arrest, the
status would not be arrest but confinement before trial as defined in 20(c). Id. at 20(c). A
person who is confined pending trial in the military is subject to actual physical restraint.
Id. MacDonald was under arrest but was not under confinement. See 531 F.2d at 203.
"' See note 53 supra.
Id-
"6 See note 33 supra.
l 531 F.2d at 200.
SId. at 200-01.
X 632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald II panel). The MacDonald II panel distinguished
Lovasco, which the Supreme Court had decided since the MacDonald I decision, on the basis
of the publicity that resulted from the Army investigation. Id. at 261-62; see text accom-
panying note 99 supra. In his statement attached to the rehearing dissent, Judge Murn-
aghan responded to the rehearing dissent's argument that the Martin rule was applicable.
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arrest or pre-indictment investigation does not contribute to a finding of
"accusation" under the Marion reasoning."' While media publicity and
public attention resulted from the Article 32 hearing, 17 the proceeding
itself did not constitute government "accusation" of MacDonald." 8
The conclusion that MacDonald's confinement and the Article 32
hearing did not result in an "accusation" of MacDonald is consistent with
the decisions of other courts holding the sixth amendment speedy trial
right inapplicable.'69 The Ninth Circuit has determined that the filing of
a criminal complaint does not constitute accusation for speedy trial pur-
poses if an arrest warrant is filed but not served.' The Second Circuit
See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra. Judge Murnaghan stated that the publicity
resulting from the Army accusation gave rise to the sixth amendment speedy trial right in
the pre-indictment period. 635 F.2d at 1124 (Murnaghan statement).
11 United States v. Elsberg, 602 F.2d 1058, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). In Elsberg the Second
Circuit found that a defendant is not "accused" for sixth amendment purposes merely
because of a government investigation that receives the attention of the press. Id. at 1059.
The Second Circuit noted that Justice Douglas, concurring in Marion, raised the possibility
that publicity prior to arrest or indictment could have as negative an effect on the defen-
dant as arrest or indictment and, therefore, should give rise to the sixth amendment speedy
trial right. 602 F.2d at 1058-59 (citing 404 U.S. at 330-31). The Marion majority, however,
refused to adopt Justice Douglas' argument and held that only formal charges or arrest and
holding to answer a criminal charge engages the protections of the sixth amendment speedy
trial right. 404 U.S. at 320.
The Marion facts are analogous to MacDonald because in both cases a government in-
vestigation resulted in media publicity implicating the individuals who later were indicted.
404 U.S. at 309-10; 632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald II panel). Although the adverse effects on
MacDonald arguably were greater, the nature of the crime, rather than the Government's
conduct, was the cause of the publicity and media attention. Therefore, publicity resulting
from the Army investigation was not a proper element for the Fourth Circuit to consider in
determining whether MacDonald had been "accused."
632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald II panel).
l See text accompanying notes 159-64 supra. Dissenting in MacDonald 1, Judge
Craven argued that the Army hearings were the equivalent of an open grand jury pro-
ceeding which resulted in the failure to return a true bill. 531 F.2d at 209 (Craven, J.,
dissenting). Since the Article 32 hearing was an investigatory proceeding which resulted in
the decision not to court-martial MacDonald, see text accompanying notes 33-34 supra,
Judge Craven's analogy is more accurate than the majority's finding that the military arrest
and Article 32 hearing were equivalent to arrest under Marion. See text acompanying notes
53-54 supra.
'e' See notes 170-73 infra.
1" Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978). In Arnold, the Government
filed a complaint against the defendant for robbery and assault and issued, but did not serve
a warrant for his arrest. Id. at 1380. The Ninth Circuit found that the sixth amendment
speedy trial right did not attach until almost a year after the filing of the complaint when
the Government actually arrested the defendant. Id. at 1382.
The defendant's trial on the robbery and assault charges resulted in a mistrial. The
Government obtained a dismissal of the charges on the grounds that the defendant subse-
quently had been incarcerated on a murder charge, and the Government did not have
enough evidence to convict on the robbery and assault charge. Id. at 1380. When the defen-
dant was retried and acquitted of the murder charge, the Government filed a second com-
plaint on the robbery and assault charges. Id. at 1381.
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has held that the sixth amendment speedy trial right does not attach un-
til federal arrest, even though state police previously arrested the
defendant on charges for the same offense. 7 1 In cases involving prison
disturbances, the Fifth Circuit has held that segregation of a prisoner
pending criminal prosecution does not constitute an "arrest," and that the
sixth amendment speedy trial right does not attach until formal accusa-
tion.1 72 The Court of Military Appeals has indicated that although
pretrial confinement meets the technical military definition of "arrest,"
the restrictions do not always constitute accusation giving rise to speedy
trial rights in courts-martial.1
7
1
The Fourth Circuit's application of the Barker test to any period
prior to the 1975 indictment depended entirely on the court's finding
that the sixth amendment speedy trial right attached at the beginning of
the military proceeding. 74 In his statement correcting the panel opinion,
however, Judge Murnaghan stated that the relevant delay was the
period between the end of the Army hearing and the return of the
federal indictment.' MacDonald clearly was not under accusation after
October, 1970 when the officer in charge of the Aricle 32 hearing con-
cluded that the Army did not have probable cause to court-martial Mac-
Donald and the Army dropped all charges against MacDonald.' During
the interval between the Army proceeding and the indictment, only the
fifth amendment due process speedy trial protections should have ap-
The Ninth Circuit held that during the period between the dismissal of the charges and
the re-arrest of the defendant, only the fifth amendment speedy trial protections applied
because the defendant was not "accused." Id. at 1383. Applying the due process speedy trial
test to the period between dismissal and re-arrest, the Arnold court found that the Govern-
ment had not violated the defendant's speedy trial right. Id at 1383-85. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit applied the fifth amendment test to periods when the defendant was not ac-
tually "accused" and applied the sixth amendment test to the periods during which the
defendant was under arrest. Id. at 1386. The appellate court concluded that the Government
did not violate the defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights. Id.
"' United States v. Lai Ming Tanu, 589 F.2d 82, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1978) (sixth amendment
speedy trial right does not attach at time of state arrest on drug charges with respect to
federal prosecution begun two years later). See also United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149,
1156 (2d Cir. 1979) (sixth amendment speedy trial right does not attach when Government
files sealed indictment, but only when indictment unsealed or police arrest defendant).
in United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Manetta, 551 F.2d 1352, 1353-54 (5th Cir. 1977) (segregation of prisoner pending criminal
charges not equivalent to accusation and does not give rise to speedy trial right).
173 United States v. Nelson, 5 M.J. 189, 190-91 (C.M.A. 1978) (pretrial confinement for
limited time period with insubstantial restriction on liberty does not give rise to military
speedy trial rights; defendant did not claim sixth amendment violation).
' See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
' 635 F.2d at 1123 (Murnaghan statement).
m See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra (MacDonald received honorable
discharge from Army and practiced medicine in California). No Army or Justice Depart-
ment charges were pending against MacDonald before the return of the 1975 grand jury in-
dictment. 635 F.2d at 1117-18 (joint rehearing dissent).
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plied to MacDonald.' Since both panel majorities decided that the sixth
amendment right attached at the beginning of the military proceeding,'
Judge Murnaghan's "correction" of language is inconsistent with the
analysis of MacDonald II. Judge Murnaghan's correction, however, ap-
parently is ineffective in revising the MacDonald 11 decision because
Judge Sprouse, who joined Judge Murnaghan in MacDonald II, did not
join in Judge Murnaghan's "correcting statement."'
Regardless of whether MacDonald's military confinement gave rise
to the sixth amendment speedy trial right, 8 ' any Army "accusation" ter-
minated with the conclusion of the Article 32 hearing and MacDonald's
subsequent discharge.8 ' Therefore, MacDonald's sixth amendment
speedy trial right, if it ever attached, ended with the Army's resolution
of the charges, and did not apply again until the return of the federal in-
dictment. 82 In cases involving the bringing of charges by a state or an
adminstrative office and subsequent prosecution by a second state or the
Justice Department,'83 the circuit courts have held that the sixth amend-
ment speedy trial right does not attach until the time of the "accusation"
that begins the second prosecution.'84 The Tenth Circuit has found that
the sixth amendment does not apply to the time between an attempted
state prosecution and a subsequent indictment in another state on the
same charges.81 The Second and Seventh Circuits have established that
delay between a state prosecution and a subsequent federal prosecution
is not relevant to the length of delay in a sixth amendment speedy trial
claim. 88 In cases involving federal administrative investigations, the
'" See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
..9 The MacDonald II majority consisted of Judges Murnaghan and Sprouse. Judge
Bryan, the third member of the MacDonald II panel, dissented. 632 F.2d at 260, 267 (Mac-
Donald II panel). Apparently Judge Sprouse voted to deny the petition for rehearing, but
only Judge Murnaghan signed the statement attached to the denial of rehearing. 635 F.2d at
1115 (rehearing denial).
180 See text accompanying notes 156-68 supra.
.81 See note 176 supra.
" 635 F.2d at 1117-18 (joint rehearing dissent) (dissenting judges considered
sixth amendment protections inapplicable to period between 1970 and 1975).
" See text accompanying notes 185-87 infra.
IS The nature of the case determines whether the prosecution involves distinct and
separate proceedings or simply two phases of a single prosecution. Compare text accom-
panying notes 185-87 infra (separate proceeding) with text accompanying notes 194-201 in-
fra (single prosecution). The indictment or arrest which results in the completed prosecu-
tion, however, is the relevant "accusation" for purposes of calculating the length of delay
under a sixth amendment analysis. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313.
1 United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 580 (10th Cir. 1975) (Tenth Circuit found that
period of delay did not begin with first indictment in Utah, but with beginning of prosecu-
tion in Wyoming).
'" United States v. Rowell, 612 F.2d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 1980) (arrest by state police
does not give rise to sixth amendment speedy trial right when federal indictment is returned
over a year later); United States v. Lai Ming Tanu, 589 F.2d 82, 87-89 (fifth but not sixth
amendment speedy trial protections apply to period between state arrest and subsequent
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sixth amendment speedy trial right applies only to the time following
formal indictment or arrest beginning a federal prosecution. 8 ' In Mac-
Donald the Justice Department did not participate in or control the Army
investigation and hearing' and did not begin to consider the case until
the Army dropped the military charges. Thus, the Justice Department
prosecution is comparable to a federal prosecution which follows either a
state prosecution or a federal administrative investigation. 89
To calculate prosecutorial delay, the Fourth Circuit considered the
Army investigation and the Justice Department prosecution to be a pro-
secution by the federal government in its "single soveriegn" capacity."'
The single sovereign doctrine usually applies to double jeopardy
claims."' Nevertheless, the MacDonald panels applied the doctrine to
MacDonald's speedy trial claim,19 and assumed that if the sixth amend-
federal arrest for drug possession charges arising out of the same incident); see United
States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no sixth amendment speedy trial viola-
tion before federal indictment where Government unsuccessfully had prosecuted defendant
for same violations under District of Columbia Code).
87 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313-20. In Marion, the Supreme Court held
that Federal Trade Commission investigations and administrative actions do not constitute
..accusation" for sixth amendment purposes. Id. at 324-25; see note 10 supra. Therefore, the
Marion Court held that the sixth amendment speedy trial right applies only to the post-
indictment period because a defendant is not under arrest prior to indictment. 404 U.S. at
325.
In United States v. Lieberman, 608 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1019
(1980), the First Circuit held that the defendant's sixth amendment speedy trial right did
not arise prior to the return of a 1977 grand jury indictment that began the federal criminal
prosecution. Id. at 899-904. In Liebernan, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
began an investigation in 1973 and initiated a civil action against the defendant in
September, 1976. Id. at 899. The SEC formally referred the case to the United States At-
torney's Office in October, 1976. Id. In United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), the Seventh Circuit held that an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) investigation and compliance with IRS procedures did not constitute "accusation" for
sixth amendment purposes with respect to the federal govenment's subsequent prosecution
of the defendant. Id. at 1009-10.
'8 See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra. Although the F.B.I. initially began in-
vestigating the crime along with the C.I.D., see note 31 supra, the Justice Department did
not take over the prosecution until the Army discharged MacDonald, thereby losing any
jurisdiction to prosecute him for the murders. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
18" Compare text accompanying notes 185-87 supra (separate proceedings) with text ac-
companying note 188 supra (Army/Justice Department proceedings in MacDonald).
632 F.2d at 261 (MacDonald H panel); 531 F.2d at 204 (MacDonald I panel).
, Schuman, supra note 39, at 74-76 (recognizing that single sovereign doctrine
developed as double jeopardy rule; arguing that military arrest was of sixth amendment
significance in Justice Department prosecution because Army no longer had jurisdiction to
prosecute MacDonald after discharge). But cf. 531 F.2d at 209 n.2 (Craven, J., dissenting)
(arguing that criminal trial provisions of fifth and sixth amendments applied to procedure in
civilian but not military courts).
11 632 F.2d at 261 (MacDonald II panel); 531 F.2d at 204. The Fourth Circuit could have
applied the "single sovereign doctrine" in MacDonald to consider MacDonald's double
jeopardy claim. If the Army had court-martialed MacDonald, the Justice Department could
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ment right attached at the beginning of the Army hearing, the right ap-
plied continuously during the interval between the dismissal of the
military charges and the grand jury indictment.193 In considering speedy
trial claims in cases in which the defendant is "accused" twice, other cir-
cuit courts have calculated sixth amendment speedy trial delay from the
second indictment or the arrest beginning the completed prosecution.'94
The rehearing dissent correctly concluded that even if the Barker test
were applicable to MacDonald, the delay between the end of the Army
proceedings and the grand jury indictment was irrelevant to the sixth
amendment length of delay factor.195
In cases involving two distinct phases of a prosecution by the federal
government, the circuit courts focus on whether calculating the delay
from the second arrest or indictment would allow the Government to cir-
cumvent the sixth amendment speedy trial requirement by dismissing
and subsequently reinstating the charges. 98 The rehearing dissent relied
not have prosecuted him subsequently for the same crime because both prosecutorial en-
tities are part of a "single sovereign," the federal government. Schuman, supra note 39, at
40. The Army, however, did not begin prosecution of MacDonald by court-martial. See text
accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
The MacDonald I panel noted that the military decision whether to prosecute appeared
to be final as a matter of "custom." 531 F.2d at 209. Another Fourth Circuit panel, however,
later determined that the Justice Department prosecution did not violate double jeopardy
because the Article 32 hearing did not adjudicate MacDonald's guilt or innocence. 585 F.2d
1211, 1212 (4th Cir. 1978) (addressing MacDonald's double jeopardy claim). Judge Butzner
authored both the MacDonald I and the double jeopardy decisions. The "single sovereign"
doctrine was not applicable to MacDonald in the double jeopardy context to which courts
normally apply the doctrine. The Fourth Circuit's translation of the doctrine to a speedy
trial concept was improper.
193 531 F.2d at 202-03. The MacDonald I panel recognized that the application of the
sixth amendment to any pre-indictment period depended on the finding that the military
charges were equivalent to accusation. Id. In deciding that the sixth amendment right at-
tached at MacDonald's military arrest, the Fourth Circuit did not analyze whether the test
applied, but only when "accusation" occurred to determine the "length of delay" factor of
the Barker test. Id. at 202; see note 13 supra.
In addressing the "reason for the delay" factor, however, the MacDonald I majority
acknowledged that any delay prior to the Justice Department's receipt of the initial C.I.D.
report was excusable. 531 F.2d at 206. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found the period be-
tween June, 1972 and August, 1973, during which MacDonald was not subject to accusation
by either the Army or the Justice Department, to be the period of delay which violated
MacDonald's sixth amendment speedy trial right. Id.
19 See text accompanying notes 196-201 infra. In cases in which the courts concluded
that prosecutorial delay did not violate the defendant's speedy trial right under either test,
the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have avoided deciding the issue of whether fifth or sixth
amendment protections apply to a period between successive indictments. United States v.
Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1232-34 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Santos, 588 F.2d 1300, 1301-02
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1307-08 (7th Cir.
1976).
191 635 F.2d at 1116 (rehearing denial) (Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting); 635 F.2d at
1119-20 (joint rehearing dissent); see text accompanying notes 123-30 supra.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1233 n.13 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing
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on the rule set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Martin9' that in a federal
prosecution involving two subsequent indictments for the same charge,
the sixth amendment applies only to the period between the second in-
dictment and trial."s' In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that follow-
ing a mistrial the defendant does not have a sixth amendment speedy
trial right until the time of the second indictment.'99 In cases in which the
Government intentionally dismissed and subsequently reinstituted
charges for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage over the defend-
ant,"' however, the Fifth Circuit has held that the sixth amendment
right attaches at the time of the initial arrest or indictment and applies
until the time of trial.0 '
United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1108-09 n.13 (5th Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 430 U.S.
970 (1977)).
'" 543 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977); see text accom-
panying notes 122-25 supra.
10 635 F.2d at 1117-19 (joint rehearing dissent); see 543 F.2d at 579 (Martin rule).
1 Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that after the dismissal of the charges, the defendant was no longer "accused" and therefore
any delay should be tested under due process requirements rather than the sixth amend-
ment speedy trial test. The Arnold court held that the prosecutor has the discretion to
dismiss charges pending further investigation if the second prosecution does not place the
defendant in double jeopardy, even if the delay results in some prejudice to the defense. Id.
at 1585; see note 170 supra (Arnold facts and reasoning).
20 Cf. text accompanying notes 271-73 infra (due process speedy trial claim requires
showing of intentional, tactical government delay of arrest or indictment).
21 United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1977); United States v. McKim, 509 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Avalos, federal authorities in the District of Columbia arrested the defendants on
conspiracy charges. The Government dismissed the arrest warrants and, a year later, in-
dicted the defendants in the Southern District of Florida on charges arising from the same
conspiracy. 541 F.2d at 1105-06. The Fifth Circuit found that the Government intentionally
had dismissed the original District of Columbia arrest warrants because the prosecutors
were more likely to obtain a conviction in the Southern District of Florida. Id. at 1112.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit calculated the sixth amendment length of delay from the time
of the original arrests. Id. at 1111-14. The Avalos court reasoned that calculating the delay
from any time after the initial arrest would allow the Government to circumvent constitu-
tional speedy trial requirements. Id. at 1108-09 n.13.
In McKim the defendant was arrested in September, 1972, for possession of marijuana.
The defendant escaped from federal custody two days after the possession arrest, but was
re-arrested the day following the escape. 509 F.2d at 771. The Government indicted the
defendant three times for escape but the Government twice obtained dismissal of the indict-
ment under rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
Rule 48(a) provides that the Government prosecutors may file a dismissal of indictment
which, if the court grants the dismissal, terminates the prosecution. Id.
The defendant was convicted on the possession charges, but the Fifth Circuit reversed
the conviction in 1973. 509 F.2d at 772 (citing United States v. McKim, 487 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.
1973)). The Fifth Circuit found that the Government filed the third indictment for escape only
because the prosecution had failed to prevail on the possession conviction. 509 F.2d at 773.
Therefore, the McKim court calculated the length of delay for speedy trial purposes from
the first escape indictment because the federal government intentionally had obtained the
dismissal and the re-indictment. Id. Nevertheless, the McKim court found that the Govern-
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Regardless of whether the MacDonald panels were correct in
holding that the Army hearing and Justice Department prosecution con-
stituted a single federal prosecution under the single sovereign
doctrine," 2 the Fourth Circuit should have applied the Barker test onry
to the period following the grand jury indictment."3 The rehearing dis-
sent correctly applied the Martin rule and concluded that the period
prior to the indictment was irrelevant to MacDonald's sixth amendment
speedy trial claim.0 4 MacDonald was not accused during the period
ment did not violate either the fifth or sixth amendment speedy trial right of the defendant
because prejudice did not result from the delay. Id.
Although McKim and Avalos represent a departure from other circuits' rule of
calculating delay from the last arrest or indictment, see text accompanying notes 196-99
supra, the cases are distinguishable on the ground that the Government intentionally
delayed the prosecution. The fifth amendment due process protections clearly protect
against intentional and tactical delay by prosecutors. See text accompanying notes 14-19
supra. Essentially, the Fifth Circuit was applying the Lovasco due process speedy trial test
in McKim and Avalos, but analyzed the cases in terms of the Barker sixth amendment test.
Under the facts of McKim or Avalos, the delay would have been unreasonable and in viola-
tion of the due process speedy trial protections if the delay had resulted in actual prejudice.
See note 14 supra. The Fifth Circuit did not find a speedy trial violation in either McKim or
Avalos because the defendants failed to show prejudice. The Fifth Circuit's application of
the speedy trial tests in McKim and Avalos illustrates the confusion which has resulted
from the existence of two different constitutional speedy trial protections.
In addition to the Fifth Circuit decisions, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Merrick,
464 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972), calculated the delay for speedy
trial purposes from the time of filing of the complaint rather than the indictment. The basis
of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Merrick, however, was that the speedy trial right did not
attach at the time of an IRS investigation, but at the beginning of the prosecution. Id at
1089-90; cf. note 187 supra (administrative investigation and proceedings do not constitute
"accusation"). The Merrick court confused the fifth and sixth amendment speedy trial tests,
and applied elements of each test. 464 F.2d at 1090-91. Although several defense witnesses
died and records were destroyed in the interval between the offense and the trial, the
Tenth Circuit found that the delay did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial. Id. at 1091.
In United States v. Small, 345 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the district court held that
the sixth amendment speedy trial right attaches at the time of military arrest with respect
to subsequent federal charges. Id. at 1249. The case involved drug charges relating to in-
cidents which occurred in Vietnam. Id. The court found that the Government intentionally
dismissed charges in Vietnam, transferred the defendant to the United States, and began
civilian prosecution. Id at 1250. Therefore, the court could have found a due process viola-
tion.
See text accompanying notes 192-93 supra.
635 F.2d at 1116-17 (joint rehearing dissent).
Id. The rehearing dissent did not analyze whether MacDonald's sixth amendment
right attached at the time of the military hearings. Cf text accompanying notes 156-58
supra. Rather, the rehearing dissent, applying the rule adopted in Martin, found that the
period between the military dismissal and civilian indictment was "completely dispositive"
against MacDonald's sixth amendment claim. 635 F.2d at 1116 (joint rehearing dissent).
In addition to adopting the Martin rule, the rehearing dissent relied on the congres-
sional determination in the Speedy Trial Act that when cases involve two indictments,
courts should calculate delay from the second indictment. 635 F.2d at 1118 (joint rehearing
dissent); see text accompanying notes 123-26 supra. The Speedy Trial Act provides that in
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
following the Army's dismissal of charges, because no prosecution was
ongoing to which MacDonald's sixth amendment right could apply." 5
The Fifth Circuit decisions applying sixth amendment protections
from the first arrest or indictment. 6 are inapposite. These cases in-
volved intentional government delay not present in MacDonald."7 Since
the Justice Department had jurisdiction independent from the Army,
the termination of the Army proceedings could not be attributed to the
Justice Department."8 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit did not find any
intent by the Army or federal prosecutors to delay the trial.00
The Fourth Circuit should have applied the Marion-Lovasco due pro-
cess test rather than the Barker sixth amendment test to evaluate pre-
indictment delay." ' Compounding the effect of the erroneous application
of the sixth amendment test, the court's consideration of the Barker fac-
tors conflicts with the application of that test by other circuits." As the
rehearing dissent pointed out, the length of delay factor is a triggering
mechanism requiring inquiry into the other factors.2 1  Although the
Supreme Court stated in Barker that none of the four factors was essen-
tial to or in itself sufficient to. constitute a speedy trial violation,2"' the
calculating speedy trial delay, a court should not include the period between the dismissal of
the first indictment and return to the second indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (1976). Even
though the Speedy Trial Act did not apply in MacDonald, the Act represents Congress' in-
terpretation of the sixth amendment speedy trial right. See note 7 supra. The rehearing dis-
sent correctly found that the Speedy Trial Act provisions support the Sixth Circuit's speedy
trial analysis in Martin. 635 F.2d at 1118 (joint rehearing dissent); cf. text accompanying
notes 196-99 supra.
"2 See text accompanying note 35 supra (Army had no jurisdiction to prosecute Mac-
Donald following dismissal of charges and honorable discharge); text accompanying notes
39-40 (MacDonald was not arrested until after return of grand jury indictment; therefore,
Justice Department prosecution began at indictment).
I United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1977); United States v. McKim, 509 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1975); see text accompanying note 201
supra.
See note 201 supra.
See note 188 supra.
See 435 U.S. at 851 (Supreme Court did nbt address merits of MacDonald, but
characterized the investigation following dismissal of Army charges as extensive and wide
ranging); 635 F.2d at 1121-22 (joint rehearing dissent) (finding that complexity of case
justified delay for investigative purposes); 632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald II panel attributed
delay to either government bureaucracy or disagreement at Justice Department regarding
whether to prosecute); 531 F.2d at 206-07 (MacDonald I panel attributed Government's
delay in convening grand jury to government bureaucracy and indifference by Justice
Department).
"I0 Compare text accompanying notes 14-19 supra (Marion-Lovasco due process test)
with note 13 supra (Barker sixth amendment balancing test).
1, See text accompanying notes 212-51 supra.
2" 635 F.2d at 1116-17 (joint rehearing dissent) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530).
2,3 407 U.S. at 533. The Barker Court rejected both the fixed-time and demand-waiver
approaches which courts had applied to determine whether delay violated the defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at 529. Barker held that courts should determine
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis by engaging in a balancing process. Id. at 533.
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circuit courts do not consider the remaining Barker factors unless the
delay is presumptively prejudicial.214 Both MacDonald panels found that
the length of delay was sufficiently long to inquire into the other
factors. 15 Each of the Fourth Circuit opinions, however, considered a dif-
ferent time period to determine the length of delay.21 The Fourth Cir-
cuit's inconsistent determinations of what period of delay was relevant
to the Barker analysis reflects the court's confusion regarding the time
at which the sixth amendment protection attached.
Courts applying the Barker test should consider the facts and
nature of the crime to determine whether a period of delay is
unreasonably long.217 In a complex murder case, to which the statute of
limitations does not apply," 8 a court is more likely to find that delay
I" United States v. Carter, 603 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1979) (sixteen month period
sufficient to necessitate inquiry into other Barker factors, even in complex case); United
States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 253-54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979) (thirteen
month period between indictment and trial sufficient to require application of Barker test
but court found no sixth amendment speedy trial violation); United States v. Richman, 600
F.2d 286, 293-94 (1st Cir. 1979) (seven month period between arraignment and trial suffi-
ciently long to invoke Barker test but did not violate sixth amendment); Morrison v. Jones,
565 F.2d 272, 273 (4th Cir. 1977) (three year delay between indictment and second trial,
following mistrial, sufficiently long to require application of Barker); United States v.
Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1977) (thirty-two month pre-trial delay sufficient to
necessitate inquiry into other Barker factors); Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir.
1977) (ten month delay between defendant's assertion of speedy trial right and trial was suf-
ficiently long to necessitate inquiry into sixth amendment violation); United States v.
Saglimbene, 471 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (six year delay be-
tween indictment and trial was sufficiently long to invoke Barker inquiry but delay justified
because defendant did not assert speedy trial right during first five years).
In Barker, the period of'delay between the defendant's arrest for murder and trial was
more than five years. 407 U.S. at 516-18. The Barker Court stated that unless some period of
delay is "presumptively prejudicial," a court need not consider the other factors of the
balancing test. Id. at 530. Although the Barker Court recognized that a delay of five years
was "extraordinary," id. at 533, the Court found that other factors outweighed the length of
the delay and found no sixth amendment speedy trial violation. Id. at 534.
In United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, the Fifth Circuit noted the inconsistency of
the Barker Court's findings that the length of delay must be presumptively prejudicial and
that none of the factors were essential to establishing a sixth amendment violation. 541 F.2d
at 1111 n.19.
"' 632 F.2d at 261-62 (MacDonald II panel); 531 F.2d at 205 (MacDonald I panel). The
MacDonald I majority considered a four and one half year delay sufficiently long to trigger
inquiry into the other Barker factors. 531 F.2d at 205. In assessing the reason for the delay,
however, the MacDonald I court only considered the two and one half year period between
the Justice Department's receipt of the C.I.D. report and the return of the indictment. Id. at
207. The MacDonald 11 panel stated that the unreasonable period of delay was the period
between military arrest and trial, 632 F.2d at 261, but discussed only the two and one half
year period on which the MacDonald I court had focused to evaluate the reason for the
delay. Id. Nevertheless, the MacDonald I1 majority quoted the MacDonald I decision to
conclude that the length of delay justified inquiry into the other Barker factors. Id. at 262.
2"6 See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
217 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
211 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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was reasonable.21 9 In less complex cases than MacDonald, courts have
found that delays of greater than two years were not unreasonably
long.22 The rehearing dissent noted that the post-indictment delay of
almost seven months was not sufficiently long to trigger consideration
of the other Barker factors.
21
In evaluating the reason for the delay, both MacDonald panels con-
sidered only the two year period between the Justice Department's
receipt of the initial C.I.D. report and the return of the grand jury indict-
ment.2 According to the circuit courts' interpretations of Barker, if a
court finds that government prosecutors intentionally delayed the trial
for tactical reasons, the delay weighs heavily against the Government.
If prosecutorial delay is the result only of negligence, however, the
courts weigh the factor less heavily against the Government. 4 Although
each court that considered MacDonald's claim noted that the Govern-
ment probably could have convened the grand jury earlier than August,
1974,1 5 no court found any intentional delay on the part of the Justice
211 In Barker the Supreme Court stated that the reasonable delay in prosecuting for an
ordinary street crime is less than the tolerable period of delay in a complex conspiracy case.
407 U.S. at 531; see United States v. Carter, 603 F.2d at 1207 (complexity of case considered
in evaluating length of delay under Barker sixth amendment test); United States v. Avalos,
541 F.2d at 1110-11 (court should consider complexity of case to determine whether delay
was unreasonable). Cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 (investigative delay not
unreasonable under fifth amendment due process claim); United States v. Cerrito, 612 F.2d
588, 593 (1st Cir. 1979) (investigative delay reasonable in fifth amendment speedy trial
claim).
' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 533-34 (five year delay in prosecution for murder did
not violate sixth amendment); Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1980) (three
year delay between arrest for robbery and trial did not violate sixth amendment).
635 F.2d at 1117 (joint rehearing dissent).
632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald II panel); 531 F.2d at 206 (MacDonald 1).
United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carter,
603 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 254 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979); accord, United States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D. Md.
1976). In Alderman, the district court found that the Government deliberately, intention-
ally, and continuously delayed presentation of the case to a grand jury for more than thirty
months. Id. at 855. The district court found that the delay violated the defendant's fifth
amendment right to a speedy trial, but that sixth amendment protections did not apply to
pre-indictment delay. Id. at 848-49.
E.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436 (1972); United States v. Carter, 603
F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Huffman, 595 F.2d 551, 557 (10th Cir. 1979);
Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 122,
123 (1st Cir. 1978); Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
907 (1978); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Graham,
538 F.2d 261, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1976).
635 F.2d at 1121 (joint rehearing dissent) (recognizing that portion of period of delay
was result of institutional problems); 632 F.2d at 268-69 (MacDonald II panel) (Bryan, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that some delay resulted from government bureaucracy); id. at 262
(MacDonald II panel) (finding government bureaucracy was reason for the delay); 485 F.
Supp. at 1089 (district court judge's post-trial order stating that Government could have
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Department." Judge Bryan's dissent in MacDonald 11 and the rehearing
dissent characterized any delay in bringing the indictment as delay for
investigative purposes.2" The Supreme Court has held that an individual
has no constitutional right to arrest or indictment.' The applicable
statute of limitations determines the time before which the Government
may bring charges. 9 The Government, however, was not limited in Mac-
Donald because the statutue of limitations does not apply to prosecution
for murder."0 As the rehearing dissent noted, the Lovasco Court held
that prosecutorial delay for purposes of investigation does not violate a
suspect's due process right to speedy trial. 1 The MacDonald II panel in-
accurately characterized the time between 1972 and 1975 as a period of
negligent delay during which the Government did not investigate the
crime. 2 The record supports the rehearing dissent's evaluation that the
Government was actively investigating and preparing the case for
trial.' The rehearing dissent noted that the Government's thorough in-
convened grand jury earlier than 1975); 531 F.2d at 206 (MacDonald I court found govern-
ment indifference and bureaucracy to be reason for delay).
531 F.2d at 205-06. The MacDonald II panel majority expressed the most negative
evaluation of the Justice Department's delay in MacDonald by stating that the delay
resulted from "bureaucratic indifference," 632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald 11 panel), and that
the Government's attitude was "calloused and lackadaisical." Id. at 266. Even if the Justice
Department had not been continuing to investigate the murders, the delay would have been
negligent but not intentional.
' 632 F.2d at 268 (MacDonald II panel) (Bryan, J., dissenting). Judge Bryan noted that
the Government convened the grand jury only one year after the filing of the final report
concluding the C.I.D. investigation. Id. The Supreme Court had stated that the investiga-
tion was "extensive and wide ranging." 435 U.S. at 851. During the year between the
Government's receipt of the final C.I.D. report and the convening of the grand jury, the
Justice Department attorneys reviewed the complex evidence consisting of nearly 700 inter-
views and scientific tests. 632 F.2d at 268 (MacDonald II panel) (Bryan, J., dissenting). The
F.B.I. continued the investigation while the grand jury heard evidence. Id.
The rehearing dissent found that the delay resulting from the Government's thorough
investigation in the case was warranted. 635 F.2d at 1121 (joint rehearing dissent). The dis-
sent noted that the case depended on complex development of circumstantial evidence, and
that the evidence obtained when the bodies of the deceased were exhumed was critical to
the case. Id. The rehearing dissent concluded that because the delay was not tactical or vin-
dictive, the court should not weigh the factor heavily against the Government. Id.
' United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790-96. The Lovasco Court emphasized that a
rule requiring prosecutors to initiate prosecution as soon as they are legally entitled to do
so would not serve the interests of the defendant, law enforcement, or the courts. Id. at
791-92 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966); United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. at 325 n.18); see text accompanying note 141 supra.
See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
31 635 F.2d at 1121 n.14 (joint rehearing dissent) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 790-91, 795).
632 F.2d at 262 (MacDonald 11 panel); compare note 226 supra (MacDonald II major-
ity's evaluation of reason for delay) with note 258 infra (both Judge Bryan, dissenting in
MacDonald II, and rehearing dissent found that delay was justifiable because purpose of
delay was to continue investigation).
635 F.2d at 1120-21 (joint rehearing dissent). In evaluating the reason for the delay,
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vestigation was commendable rather than unreasonable.2" Circuit courts
have considered delay for investigative purposes reasonable in applying
both fifth and sixth amendment analyses." Therefore, the delay be-
the MacDonald II panel considered the period between the Justice Department's receipt of
the initial CJ.D. report in June, 1972 and the return of the indictment in 1975. 632 F.2d at
261 (MacDonald II panel). The MacDonald I majority stated that the Justice Department
was in the possession of all the evidence in June, 1972, and that "nothing occurred" until the
presentation of evidence to the grand jury in August, 1974. Id. The statement, however, is
inconsistent with the facts that the C.I.D. submitted two supplementary reports in the
period after June, 1972, see text accompanying note 38 supra, and that the C.I.D. suggested
using the investigatory powers of the grand jury before continuing the investigation, see
531 F.2d at 201. The evidence that the F.B.I. obtained during the grand jury proceedings
was critical to the case. 635 F.2d at 1121 (joint rehearing dissent); see note 227 supra.
1 635 F.2d at 1121-22 (joint rehearing dissent). The MacDonald panel decisions had
relied on the statements of a United States Attorney that he recommended prose-
cution within six months of June, 1972, to support the conclusion that any delay following
that period was inexcusable. 632 F.2d at 261 (MacDonald II panel); 531 F.2d at 206 (Mac-
Donald I panel). The rehearing dissent, however, reasoned that finding that the delay was
unreasonable in MacDonald would encourage overzealous and "eager beaver" prosecutors
to begin prosecution when the defendant's right would be served better by a careful con-
sideration of the arguments opposed to prosecution. 635 F.2d at 1121 (joint rehearing dis-
sent).
'3 The Supreme Court established in Lovasco that delay for investigative purposes
was reasonable. 431 U.S. at 790-96; see note 19 supra. The circuit courts find that the
Government's delay to continue to investigate a crime does not constitute unreasonable
delay in fifth amendment speedy trial claims. United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir.
1979) cert. granted, 445 U.S. 960 (1980) (No. 79-1013) (prosecutor justified in not seeking in-
dictment until obtaining evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt);
United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 923 (10th Cir. 1979) (pre-arrest investigative
delay not unreasonable even though co-conspirator died during interval, because Govern-
ment did not know witness' death was imminent); United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732, 735
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 982 (1979) (Government acted reasonably in completing in-
vestigation of entire drug conspiracy before indicting individual).
The principle of Lovasco that investigative delay is reasonable also applies to sixth
amendment speedy trial claims. In Barker, which was decided five years before Lovasco,
the Supreme Court stated that intentional delay should weigh heavily against the Govern-
ment, and that other delays weigh less heavily. 407 U.S. at 531. The circuit courts do not
weigh investigative and institutional delay heavily against the Government. United States
v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979) (unintentional
delay resulting from overcrowded dockets or understaffed prosecutors weighs less heavily
against Government under Barker test); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 254 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979) (delay not weighed heavily against Government
because not intended to gain advantage over defendant); United States v. Walters, 591 F.2d
1195, 1201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945 (1979) (delay not weighed heavily against
Government where Government did not have intent to gain advantage over defendant,
especially when defendant was at liberty and outside jurisdiction); Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d
684, 686 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 695 (1979) (delay because of prosecutor's doubt
regarding whether to proceed does not weigh heavily against Government under Barker);
United States v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 122, 123 (1st Cir. 1978) (prosecutorial delay weighs most
heavily against Government if delay was intentional); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144,
149 (2d Cir. 1977) (institutional delays do not weigh heavily against Government under
Barker test).
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tween the end of the Army hearings and the grand jury indictment was
not unreasonable under either test.
The defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial is the third
factor that courts consider under the Barker test. 6 As the Fourth Cir-
cuit panels stated, MacDonald repeatedly requested resolution of the
charges against him and moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial
grounds at every stage of the proceedings.17 If MacDonald had been
under indictment or arrest, his requests for a speedy trial would have
weighed heavily in his favor." Since the Army charges had been re-
solved, however, and the Justice Department had not begun prosecution,
MacDonald had no right to demand trial before the return of the indict-
ment. 9 As the rehearing dissent concluded, MacDonald's assertion of his
right to a speedy trial before the indictment was not relevant to a
Barker analysis. 40 Under a fifth amendment analysis, the defendant's
assertion of the right does not contribute to a finding of pre-indictment
delay.241 Therefore, MacDonald's requests for a speedy resolution of the
case did not support his constitutional speedy trial claims.
The prejudice factor is the most significant of the four Barker fac-
tors.242 In reversing MacDonald I, the Supreme Court implied that the
Fourth Circuit could not determine the prejudice factor before trial.243
The rehearing dissent interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion to re-
See text accompanying note 13 supra.
632 F.2d at 262-63 (MacDonald II panel); 531 F.2d at 207 (MacDonald I panel); see
text accompanying notes 64 & 101 supra.
2M Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531-53; see United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 84
(5th Cir. 1980) (defendant's failure to assert speedy trial right at trial results in waiver of
claim); Morrison v. Jones, 565 F.2d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978)
(third Barker factor, defendant's assertion of the right, weighs against defendant when
defendant fails to request speedy trial).
' United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790-96; see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
at 325 n.18 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), for rule that potential
criminal defendant has no constitutional right to demand that Government end investiga-
tion upon obtaining minimum evidence to establish probable cause).
..0 635 F.2d at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent). The rehearing dissent reasoned that allow-
ing a defendant to demand that the Government abandon an investigation would interfere
with the executive's discretion to investigate and to prosecute. Id. (citing United States v.
Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1978)).
241 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (due process speedy trial inquiry in-
volves evaluation of prejudice and reason for delay); text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
The rehearing dissent stated that MacDonald's requests for completion of the investigation
should be directed to the fifth amendment claim. 635 F.2d at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent).
Although the rehearing dissent presumably based the statement on the fact that Mac-
Donald made the requests before indictment, MacDonald's requests for an end to the
Justice Department investigation were irrelevant to the fifth amendment claim because
MacDonald did not have a right to demand trial before accusation. Id. at 1122 n.15.
.2 635 F.2d at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent).
"' 435 U.S. at 858-59. The Supreme Court based the decision that a denial of a speedy
trial claim is not appealable before trial on the finding that prejudice could be gauged better
after trial. Id. at 859; see text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
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quire that the district court judge determine whether the delay pre-
judiced the defendant's defense at trial. " ' The district judge thoroughly
considered the question of prejudice and concluded that any delay had
not prejudiced MacDonald's defense.245 The MacDonald II panel should
have reversed the district judge's finding only for clear error.
The circuit courts, interpreting Barker, require a high degree of pre-
judice to find a sixth amendment speedy trial violation. 7 Although the
Supreme Court in Moore v. Arizona'8 held that proof of actual prejudice
is not necessary to establish a speedy trial violation,249 the circuit courts
have required a strong showing of prejudice to the defendant's presenta-
tion of his case at trial."° Thus, the requirement of establishing prejudice
in a sixth amendment speedy trial claim frequently is as strict as the
fifth amendment due process requirement of actual prejudice. 15 ' Other
circuits recognize that incarceration and anxiety are part of the pre-
judice factor, but the courts have focused on impairment of the defense
at trial.252 In cases in which the delay caused loss of witnesses or faded
memories, the courts consider the resulting prejudice significant only if
the defendant shows that the testimony would have contributed
substantially to his defense.
635 F.2d at 1122 n.16 (joint rehearing dissent).
, See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
635 F.2d at 1122 n.16 (joint rehearing dissent).
2, See text accompanying notes 250-53 infra.
414 U.S. 25 (1973).
21 Id. at 26.
The circuit courts usually consider pre-trial incarceration, anxiety to the defendant,
and prejudice to the defense at trial to determine whether delay resulted in a speedy trial
violation. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra. The courts focus on the effect on the
defense at trial. See notes 252-53 infra.
"2 Compare note 252 infra (requirements for sixth amendment speedy trial prejudice)
with note 269 infra (requirements to establish prejudice in fifth amendment speedy trial
claim).
Even lengthy pre-trial incarceration does not always establish significant prejudice.
See United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1976) (no speedy trial violation
under Barker test even though defendant jailed for one year between arest and trial). The
circuit courts recognize that anxiety results from any criminal prosecution, and usually do
not give significant weight to a defendant's claim of pre-trial anxiety. See United States v.
Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979) (emotional strain re-
sulting from "publicity, fanfare, and bad press" insufficient to establish prejudice); United
States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 294 (1st Cir. 1979) (anxiety in absence of incarceration and
loss of witnesses does not establish prejudice); Morrison v. Jones, 565 F.2d 272, 274 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (anxiety does not constitute prejudice under Barker);
United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976)
(defendant's assertion of anxiety does not establish prejudice).
Although the Barker court noted that impairment to the defendant's case at trial
may result from witnesses' loss memory, 407 U.S. at 532, circuit courts have required a
higher showing of prejudice. See Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1980) (defen-
dant claimed that Government delay resulted in prejudice because defense witnesses'
memories faded; court rejected claim because effect on testimony did not constitute actual
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The Fourth Circuit's assessment of prejudice in MacDonald conflicts
with the strict requirements for a showing of prejudice which other cir-
cuits have developed. The MacDonald II panel found only a possibility of
prejudice to MacDonald's defense."4 Nevertheless, the majority weighed
the prejudice factor heavily in MacDonald's favor."5 The rehearing dis-
sent disagreed with the MacDonald II panel's evaluation of the prejudice
which MacDonald suffered."8 Although other circuits have not required
a showing of actual prejudice which the rehearing dissent implied would
prejudice); United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
968 (1979) (defendant's vague assertions of faded memories insufficient to establish pre-
judice at trial).
In cases in which the defendant shows that the witnesses died or became unavailable to
testify during the period of delay, the circuit courts generally require a showing that the
evidence significantly would have aided the defense at trial. See United States v. Mitchell,
615 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant failed to establish prejudice by showing that
witnesses were unable to recall details or were unable to testify, because defendant did not
show how loss of testimony impaired defense at trial); United States v. Huffman, 595 F.2d
551, 558 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendant did not establish prejudice in sixth amendment speedy
trial claim because of failure to demonstrate how loss of witnesses impaired defense at
trial); Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684, 687 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979)
(unavailability of witnesses does not establish prejudice unless defendant shows how
testimony would have helped case); United States v. Johnson, 579 F.2d 122, 125 (1st Cir.
1978) (showing of loss of witnesses' testimony is insufficient to establish prejudice in sixth
amendment speedy trial claim unless defendant can show how loss would have affected out-
come of trial); United States v. Canales, 573 F.2d 908, 910 (5th Cir. 1978) (death of defense
witness did not result in prejudice to defendant's case absent showing of how testimony
would have aided defense); Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249, 253 (8th Cir. 1977), cert denied,
435 U.S. 907 (1978) (to establish prejudice, defendant must show that missing witness could
have supplied material evidence for defense).
In contrast to the majority to sixth amendment speedy trial cases, which require a
showing of loss of testimony and of how the testimony would have aided the defense, the
Second Circuit found sufficient prejudice to support a finding of a violation of the
defendant's sixth amendment speedy trial right in United States v. New Buffalo Amuse-
ment Corp., 600 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1979). New Buffalo concerned prosecution for distribution
of a pornographic film. Id at 371-72. The case involved a four and one half year delay be-
tween indictment and trial, thirty-one months of which the court found resulted from
Government inaction and overcrowded court dockets. Id. at 377. The Second Circuit stated
that the case was not complex and that the delay was not for investigative purposes. Id. at
378. The court did not focus solely on the commonly used test for prejudice enunciated in
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 166, 120 (1966). See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
The Second Circuit based its finding of sixth amendment prejudice not only on the anxiety
which the defendant suffered during the delay but also on the change in social attitudes dur-
ing the four and one half year period between indictment and trial. 600 F.2d at 379. The
court reasoned that the change in the way in which the public considered pornographic films
may have resulted in the defendant's conviction. Id. Judge Mansfield dissented, arguing
that changes in social attitudes do not represent legally cognizable prejudice to a defendant.
Id. at 383 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
632 F.2d at 263-65 (MacDonald II panel); see text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
632 F.2d at 265-66 (MacDonald 11 panel).
635 F.2d at 1122-23 (joint rehearing dissent); see text accompanying notes
121-122 supra.
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be necessary in MacDonald,"7 the courts do not weigh the Barker pre-
judice factor in favor of a defendant who has shown only a vague
possibility of prejudice."
The rehearing dissent viewed the MacDonald panels' application of
the Barker test as improper." Prior to the grand jury indictment in
1975, MacDonald had a due process right to a speedy trial.260 Since the
delay preceded the indictment, the Fourth Circuit should have applied
the due process test of Marion"' and Lovasco"' to determine whether
the delay violated MacDonald's fifth amendment right to a speedy trial.
Both MacDonald panels based the decision on sixth amendment
grounds" and did not consider MacDonald's fifth amendment speedy
trial claim.'" The rehearing dissent correctly found that only the fifth
635 F.2d at 1122-23 (joint rehearing dissent). The rehearing dissent cited the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1980), for the rule that a
defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a sixth amendment speedy trial claim.
635 F.2d at 1122 (joint rehearing dissent); see text accompanying notes 139-41 supra. The re-
quirement is incorrect and demonstrates the confusion in terminology used in fifth and sixth
amendment speedy trial claims. The Hill court recognized that a defendant does not
necessarily have to demonstrate any prejudice in a sixth amendment claim if the first three
Barker factors weigh in the defendant's favor. 617 F.2d at 379 n.4. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court established in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), that a sixth amendment
claim does not require an affirmative showing of prejudice. Id. at 26; see text accompanying
notes 247-48 supra. The Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th
Cir. 1980), that the required demonstration of prejudice is the most crucial difference bet-
ween the sixth amendment and due process speedy trial tests. Id. at 1232 n.12. Compare
text accompanying note 13 supra (courts should consider prejudice resulting from post-
accusation delay as element of sixth amendment speedy trial claim under Barker) with text
accompanying notes 15-17 (proof of actual prejudice resulting from prosecutorial delay
necessary to establish due process speedy trial claim).
The circuit courts require that the defendant demonstrate a high level of prejudice to
weigh the Barker factor in favor of a defendant, but the Fifth Circuit's use of the term "ac-
tual prejudice" in Hill was not typical of sixth amendment cases. See note 253 supra.
Therefore, the rehearing dissent's evaluation of prejudice might be interpreted as being
based on a stricter standard than other circuits require.
See cases cited in note 253 supra.
635 F.2d at 1116 (rehearing denial) (Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting) (pre-indictment
delay relevant to fifth amendment speedy trial claim; interval between end of Army pro-
ceedings and federal indictment irrelevant to MacDonald's sixth amendment claim); 635
F.2d at 1116 (joint rehearing dissent) (rule that period between two indictments is irrelevant
to sixth amendment claim completely disposed of any sixth amendment speedy trial claim
by MacDonald).
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
"' 404 U.S. 325-26; see text accompanying note 15 supra.
431 U.S. at 790; see text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
531 F.2d at 209 (MacDonald I decision based on sixth amendment grounds); 632 F.2d
at 260 (MacDonald Il) (MacDonald II panel upheld MacDonald's sixth amendment claim).
1 632 F.2d at 260 (MacDonald II panel). The MacDonald II panel reasoned that
because the burden on MacDonald would be greater under the fifth amendment, the court
did not have to address the due process argument. Id. at 260. MacDonald's only constitu-
tional speedy trial claim in MacDonald I was based on the sixth amendment. See Brief of
the Appellant at 42-92, United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976).
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The fifth amendment requirements for a due process speedy trial
violation, as established by the Supreme Court in Lovasco, are a proof of
unreasonable delay and a showing of actual prejudice to the defense at
trial.86 The crucial aspect of a fifth amendment speedy trial claim is a
proof of actual prejudice.2 67 The Fourth Circuit in MacDonald I could not
have found a speedy trial violation under the fifth amendment because
MacDonald would not have been able to show actual prejudice before
trial. 8 Under Lovasco proof of actual prejudice requires a showing of
loss of evidence or testimony and a showing that the evidence would
have changed the outcome of the trial.269 In MacDonald II the court's
analysis revealed only the possibility that the delay weakened the
defense at trial." The rehearing dissent more accurately evaluated the
record and agreed with the district court that prejudice was minimal
and that the delay may have aided MacDonald's defense."' The prejudice
which the MacDonald panels described would not support a finding of ac-
tual prejudice under a due process analysisY2
635 F.2d at 1119 (joint rehearing dissent); see note 259 supra.
431 U.S. at 789-90; see text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789 (proof of actual prejudice makes due
process speedy trial claim ripe for adjudication but not automatically valid); United States
v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1980) (due process speedy trial claim held invalid
because defendant did not prove actual prejudice); United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376,
382-83 (1st Cir. 1979) (proof of actual prejudice required before trial court should inquire into
reasons for delay); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant bears
heavy burden of showing actual prejudice and unreasonable delay in due process speedy
trail claim); United States v. King, 593 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendant must prove
actual prejudice rather than possible or presumed prejudice to establish due process speedy
trial violation).
' MacDonald did not claim a fifth amendment speedy trial violation in MacDonald L
See note 264 supra. Since proof of actual prejudice involves a demonstration of how the
delay affected the outcome of the trial, see note 269 infra, MacDonald could not have sup-
ported a fifth amendment argument in his pre-trial appeal.
" See United States v. Kail, 612 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912
(1980) (proof of Government's delay insufficient to establish due process violation because
defendants did not specify how loss of testimony prejudiced case or that Government
delayed prosecution for tactical advantage); United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 304 (9th
Cir. 1979) (loss of witness' testimony during period of delay does not establish due process
violation absent showing that loss resulted in actual prejudice); United States v.
McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 923 (10th Cir. 1979) (death of potential witness did not support
finding of due process violation absent showing that testimony would have been helpful to
defendant's case).
270 See text accompanying note 254 supra.
2' See 635 F.2d at 1122-23 (joint rehearing dissent); cf text accompanying notes 81-86
supra (district court judge's evaluation of prejudice at trial).
272 Compare text accompanying notes 102-10 (MacDonald II evaluation of prejudice)
with text accompanying note 269 (due process requirement of actual prejudice). The Mac-
Donald II panel's consideration of the prejudice factor did not differ significantly from the
reasoning of MacDonald I. See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra. Since both panels
[Vol. XXXVIII
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Even if MacDonald had proved actual prejudice, under Lovasco he.
also would have had to show that the delay by the Government was
unreasonable. 3 In cases involving due process speedy trial claims, the
circuit courts require proof of intentional, tactical delay on the part of
government prosecutors. 4 The circuit courts have applied Lovasco to
find that investigative delay by the Government is not unreasonable for
purposes of determining a due process speedy trial violationY5 The Mac-
Donald record indicates that the Justice Department's delay in conven-
ing the grand jury was the result of extensive investigation and the need
for the attorneys to become familiar with the case in order to decide
whether to seek an indictment. " While the delay may have increased as
a result of government bureaucracy, the delay was not intentional.",
Therefore, if the MacDonald 11 panel had considered MacDonald's fifth
amendment claim, the facts apparently would have failed to establish a
due process speedy trial violation." 8
MacDonald II represents a misinterpretation of precedent and
results in an unwarranted expansion of the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial. 9 In prosecuting MacDonald for the murder of his wife and
children, the Government did not violate MacDonald's sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial.'0 Until the grand jury returned the indictment in
evaluated prejudice in a sixth amendment context, the determination of prejudice should
not be conclusive as applied to a fifth amendment claim. Neither panel analyzed prejudice in
terms of the change in social attitudes in the nine year period which may have influenced
the manner in which the jury considered the evidence. Cf. note 253 supra (Second Circuit's
decision in New Buffalo basing sixth amendment speedy trial violation on prejudice
resulting from change in social attitude).
27 431 U.S. at 790; see text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
"I E.g., United States v. Kail, 612 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
912 (1980); United States v. Cerrito, 612 F.2d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Rubin,
609 F.2d 51, 66 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 960 (1980) (No. 79-1013); United States
v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); United States v.
Jessee, 605 F.2d 430, 431 (9th Cir. 1979).
" E.g., United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 923 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Taylor, 603 F.2d 732, 735
(8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1153 (2d Cir. 1979).
See text accompanying notes 231-34 supra.
See text accompanying notes 245-46 supra.
27 The MacDonald II panel did not address MacDonald's fifth amendment claim
because the burden on MacDonald would have been greater than for a sixth amendment
claim. 632 F.2d at 260. (MacDonald II panel). The rehearing dissent did not address Mac-
Donald's fifth amendment claim, concluding that the Fourth Circuit could consider the claim
only by granting the rehearing. 635 F.2d at 1116 n.1 (joint rehearing dissent). The rehearing
dissent noted, however, that without a greater showing of prejudice than the MacDonald II
panel found, MacDonald could not establish either a fifth or sixth amendment speedy trial
violation. Id. at 1123.
1 The Fourth Circuit's primary error was the extension of sixth amendment speedy
trial protections to a defendant during the period prior to accusation. See text accompany-
ing notes 152-55 supra. The Government's delay for investigative purposes was reasonable
under either speedy trial amendment. See notes 232-35 supra.
See 635 F.2d at 1123 (joint rehearing dissent).
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1975, the Government was investigating MacDonald, but had not accus-
ed him of the crime.281 Therefore, MacDonald's constitutional right to a
speedy trial was limited to the protections of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.28 The Fourth Circuit panels never addressed Mac-
Donald's due process claim. While the MacDonald I1 panel's assessment
of the prejudice at trial strongly indicates that the prejudice did not rise
to the level of actual prejudice necessary for a fifth amendment claim,M
the Fourth Circuit has never considered all of MacDonald's arguments in
the proper fifth amendment context.284
The rehearing dissent attempted to point out the MacDonald panels'
errors in applying the sixth amendment Barker test to measure pre-
indictment delay."u Judge Murnaghan's statement ineffectively respond-
ed to the rehearing dissent's arguments, while confusing the position set
forth in the MacDonald 11 panel decision by changing the relevant period
of delay. 8 The MacDonald I opinion, which stands as the existing law,
inaccurately evaluated the facts of the case and incorrectly applied the
law of speedy trial.
CATHARINE MCG. GILLIAM
G. Preventing Multiple Punishments
Demosthenes said that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue."' This ancient principle is embodied in the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.2 The clause prevents multiple punishments at a single trial for a
single offense.' The clause also prevents successive trials for a single of-
" See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
' See text accompanying note 14 supra.
See text accompanying notes 276-78 supra.
See note 278 supra.
See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
See text accompanying notes 175-78 supra.
Demosthenes 589 (Vance transl. 1962), quoted in United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d
868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), affd 420 U.S. 358 (1975). The Romans codified a principle similar to
the double jeopardy clause in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. M. Friedland,Double Jeopardy
5-15 (1969) at 15. Blackstone spoke of the "universal maxim of the common law of England,
that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once for the same offense."
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335. See generally Friedland, supra; Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
' U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any person subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The double jeopardy clause is binding on the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), overrul-
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-09 (1931) (courts may not impose
more than one punishment for a single offense); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,
341-42 (1911) (same); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170 (1873) (same).
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fense.' To prevent multiple punishments arising from a single trial, a.
court must determine when an increase in a convict's original sentence
amounts to a multiple punishment forbidden by the clause.' In Safrit v.
Garrison,' the Fourth Circuit recently confronted the problem of multi-
ple punishments and held that the double jeopardy clause bars a court
from increasing a defendant's original sentence where the sentence is
neither wholly void nor reviewed at defendant's behest.7 To prevent
multiple punishments arising from successive trials, a court must deter-
mine when two offenses stem from the "same offense."8 In Jordan v.
Virginia,9 the Fourth Circuit recently held that a single test does not suf-
fice to prevent both multiple punishments and successive trials for the
same offense. 0
Safrit v. Garrison
In 1973, Howard Eugene Safrit, then 15 years old, plead guilty in
Rowan County, North Carolina, to charges of armed robbery and break-
ing and entering.1 The state court sentenced Safrit to an indeterminate
sentence as a "youthful offender," but the court did not specify whether
Safrit was a "regular" or a "committed" youthful offender. 2 Committed
See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (acquittal on charge of
second degree murder bars subsequent prosecution for first degree murder); United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (appeals court may not review verdict of acquittal); In re
Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887) (conviction bars subsequent prosecution for the same offense).
Under the doctrine of "dual sovereignty," however, the double jeopardy clause does not bar
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense in state or federal court after an acquittal or
conviction in a court of the other jurisdiction. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187,
195-96 (1959). The doctrine of dual sovereignty arises from the theory that the state and
federal courts represent sovereign entities with separate interests to protect. See United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
1 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 391 U.S. 711 (1969); United States v. Walker, 346
F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965).
" 623 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1980).
' Id at 332.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (double jeopardy clause bars prose-
cution for theft of automobile after conviction for lesser included offense of operating same
vehicle without owner's consent); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889) (conviction on
charge of cohabiting with two wives over 21/ year period bars subsequent prosecution for
adultery with one of them on day following end of that period).
No. 78-6540 (4th Cir. June 2, 1980).
Id., slip op. at 6-7.
U 623 F.2d at 331. In North Carolina, juvenile offenders stand trial within the state
district court system. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(20) (Cum. Supp. 1979). See generally,
Thomas, Juvenile Justice in Transition-A New Juvenile Code for North Carolina, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1980).
' 623 F.2d at 331. Safrit's trial judge had the option of designating convicts under the
age of 21 as "committed" or "regular" youthful offenders. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-49.4
(repealed 1977) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-49.14 (1978)). At the time Safrit's
conviction, committed youthful offenders were sentenced under North Carolina's youthful
offender statutes, while regular youthful offenders were sentenced under any other ap-
plicable provisions. Id. The purpose of the committed youthful offender program is to pro-
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youthful offenders, as opposed to regular youthful offenders, are housed
apart from adult prisoners and in 1973 were entitled to mandatory
release on parole after serving four years."
For three years after his conviction, Safrit resided in a youth prison
camp under the assumption that he was a committed youthful offender. 4
In 1976, however, the state transferred Safrit to Raleigh Central Prison,
and incarcerated him with adult prisoners.15 Safrit sought habeas corpus
relief"8 in state court on grounds that his incarceration with adults
violated the conditions of his commitment. 7 The state court found that
Safrit's original sentence did not specify whether he was a regular or a
committed youthful offender, and ordered both his release and return to
Rowan County for resentencing.'
8
Upon resentencing, a Rowan County judge held on September 20,
1976, that the trial judge had intended to sentence Safrit as a committed
youthful offender. 9 In addition, the court noted that the state had
treated Safrit as a committed youthful offender when it first in-
carcerated him." After the court clarified Safrit's status as a committed
youthful offender, it resentenced him to his original indeterminate
sentence."
After resentencing, the state again transferred Safrit to Raleigh
Central Prison, and again he sought habeas corpus relief in state court
on grounds that his incarceration with adults violated the conditions of
his commitment.22 On October 13, 1976, the state court vacated the
September 20 sentence because an indeterminate sentence was imper-
missible under the youthful offender statutes then in effect in North
Carolina.' The judge again ordered that the state return Safrit to
vide a special rehabilitation program for juvenile offenders to improve their chances of a
successful return to the community. Id., § 148-49.10 (1978).
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-49.7, 148-49.8(b) (repealed 1977). Under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
148-49.12 (1978), committed youthful offenders are still housed separately from adult of-
fenders, but they are entitled to early parole only at the discretion of the Parole Commis-
sion. Id., § 148-49.15.
623 F.2d at 331.
11 Id
" The writ of habeas corpus is the traditional means by which prisoners may challenge
the constitutionality of their imprisonment. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963). Both
state and federal prisoners may petition federal courts for habeas corpus relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2255 (1976).
17 623 F.2d at 331. Safrit argued that he was a committed rather than regular youthful
offender, and therefore could not be imprisoned with adults. Brief for Appellant at 6-7; see
text accompanying note 13 supra.
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Rowan County for resentencing.24 On December 6, 1976, a different
Rowan County judge decided that Safrit would not benefit from sentenc-
ing as a committed youthful offender.' The judge resentenced Safrit
again to an indeterminate sentence, only this time as a regular youthful
offender.28
After unsuccessfully exhausting his state remedies, Safrit sought
habeas corpus relief in federal district court. He asserted that his
resentencing as a regular youthful offender amounted to an increased
sentence in violation of the double jeopardy clauseY The district court
admitted that Safrit's resentencing as a regular youthful offender
amounted to an increased sentence." Nevertheless, the court denied
Safrit relief, holding that since the court on October 13 had vacated the
original sentence and the September 20 sentence, the Rowan County
court could increase his sentence without violating his double jeopardy
rights. 9
In denying Safrit relief, the district court relied on Robinson v.
determinate sentences. See State v. Williams, 28 N.C. App. 320, 323, 220 S.E.2d 856, 858'
(1976).
The September 20 sentence also contained two clerical errors. The sentence commit-
ted Safrit to the custody of the "Secretary of Corrections" instead of the "Secretary of the
North Carolina Department of Corrections." In addition, the sentence listed the date of
Safrit's original conviction as May 1, 1976 instead of May 1, 1973. The Fourth Circuit men-
tioned these errors briefly, and clearly considered them of little importance to its decision.
Brief for Appellant at 9; Appendix at 6; 623 F.2d at 331. The Supreme Court has stated that
a trial judge may correct errors which are merely clerical at any time. See American Truck-
ing Ass'n v. Frisco Transp. Co. 358 U.S. 133, 145 (1958).
623 F.2d at 331.
Id- In 1976, when the judge resentenced Safrit for the second time, convicts under
the age of 21 were to be sentenced as committed youthful offenders, unless the trial judge
felt that the defendant would derive no benefit from such sentencing. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
148-49.4 (repealed 1977). In State v. Mitchell, 24 N.C. App. 484, 488, 211 S.E.2d 645, 648
(1975), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that youthful offenders were assumed to
be "committed" unless the trial judge explicitly stated otherwise. Id.
623 F.2d at 331. The judge vacated Safrit's status as a committed youthful offender
less than four months before he was to receive his mandatory parole. See text accompany-
ing note 13 supra.
' 623 F.2d at 331. Safrit also argued that the change in his status violated due process
because it came so soon before his mandatory release, and because it was the result of vin-
dictiveness. Brief for Appellant at 25-29.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Safrit's double jeopardy argument, and thus did not
consider his due process argument. 623 F.2d at 332. In support of Safrit's charge that the
December 6 judge changed Safrit's status as a result of vindictiveness, Safrit submitted a
note the October 13 judge wrote to a later state judge who denied one of Safrit's habeas cor-
pus petitions. The note said, in effect, that after Safrit repeatedly "complained" about the
terms of his commitment and had his status changed, "his wagon got fixed, and fixed cor-
rectly." Brief of Appellant at 11. This evidence is not wholly persuasive, because neither the
judge who wrote the note nor the one who received it mandated Safrit's change in status
from a committed to a regular youthful offender.
623 F.2d at 331.
Id at 332.
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Warden"0 to support its finding that the increase in Safrit's sentence did
not violate the double jeopardy clause. In Robinson, the Fourth Circuit
held that a special sentencing review board had not violated the double
jeopardy clause by increasing a petitoner's sentence.2 The Robinson
court noted, however, that the petitioner sought review of his sentence
under a statute which specifically authorized the review board to in-
crease sentences.
3 3
On Safrit's appeal, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Robinson and
held that the increase in Safrit's sentence violated the double jeopardy
clause.34 The court explained that unlike Robinson, Safrit had not attacked
the validity of the September 20 sentence itself, but merely the place of
his confinement. 5 Since Safrit did not question the validity of his status
as a committed youthful offender, the district court had no authority to
review the propriety of his status, or to impose a harsher punishment, as
did the Robinson court. 8
The Safrit court admitted that a judge may correct a void or illegal
sentence, even if the correction results in an increased sentence. 7 The
court stated that Safrit's sentence could not be increased, however,
because the September 20 sentence was only partially void.' Specifi-
cally, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the sentence was valid to the extent
that it established Safrit's status as a committed youthful offender, and
void only with respect to its indeterminate length and two minor clerical
errors. 9 The court reasoned that because Safrit's status as a committed
youthful offender was neither void nor illegal, the resentencing court's
imposition of the harsher status of regular youthful offender violated his
right against suffering increased punishment for the same offense."'
Circuits in agreement with the Fourth Circuit have ruled that the
valid part of an otherwise invalid sentence is the upper limit on the
455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972).
623 F.2d at 331.
455 F.2d at 1177. Robinson sought review of his sentence under § 132 of Article 26 of
the Code of Maryland, which provides that convicts sentenced to serve two or more years,
or sentenced to death, are entitled to sentence review by a three-judge panel. Id at 1173,
citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 132 (1966).
' 445 F.2d at 1174. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 134 (1973) (amended 1974) specifically pro-
vides that the sentence review panel has authority to increase or decrease a petitioner's
sentence.
623 F.2d at 331-32.
Id. at 332.
SId.
Id.; see, e.g., Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947); Breest v. Helgemoe,
579 F.2d 95, 100-01 (1st Cir. 1978). Both the Bozza and Breest courts implied that the double
jeopardy clause forbids increases only of valid sentences. 330 U.S. at 166-67; 579 F.2d at 99.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), the Supreme Court noted that the due
process clause forbids courts to increase void sentences for vindictive reasons. Id
623 F.2d at 332.
Id.; see note 23 supra.
O 623 F.2d at 332.
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punishment that a resentencing court may impose without violating the
double jeopardy clause. ' Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is
not inconsistent with other courts which have considered and approved
the propriety of increasing a prisoner's punishment upon sentence
review. Where appellate courts have approved an increase of a sentence
which a defendant already has begun to serve, the original sentences
were either wholly invalid,4" reviewed at defendant's own behest," or
", See United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486, 488-89 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Turner, 518 F.2d 14, 16 (7th Cir. 1975); Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854, 855 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
In Durbin, a court had sentenced defendant to 12 years for bank robbery, taking into
account defendant's prior conviction for violating the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312. 542 F.2d at
487. When his Dyer Act conviction was subsequently set aside, Durbin asked that his 12
year sentence be vacated or corrected. Id. On resentencing, the district court increased Dur-
bin's sentence to 15 years, because he had engaged in criminal activity while on parole from
his 12 year sentence. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that this sentence increase violated Dur-
bin's right to be free from double jeopardy, reasoning that since his 12 year sentence was
not wholly void or illegal, it set a maximum limit on resentencing. Id at 488-89.
In Turner, two defendants has been sentenced illegally to consecutive prison terms on
two separate counts. 518 F.2d at 15. On resentencing, each defendant's consecutive
penalties were consolidated into a single sentence which equalled the same number of years
as the combined consecutive sentences. Id. In holding that the resentencing violated the
double jeopardy clause, the Seventh Circuit explained that the original sentences were not
wholly invalid, and ruled that the most severe sentence which the trial judge originally im-
posed on any one count set the upper limit on resentencing. Id. at 16.
The facts in Tatum are remarkably similar to those in Safrit. The court originally
sentenced defendant to a term of three to nine years for robbery under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act. 310 F.2d at 855; see 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976). The Act, however, did not
permit the imposition of minimum terms. Id On resentencing, the trial court vacated the
original sentence, and resentenced defendant under the harsher indeterminate sentence
law. 310 F.2d at 855; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-203 (1961). The D.C. Circuit noted that the
defendant's original sentence was valid insofar as it penalized him under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, and ruled that the valid part of his sentence set the upper limit on
resentencing for double jeopardy purposes. 310 F.2d 855.
"2 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720-21 (1969) (double jeopardy
clause does not bar increase in defendant's original sentence when sentence is wholly void);
Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947) (same).
" See, e.g., Tipton v. Baker, 432 F.2d 245, 248 (10th Cir. 1970); Davenport v. United
States, 353 F.2d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The Tipton and Davenport courts both held that
the double jeopardy clause does not bar an increase in a defendant's original sentence after
defendant successfully challenges the validity of that sentence. 432 F.2d at 248; 353 F.2d at
884. Eight states have statutes which allow their appellate courts to increase or decrease
sentences on review without particular regard to voidness, as long as the review is initiated
by the defendant. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-409 (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194 to 197 (West 1960 and Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 2141-2144 (1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645 JA - 645 JG (1976 and Supp. 1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 278, §§ 28A-28C (West 1972 and Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 95-250 to 95-2504 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651:57-651:61 (Supp. 1977). The
First and Fourth Circuits have upheld sentence increases under the Massachusetts and
Maryland statutes. See Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (4th Cir. 1972); Walsh v.
Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1211 (1st Cir. 1971). See generally Dunsky, The Constitutionality of
Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. CRrM. L. & CRBIINOLOGY 19 (1978).
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reviewed at the government's request.44 Safrit is consistent with courts
permitting increased punishment because Safrit's sentence was neither
wholly void nor reviewed at the behest of himself or the government.
Safrit's September 20 sentence was not wholly invalid because the
sentence was invalid only to the degree that Safrit, a committed
youthful offender, was to serve an indeterminate term of punishment.
Under North Carolina law, the court could not technically label Safrit a
committed youthful offender and simultaneously sentence him to an in-
determinate term." Since the court's purpose for sentencing Safrit on
September 20 was to confirm his status as a committed youthful of-
fender,46 the court's contradictory imposition of an indeterminate
sentence was necessarily invalid.
In ruling that Safrit's valid status as a committed youthful offender
set an upper limit on resentencing, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's well-settled rule that any increase in a
valid sentence which a defendant has already begun to serve constitutes
multiple punishment forbidden by the double jeopardy clause.47 By
changing Safrit's status from a committed to a regular youthful offender,
the December 7 Rowan County judge did not correct a wholly invalid
sentence but rather increased a valid one in violation of Safrit's double
jeopardy rights.
In addition, the government did not appeal Safrit's sentence, nor did
the court even review the sentence at Safrit's own request. A defendant
that seeks to have his original sentence vacated is on notice that the
slate upon which his original sentence was written will be wiped clean,
and that a harsher punishment may be imposed. 8 Safrit, however,
Many courts have held that a trial judge may not seek, at his discretion, to increase a
convict's valid sentence once the convict has begun to serve the sentence. See, e.g., Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18. Wall. ) 163, 175 (1873); Sullens v. United States, 409 F.2d 545, 547
(5th Cir. 1969); but c.f. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165-65 (1947) (trial judge may
sua sponte increase invalid sentence, even if defendant has already begun to serve
sentence).
" Nearly identical provisions in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 both specifically give the
government the right to seek an increased sentence on review. See 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976);
21 U.S.C. § 849(h) (1976). In United States v. DiFrancesco, 49 U.S.L.W. 4022 (December 9,
1980), the Supreme Court recently affirmed the government's right to seek sentence review
under the Organized Crime Control Act. Id. at 4027-28.
" See note 23 supra.
4' See 623 F.2d at 331.
See, e.g., In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52 (1943) (double jeopardy clause bars increases
in valid sentences which defendants have already begun to serve); United States v. Benz,
282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931) (same); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 175 (1874) (same).
I See Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d at 1174. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 721 (1969) (defendant who obtains retrial after conviction runs risk of receiving in-
creased sentence upon reconviction). Neither the Pearce nor the Robinson court actually
mentioned the word "notice" itself, but each court stressed that the defendant himself con-
sciously assumed the risk of an increased sentence. See 395 U.S. at 721; 455 F.2d at 1176.
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challenged neither his status as a committed youthful offender, nor even
the indeterminate length of his sentence. Safrit challenged only the man-
ner in which the state enforced his sentence, and therefore was never on
notice that he was exposing himself to the possibility of increased
punishment. Because Safrit's September 20 sentence was neither wholly
invalid nor reviewed at his or the government's request, the Fourth Cir-
cuit properly prevented the imposition of an unfair and unconstitutional
punishment.
Safrit presents practical lessons for petitioners and courts within
the Fourth Circuit's jurisidiction. Petitioners, like Safrit, that seek only
to have their sentences properly enforced should emphasize in their peti-
tions that they are challenging only the manner of sentence enforcement
and not the validity of the underlying sentence. Similarly, courts must
carefully determine the form of relief petitioners are seeking, and must
not vacate sentences if the petitioner has not challenged the sentence's
validity. Only by carefully avoiding the imposition of additional punish-
ment on valid sentences can the courts preserve the ancient prohibition
of double jeopardy.
Jordan v. Virginia
On May 6, 1976, Jerry Lee Jordan obtained the drug Eskatrol4 ' by
presenting a forged prescription to a pharmacist in Virginia. The phar-
macist suspected the forgery, and instructed a pharmacy employee to
keep her eye on Jordan. The employee saw Jordan a few minutes later in
a nearby parking lot, still in possession of the drug. She recorded Jor-
dan's license plate number, and informed the police of the alleged
forgery.50 The police arrested Jordan, and the Commonwealth of Virginia
sucessfully prosecuted him on July 26 for the misdemeanor offense of ob-
taining a controlled substance by forgery." On September 20, the Com-
monwealth tried Jordan for the felony offense of possession of a "con-
trolled substance."'2 At his felony trial, Jordan asserted that by virtue of
his misdemeanor conviction for falsely obtaining drugs, the felony trial
for possession of the same drugs amounted to a retrial for the same of-
" VA. CODE § 54-84:6 (1978 & Supp. 1980) classifies Eskatrol as a Schedule II controlled
substance. Schedule H substances are those drugs which have a currently accepted medical
use, but also have a high potential for abuse which may lead to psychic or physical
dependence. IM, § 54-524.84:5.
No. 78-6540, slip op. at 2; Brief for Appellee at 5.
,In 1976, when the Commonwealth first prosecuted Jordan, the Virginia Code made
it a misdemeanor to obtain drugs by misrepresentation or to utter a forged prescription.
VA. CODE § 54-524.76 (repealed 1977 and substantially recodified as a felony offense under
VA. CODE § 18.2-258.1, Supp. 1980).
" No. 78-6540, slip op. at 2-3. The Commonwealth charged Jordan with the felony of
knowingly possessing a controlled substance not pursuant to a valid prescription. IM at 3
n.2. The Commonwealth's indictment charged specifically that Jordan possessed the
Eskatrol "at approximately 3 p.m. in Ballou Park Shopping Center." Md
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fense in violation of the double jeopardy clause." The trial court rejected
Jordan's argument, as did Supreme Court of Virginia on appeal.'
Jordan obtained habeas corpus relief in federal district court.55 On
appeal, the Commonwealth contended that no double jeopardy problem
existed because Jordan had been convicted for two separate offenses
under the "two offense" test of Blockburger v. United States.6 Under
the Blockburger test, an accused has committed two separate offenses if
his acts have violated two statutes which have separate and distinct
elements of proof. Specifically, the Commonwealth relied upon the ap-
plication of the Blockburger test in Gore v. United States."5 The
Supreme Court in Gore held that on the basis of a single sale of nar-
cotics, the double jeopardy clause did not prevent the defendant's con-
viction in a single trial for three distinct offenses. 9
In Jordan, the Fourth Circuit recognized that if the Blockburger test
is not satisfied, double jeopardy results from the prosecution of multiple
charges, whether joined in a single prosecution or prosecuted suc-
cessively. The court noted, however, that the exact converse does not
follow: multiple charges which may be joined under the Blockburger test
in a single prosecution may nevertheless constitute double jeopardy if
No. 78-6540, slip op. at 4. In his Plea of Former Jeopardy, Jordan stressed that both
trials involved the same defendant, time of day, drug, place, and witnesses. Plea of Former
Jeopardy, reprinted in Joint Appendix, Jordan v. Virginia, No. 78-6540 (4th Cir. June 2,
1980). He also stressed that in both trials the necessary proof showed that he intentionally
obtained and possessed the drug by virtue of an invalid prescription. Id
No. 78-6540, slip op. at 4.
Jordan v. Virginia, No. 77-0076-D (W.D. Va. Aug. 8, 1978). In granting habeas corpus
relief, the district court reasoned that the Commonwealth's misdemeanor complaint set
forth an offense almost identical to that set forth in the later felony indictment, and
therefore, the double jeopardy clause barred the later prosecution. Memorandum Opinion at
5-6, reprinted in Joint Appendix, Jordan v. Virginia, No. 78-6540 (4th Cir. June 2, 1980). In
support of its decision, the court cited Wheeler v. Virginia, 192 Va. 665, 66 S.E.2d 605 (1951),
where the Virginia Supreme Court held that a prior conviction for the illegal sale of
whiskey barred a subsequent prosecution for illegal possession of the same whiskey. Id.; see
192 Va. at 669; 66 S.E.2d at 606-07.
284 U.S. 299 (1932). Applying its own test, the Blockburger Court held that the sale
of narcotics not in the original stamped package and the sale of those same narcotics not
pursuant to a written order were two distinct offenses which the government could try in a
single trial. Id at 301.
" 284 U.S. at 304. The Commonwealth argued that this test revealed two separate of-
fenses because the misdemeanor charge required proof of illegal obtainment, and the felony
charged did not. No. 78-6540, slip op. at 6, n.5. Similarly, the felony charge required proof of
possession of a "controlled substance," which the misdeameanor charge did not require. Id
No. 78-6540, slip op. at 4-5, citing 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
5 357 U.S. at 392. The government prosecuted Gore for the sale of drugs not "in pur-
suance of a written order," the sale of drugs not "in the original stamped package," and the
sale of drugs with knowledge that they had been illegally imported. 357 U.S. at 387. But see
United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959). In Sabella, the Second Circuit held that
the double jeopardy clause barred a prosecution for the sale of drugs with knowledge that
they had been illegally imported after a prior conviction for the sale of those §ame drugs not
"in pursuance of a written order." Id at 208-08.
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they are prosecuted successively."0 Relying on a footnote in the Supreme
Court case of Brown v. Ohio,61 the Fourth Circuit explained that the
Blockburger test inadequately safeguards the protections of the double
jeopardy clause in successive trials.2 The court stated that an important
protection of the double jeopardy clause is the assurance that an acquit-
ted or convicted defendant need not run the agonizing gauntlet of suc-
cessive trials for any single offense.13 This assurance simply never arises
in the context of single joined charge prosecutions. Therefore, the
Blockburger test does not adequately protect defendants' fifth amend-
ment rights in successive prosecutions.
The Fourth Circuit employed a test which better accounts for the
specific problems of successive trials than does the Blockburger test.
The court inquired whether "the evidence required to support a convic-
tion upon one of [the indictments] would have been sufficient to warrant
a conviction upon the other."" If the evidence which supported the first
conviction would have been sufficient for both convictions, then the
second prosecution is barred.
In applying its more protective test, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the double jeopardy clause barred Jordan's prosecution for posses-
sion. 5 The court reasoned that when the Commonwealth proved during
the misdemeanor trial that Jordan had illegally "obtained" the Eskatrol,
they necessarily proved that he illegally "possessed" the drug.6 6 The
evidence adduced at the first trial would therefore have sufficed to sus-
tain the later felony conviction.' Although the Commonwealth charged
specifically in the felony trial that Jordan possessed the Eskatrol in the
0 No. 78-6540, slip op. at 5-6.
81 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1977). In Brown, the Court stated that the Blockburger test
does not always suffice to protect double jeopardy rights in cases where a second prosecu-
tion requires relitigation of factual issues already resolved in the previous trial. Id The
Court pointed with approval to the result in In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). Id. In
Nielsen, the Court held that the defendant's conviction on a charge of cohabiting with two
wives over a 21/2 year period barred a subsequent prosecution for adultery with one of them
on the day following the end of that period. 131 U.S. at 190-91. The Nielsen Court inquired
whether the evidence adduced at the first trial would have sufficed for conviction at the
second trial. Id. at 188-89.
82 No. 78-6540, slip op. at 6-7. The Jordan court found it unnecessary to decide whether
Blockburger test would indeed have revealed two offenses or only one after rejecting the
Blockburger test as inappropriate. Id. at 10 n.9.
No. 78-6540, slip op. at 7. The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose underlying
the doctrine of double jeopardy is that once a judgement has been- reached, a defendant can
rest assured that the judgement is final, and that he need not live "in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
No. 78-6540, slip op. at 7; see In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1889); United States
v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206, 210-11 (2d Cir. 1959). In Nielsen and Sabella, the Supreme Court
and the Second Circuit employed a "two offense" test for successive prosecutions identical
to that which the Fourth Circuit employed in Jordan. See notes 59 and 61 supra.
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parking lot and not in the pharmacy,68 the court rejected the state's
argument that the possession in the felony charge was separate from the
defendant's possession in the misdemeanor charge.69
The Jordan court's refusal to employ only the Blockburger "two of-
fense" test for successive trials is not consistent with prior Fourth Cir-
cuit law7" or the law of other circuits. 1 The Second Circuit, however,
employs a "two offense" test for successive prosecutions that is identical
to the test the Fourth Circuit adopted in Jordan.2 The Fourth Circuit's
adoption of a "two offense" test different from the Blockburger test is
also consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court de-
veloped the Blockburger test in the context of a single trial. The Court
designed the test to safeguard the double jeopardy clause's protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense at a single trial. The
Blockburger Court, however, was not concerned with the prevention of
successive trials for the same offense.73 To prevent the special double
jeopardy hazards posed by successive prosecutions, the Supreme Court
developed in In re Nielsen74 and recently reaffirmed in Brown v. Ohio75 a
"two offense" test that is identical to the Jordan court's test.
See note 53 supra.
69 No. 78-6540, slip op. at 11. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that possession by nature is
a continuing offense, and noted that the legislature did not define possession as anything
other than a continuing offense. Id.
" See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, No. 76-1059 (4th Cir. July 7, 1976) (prosecution
for carrying concealed weapon does not bar subsequent prosecution for knowingly possess-
ing unregistered firearm).
7' See, e.g., Brown v. Alabama, 619 F.2d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecution for armed
robbery does not bar subsequent prosecution for assault with intent to kill arising out of the
same incident); United States v. Heady, 620 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1980) (prosecution for misap-
plication of CETA funds does not bar subsequent prosecution for false and fictitious
misrepresentations); United States v. Kelava, 610 F.2d 479, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1979) (prosecu-
tion for kidnapping foreign officials does not bar subsequent prosecution for imprisonment);
United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 442 U.S. (1979) (prosecu-
tion for conspriracy to rob bank does not bar subsequent prosecution for attempted bank
robbery); United States v. Cruz, 568 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir. 1978) cert denied, 444 U.S.
878 (1979) (conviction for distribution of heroin does not bar subsequent prosecution for con-
spiracy to distribute same); United States v. DeCotreau, 516 F.2d 16, 18 (8th Cir. 1975)
(prosecution for driving while intoxicated does not bar prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter arising from such driving); United States v. Wilder, 463 F.2d 1263, 1266-67
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (prosecution for possessing an unregistered firearm does not bar a subse-
quent prosecution for carrying a pistol without a license); Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d
624, 626-27 (10th Cir. 1971) (prosecution for murder does not bar a subsequent prosecution
for being an accessory to murder before the fact); United States ex rel. Brown v Hendrick,
431 F.2d 436, 440 (3rd Cir. 1970) cert. denied 402 U.S. 976 (1971) (prosecution for open
lewdness does not bar subsequent prosecution for rape). Because the Jordan court's "two of-
fense" test is more sensitive to the problems of successive prosecutions, the use of that test
would probably have prevented many of the subsequent prosecutions which the
Blockburger test allowed. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
72 See note 64 supra.
See text accompanying notes 4 and 25 supra.
7' See In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889); note 61 supra.
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6. (1977); note 61 supra.
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The Jordan court's rejection of the Commonwealth's argument that
Jordan's conduct was divisible into separate factual settings is also con-
sistent with Supreme Court precedent. When Jordan "obtained" the
Eskatrol, he obviously "possessed" it as well." The Commonwealth could
not transform Jordan's possession of the drug in the parking lot into an
offense separate from his possesion in the pharmacy simply by confining
the formal charge of possession to the time while Jordan was in the
parking lot. As the Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Ohio, prosecutors
may not avoid the dictates of the double jeopardy clause by dividing a
single crime into temporal units."
United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan has suggested a "two
offense" test for successive prosecutions which goes beyond the Jordan
court's test in protecting defendants against double jeopardy. Brennan
argues that the double jeopardy clause requires the government to
prosecute in one proceeding all of the charges against a defendant which
arise out of a single act or series of acts. In effect, Brennan recommends
a rule of compulsory joinder.
78
A rule of compulsory joinder would eliminate the potential in the
Jordan court's test for the government to harass the perpetrators of
multiple victim crimes with successive prosecutions.79 The Jordan
", The Commonwealth recognized clearly that Jordan "possessed" the Eskatrol when
he "obtained" it, for the prosecution would not otherwise have confined its possession
charge to the time while Jordan was in the parking lot. See note 10 supra.
" 432 U.S. at 169. See also Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1954); United
States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-24 (1952). Both Bell and Universal
established that the government may not divide a single transaction which violated a
statute into multiple offenses unless the statute specifically authorizes such division. 349
U.S. at 83-84; 344 U.S. at 224.
78 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (acquittal
of defendant for offense against one victim of multiple victim crime bars subsequent prose-
cution for offense against any remaining victims). To support the Court's adoption of a rule
of compulsory joinder, Brennan claimed that the rule would prevent the government from
harassing the alleged perpetrators of multiple victim crimes and promote judicial efficiency
and economy. Id. at 454. Brennan recognized, however, that his rule would require certain
limited exceptions. Id. at 453. Brennan would make an exception, for example, when a pro-
secutor exercising due diligence had not yet discovered, by the time of the original trial, the
facts requisite to conviction for a second offense arising out of the same incident. See, e.g.,
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912). Other exceptions would be made when no
single court had jurisdiction over all of the alleged crimes, or when joinder of offenses would
result in undue prejudice. 397 U.S. at 453 n.7, 455 n.11. Brennan does not specify whether or
not his exception concerning jurisdiction would preserve the doctrine of dual sovereignty.
See note 4 supra. See generally Note, Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising
from the Same Transaction, 15 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 259 (1978).
79 See, e.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), affg 8 Ill.2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956).
Defendant Ciucci, in one violent incident, murdered his wife and three children. The govern-
ment prosecuted Ciucci three separate times for murder, stopping only when Ciucci received
the death penalty. 356 U.S. at 572. The Ciucci Court held that the three successive prosecu-
tions did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 573.
Because the Court had not yet held the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states
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court's test does not necessarily prevent such abuse because the test
permits a new prosecution for each charge which requires proof of a
"significant additional fact,"8 even though the charges arise from the
same general circumstances. Thus, under Jordan, the harm to separate
victims in multiple victim crimes would be a sufficient basis for suc-
cessive prosecutions.
The Supreme Court has not yet adopted Brennan's suggested rule of
compulsory joinder. In light of the Court's specific approval of a test
identical to that which the Jordan court employed, however, the Fourth
Circuit has made a sound decision designed to assure defendants that
they shall not twice suffer the threat of punishment of any one offense.
The Safrit and Jordan courts have set some important rules for
courts within the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction. After Safrit, the valid
part of a partially invalid sentence sets the upper limit upon resentenc-
ing. After Jordan, the courts may apply the Blockburger test only to pre-
vent multiple punishments arising from single trials. To prevent multi-
ple punishments arising from successive trials, the courts must apply a
new test that is more protective of defendants in criminal trials. Safrit
and Jordan together demonstrate that the Fourth Circuit intends to
preserve the ancient protections of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
RICHARD J. KAHN
H. Search of Third Party Home Pursuant to Arrest Warrant
Unconstitutional
The fourth amendment protects an individual's right to be free from
unreasonable government intrusions into his home.1 As a general rule,
police must obtain a search warrant from a magistrate before entering a
private home to search for persons or objects.2 The magistrate must
determine that there is probable cause to believe that the object or per-
through the fourteenth amendment, it did not consider whether Ciucci's prosecutions sub-
jected him to double jeopardy. See note 2 supra.
" "The defendant may not be later tried on [the] same fact situation, where no signifi-
cant additional fact need be proved." Jordan v. Virginia, No. 78-6540, slip op. at 9, quoting
United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d at 212.
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967). The fourth amendment ap-
plies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925). A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonably, subject to a few
exceptions. 389 U.S. at 357; see note 4 infra.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
son sought is within the place to be searched.' The courts do recognize,
however, exceptions to the search warrant requirement.4
In Payton v. New York,5 the United States Supreme Court held that
police with an arrest warrant could lawfully enter a suspect's home
without a search warrant to arrest the suspect if they had reason to
believe the suspect was within.' The Payton Court reasoned that a
suspect named in an arrest warrant had a diminished expectation of
privacy in his home." The Court concluded that an arrest warrant suffi-
ciently protected the suspect's fourth amendment right to privacy when
officers entered his home to arrest him.
8
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed a question left unanswered in
Payton. In Wallace v. King,9 the Fourth Circuit confronted the issue
whether police officers may enter a third person's home without a
search warrant to search for and arrest a non-resident suspect pursuant
to a valid arrest warrant.10 The question in Wallace is distinguishable
from the issue in Payton, because the fourth amendment rights at stake
in Wallace were those of an innocent third party.1
I Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. The warrant re-
quirement protects the.reasonable expectation of privacy that a person has in his home.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (emergency search); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1966) (hot pursuit); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628
(1946), rev'd on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800 (1947) (consent search).
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Id. at 602-03. In Payton, police officers entered the suspect's home without an arrest
warrant or a search warrant to place the suspect under felony arrest. Id. at 576. The
Supreme Court reasoned that an officer's warrantless entry into a suspect's home to arrest
or search for the suspect violated the suspect's constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 588-89;
see United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983
(1977). The Court found that the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
prohibited warrantless entries to arrest a resident suspect, since an arrest entry often
would involve a search for the suspect. 445 U.S. at 588-89. The Court concluded that absent
consent or exigent circumstances officers had to obtain an arrest warrent before entering a
private home to arrest a resident suspect. Id. at 590, 603. The Court stated, however, that a
search warrant was unnecessary. Id. at 602-03.
' See id (conclusion that suspect has diminished expectation of privacy in home im-
plied by Court's reasoning); note 3 supra.
" 445 U.S. at 603. The Payton Court reasoned that if there was sufficient evidence to
persuade a magistrate that the suspect's arrest was justified, then it was constitutionally
reasonable to require the suspect to "open his doors" to police. Id. at 602-03.
626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question whether policy may enter a
third person's home without a search warrant to search for and arrest a non-resident
suspect pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. See 445 U.S. at 603.
" See Grady, Warrantless Entry to Arrest: A Practical Solution to a Fourth Amend-
ment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 676. In determining the constitutionality of a police en-
try into a thrid person's home to search for a suspect, the focus of the analysis should be on
the privacy interests of the third party. Id.
Before Wallace, the Fourth Circuit had not addressed the issue whether police with an
arrest warrant must obtain a search warrant before entering a third person's home to
1981]
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To apprehend a suspect named in a valid arrest warrant, the officers
in Wallace first searched the home of the suspect's parents.12 Informa-
tion received from the suspect's husband then led the officers to search a
house that belonged to friends of her parents. 3 The suspect did not live
at either home. 14 The homeowners sued the officers and the Chief of the
Police Department of Fairfax County, Virginia, under the Federal Tort
Claims Act" for money damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief."
The plaintiffs asserted a fourth amendment challenge to an unwritten
policy of the Fairfax County police authorizing officers to search any
dwelling without a search warrant in order to locate a person named in
an arrest warrant, if the officers reasonably believed that the suspect
was in the dwelling. 7 The district court entered summary judgment for
the defendants.'8
On appeal, the plaintiffs again argued that the department's unwrit-
ten search policy violated the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 9
Recognizing that the fourth amendment does not permit officers to enter
a dwelling to search for objects without a search warrant, the plaintiffs
asserted that the police violated the fourth amendment by entering
arrest a suspect. In Lankford v. Gelston, the Fourth Circuit enjoined the Baltimore City
police from searching third party residences for suspects pursuant to arrest warrants when
the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the suspects were in the homes sear-
ched. 364 F.2d 197, 198-204 (4th Cir. 1966). The court declined to decide whether police must
obtain a search warrant in addition to an arrest warrant before entering a third person's
home to arrest a suspect. Id. at 205-206.
In United States v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit upheld a warrantless search of an
apartment used by members of a narcotics ring, where the officers had arrest warrants and
probable cause to believe the suspects were on the premises. 593 F.2d 553, 556 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom. Speech v. United States, 441 U.S. 947 (1979). Phillips can be
distinguished from Wallace, because the apartment searched in Phillips was not a third party
residence, but was a headquarters for a narcotics ring. See id. Since the suspect's privacy in-
terests were at stake and not the rights of an innocent third person, the officers did not need a
search warrent. See id.
12 626 F.2d at 1159. The suspect was named in an arrest warrant for refusing to appear in
court with her child in a domestic relations suit. Id.
11 Id at 1160. Both searches were conducted without the homeowners' consent. See id. at
1159-60. The officers did not find the suspect in either search. See id.
'I Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act states that any person who,
under any law of a state, territory, or the District of Columbia, deprives a United States
citizen of any constitutional right is liable to the injured party. Id. The Act permits the in-
jured party to bring an action at law or in equity. Id.
11 626 F.2d at 1159.
17 Id.
11 Brief for Appellant at 2, 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Appellant
Brief]. In an unreported memorandum opinion and order filed on May 3, 1978, the district
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Id.
11 626 F.2d at 1160; Appellant Brief, supra note 18, at 11. The fourth amendment re-
quires that a magistrate issue a warrant only on a showing of probable cause, and that the
warrant particularly describes the place to be searched. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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private houses to search for a nonresident suspect without a search war-
rant."0 In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the department policy en-
couraged indiscriminate searches of residents' homes."
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held that the of-
ficers violated the plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights by entering a
third party's residence without a search warrant." The court stated that
an officer's reasonable belief that a suspect named in an arrest warrant
was on the premises was insufficient to justify entry into a third party
home, absent either exigent circumstances' or the homeowner's con-
sent. 4 Observing that the Supreme Court had specifically limited
Payton's holding to the suspect's own dwelling,' the Fourth Circuit
recognized that an arrest warrant did not sufficiently protect a third
person's privacy when officers entered his home to search for a non-
resident suspect." While an arrest warrant demonstrated that the of-
ficers had probable cause to believe the named person had committed a
crime,27 the warrant afforded no basis for a reasonable belief that the
suspect was in a third person's home.' The court concluded that the of-
Appellant Brief, supra note 18, at 11; see text accompanying note 2 supra.
2 Appellant Brief, supra note 18, at 12-15. The Supreme Court has observed that the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement protects people from the potential for abuse that
exists when police have unrestricted discretion to decide to conduct a search. See Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965). In Stanford, the Court held that a search warrant
authorizing officers to search a private home for "literary materials" did not sufficiently
restrict the officers' discretion to search, and that the resulting search and seizure of over
2,000 items was too extensive and indiscriminate under the fourth amendment. Id. at 485-86.
' 626 F.2d at 1161. The Fourth Circuit was unwilling to hold the officers in Wallace
personally liable for money damages. Id. The court reasoned that the officers were merely
following the instructions of their superiors on a point of law which the United States
Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, and the Virginia Supreme Court had not decided. Id.
Furthermore, the officers had acted in good faith and had conducted the searches in a
reasonable manner. Id.
n 606 F.2d at 1161. The Fourth Circuit noted that no exigent circumstances existed in
Wallace. Id. The suspect was not considered dangerous, and the officers had sufficient time
to obtain search warrants. Id. According to the Wallace majority, exigent circumstances
may include hot pursuit, danger of injury to persons or property if arrest is delayed, the
absence of a readily available magistrate, and reasonable cause to believe that the suspect
owns or resides in the premises to be searched. Id.
2 Id.; see note 13 supra.
Id.; see 445 U.S. at 603.
626 F.2d at 1161.
" Id.; e.g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1976); Fisher v. Volz,
496 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1974). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(a) states that a
magistrate may issue an arrest warrant if there is probable cause to believe that a crime
was committed and that the defendant committed it. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a).
21 626 F.2d at 1161; e.g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1976);
Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1974).
An arrest warrant requires a judicial determination that there is probable cause to ar-
rest a suspect but does not limit the place where police may carry out the arrest. See 496
F.2d at 341.
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ficers were not authorized to conduct nonconsensual searches of the
plaintiffs' homes without search warrants. 9
The dissent argued, however, that police officers having a
reasonable belief that a suspect named in an arrest'warrant is within a
third person's home should be able to enter the home without a search
warrant to arrest the suspect." The dissent maintained that the search
for a person named in an arrest warrant presents "inherent exigencies"
which justify entry without a search warrant." According to the dissent,
even if the court assumed that an arrest warrant did not establish
exigent circumstances, a requirement that the police obtain a search
warrant would hamper investigation while giving the third person no
significant benefit.2 The dissent asserted that the reasonableness of
a search should be determined "on a case-by-case basis.
33
All courts that have considered the issue in Wallace agree that the
officers must have both an arrest warrant and a reasonable belief that
the suspect is within the third party dwelling to be searched.3 4 Courts
have not consistently decided, however, whether exigent circumstances
that prevent the police from obtaining a search warrant must also
626 F.2d at 1161. The Fourth Circuit ordered declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
o Id. at 1163. The dissent would have permitted the officers to use force, if necessary,
to enter a home and arrest a suspect pursuant to an arrest warrant. Id. at 1162. The dissent
argued that the Fourth Circuit should have followed United States v. Phillips, 593 F.2d 553
(4th Cir. 1978). Id.; see note 11 supra.
11 626 F.2d at 1162. The dissent suggested that a suspect often is armed and mobile.
See id. The dissent's reasoning is consistent with United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259,
263 (6th Cir. 1967). In McKinney, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that a
search warrant is necessary when officers execute a valid arrest warrant on the premises of
a third party. 379 F.2d at 262-63. The Sixth Circuit stated that the issuance of an arrest war-
rant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating the need for a search warrant. Id. at 263.
' 626 F.2d at 1163. The dissent argued that a warrant requirement would not protect
a third person's fourth amendment rights, because a homeowner's privacy interests were af-
fected primarily by the manner and extent of the search, factors which a magistrate could
not review before the search occurred. Id. at 1162.
' Id. at 1163; see United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) (reasonableness of
search must be determined from facts and circumstances of each case). But see Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-68 (1969) (overruling Rabinowitz and holding that reasonable-
ness of search depended on existence of search warrant).
The dissent added that citizens may challenge the reasonableness of a police search
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 626 F.2d at 1163; see note 15 supra. As Wallace il-
lustrates, however, this remedy is undesirable for a homeowner when police enter his home
to search for a non-resident suspect, since the innocent third party must bear the burden of
the time and expense of litigation after his fourth amendment rights have been violated.
See 626 F.2d at 1163. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389-90
(1971); Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374, 1374-76 (4th Cir. 1973).
' See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States
v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); United States
v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 414 (5th Cir. 1976); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1292 (8th Cir.
1975), aff'd sub. nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 338
(3d Cir. 1974); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967). Since an arrest
warrant does not establish that a suspect is within a third person's home, an officer must
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exist.- The Wallace majority's conclusion gains support from the fact
that an arrest warrant does not protect an innocent third person's fourth
amendment right to privacy when officers enter his home to search for a
suspect.w Unlike a suspect in his own home, a third party does not have a
diminished expectation of privacy in his home merely because a suspect
is present.17 An arrest warrant does not establish that there is reason to
believe a suspect is within a third party home.' Some courts have held
that when the suspect is not considered dangerous, exigent cir-
cumstances may not exist. The police, therefore, do not have a justifica-
tion for circumventing the warrant requirement.39
As the Wallace dissent observed, some courts adhere to the proposi-
tion that police officers do not need exigent circumstances to justify a
search of third party premises when the officers reasonably believe that
have a reasonable belief that the suspect is within the residence. 496 F.2d at 341. The fourth
amendment requires a reasonable belief to protect an innocent third party from arbitrary
police invasions of his home. Id.; see text accompanying note 1 supra. An officer's
reasonable belief constitutes a probable cause required for a magistrate to issue a warrant
under the fourth amendment. See 496 F.2d at 340-41.
" Compare Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1292 (8th Cir. 1975) (police who enter third
party residence to arrest suspect must have valid arrest warrant and probable cause to
believe suspect is within) [and] United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir.
1967) (fact that police had arrest warrant obviated need for search warrant) with Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928-29 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975) (ex-
igent circumstances and probable cause validated search of third party home for suspects
named in arrest warrant).
In United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit ruled initially
that the fourth amendment required both probable cause and exigent circumstances to sup-
port a warrantless search of third party premises. Id. at 416. On petition for rehearing the
court reversed. Id. at 421. The court stated that it had "overlooked" existing Fifth Circuit
law holding that where police have a valid arrest warrant and reasonably believe that the
named person is on third party premises, they need not obtain a search warrant to enter
and arrest the suspect. Id.
The Wallace majority's reasoning is in line with those courts which have concluded
that the fourth amendment requires both a reasonable belief and exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless search of third party premises. See 626 F.2d at 1161; United States v.
Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.0. Cir. 1977); Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 341-43 (3d Cir.
1974).
See Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1974).
See United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1976); text accompanying
notes 7 & 11 supra. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565 (1976)
(sanctity of home afforded most stringent fourth amendment protection); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (person's privacy expectation in car significantly less
than that in home).
-" United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1976); Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d
333, 341 &3d Cir. 1974); text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
" See 545 F.2d at 414 n.24, 415-16; 496 F.2d at 337-41. In United States v. Cravero, the
court found that no exigent circumstances existed because the suspects were in a house sur-
rounded by police and could not have escaped. 545 F.2d at 414 n.24. The suspects posed no
threat of harm to third perons. Id. Therefore, the court found initially that the officers were
not justified in entering the third party home without a search warrant. Id. at 416; see note
35 supra.
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a suspect named in an arrest warrant is within the third party
premises." Courts have argued that the issuance of an arrest warrant is
itself an exceptional circumstance.41 Courts have reasoned that the
strong public interest in ensuring effective law enforcement through the
swift apprehension of suspects supports warrantless searches of third
party residences." Courts have held that where a suspect is mobile and
avoiding arrest, an officer's entrance and search of a third party home is
constitutionally reasonable." The Wallace dissent's view is most attrac-
tive when applied to cases in which the suspect is considered a threat to
life or property.44 In such cases, the public interest in the suspect's swift
arrest may override the third party homeowner's fourth amendment
rights. 5 In Wallace, however, the suspect was charged with failure to
obey a court order to appear at trial in a domestic relations suit.6 She
was not considered a danger to life or property.47 On the Wallace facts,
therefore, the court found it difficult to justify the invasion of privacy
occasioned by a warrantless search of an innocent third person's home. 8
As the conflicting views in Wallace indicate, a police entry into a
third party home to search for a suspect named in an arrest warrant
presents a difficult problem of weighing competing interests.9 While the
public has an interest in the swift apprehension of criminal suspects,' an
innocent third person has a constitutional right to be secure in his home
I See 626 F.2d at 1162; e.g., Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1967);
see also United States v. Arboleda, No. 79-1278, slip op. at 3403-04 (2d Cir. June 9, 1980);
United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 4445 (1st Cir. 1980). Arboleda and Adams suggested
in dicta without supporting reasoning or discussion, that a search warrant would be un-
necessary where officers with a valid arrest warrant entered a third party home to arrest a
suspect. No. 79-1278, slip op. at 3403-04; 621 F.2d at 44-45. Both cases dealt with entries by
police without an arrest warrant or a search warrant and therefore do not apply directly to
the Wallace facts. See No. 79-1278, slip op. at 3403-94; 621 F.2d at 44-45.
41 379 F.2d at 263; see 626 F.2d at 1162.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (5th Cir. 1976); Rodriguez v.
Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 1973).
' See, e.g., 626 F.2d at 1162-63; United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir.
1967).
" See 626 F.2d at 1162-63; United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 416 n.30 (5th Cir.
1976); Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 1973). In Rodriguez, officers forcibly
entered a third party home without a search warrant to search for and arrest suspects named
in valid arrest warrants. 473 F.2d at 601-03. In determining that the officers' entry was
lawful, the court relied on the fact that the suspects had already killed three people and had
threatened to kill any officer who tried to arrest them. Id. at 606. The danger of injury to
persons overrode the fourth amendment rights of the third party homeowners. See id.
'5 See note 44 supra.
626 F.2d at 1159.
,T See id.
See notes 36-39 supra.
" Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1974).
See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
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against unreasonable police invasions."1 If the suspect in Wallace had
been armed and dangerous, the majority might have decided that the of-
ficers acted reasonably in entering a third party home without a search
warrant.2 Until the United States Supreme Court speaks on the issue of
police entries into third party homes pursuant to arrest warrants, it is
difficult to predict whether other courts treating the issue will follow
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning.'
JAMES REESE SHOEMAKER
L Warrantless Administrative Inspections Under the Mine Safety and
Health Act
The fourth amendment safeguards an individual's interest in privacy
from unreasonable intrusions by government officials.' As a general
rule, a police officer's search of private property is unreasonable unless
authorized by a valid search warrant.2 A magistrate may issue a criminal
search warrant only upon the officer's showing that there is probable
cause to believe that particular evidence of a crime is located in a par-
ticular place. The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.4
In recent years, the Supreme Court has applied the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement to administrative searches conducted pur-
suant to a regulatory scheme.5 An administrative search warrant need
51 See text accompanying notes 1 & 37 supra.
See 78-1399, slip op. at 9; text accompanying notes 44 & 45 supra.
'3 See note 10 supra; text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). See gener-
ally Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1973).
2 E.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-68 (1969).
1 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a); see U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 423 U.S. 38 (1976) (warrantless search con-
ducted after hot pursuit of suspect); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless
inventory search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (warrantless search incident to
lawful arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of moving
vehicle).
5 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 533-34 (1967). In Camara, the Supreme Court held that warrantless inspections
of residential premises conducted pursuant to a municipal housing code violated the fourth
amendment. 387 U.S. at 525-26, 534. The Court found that the fourth amendment circum-
scribed an inspector's broad discretion to search private homes, and required that a magis-
trate issue a warrant authorizing inspection. Id. at 533-34.
In See, the Supreme Court held that warrantless routine inspections of a warehouse
by the Seattle fire department violated the warehouse owner's fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable government intrusions into his private commercial premises. 387
U.S. at 541, 543-44.
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not depend on specific knowledge that a violation of an administrative
ordinance exists.' Instead an administrative search warrant may issue
upon a showing that the nature of the building or premises to be searched,
or the condition of the area in which the building is located, suggests
that a regulatory violation might exist.7 Although a lesser showing of
probable cause is required for administrative search warrants than that
required for criminal search warrants,' the Supreme Court has upheld
administrative statutory schemes that permit warrantless inspections.9
In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., ° however, the Supreme Court struck
down a warrantless inspection provision in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)." The Barlow's Court stated that a war-
' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
7Id.
' Id. The Camara Court justified a more lenient probable cause standard by noting
the long history of public and judicial acceptance of administrative inspections, and the pub-
lic interest in preventing or abating dangerous conditions. Id. at 537. Moreover, adminis-
trative inspections normally entail a lesser invasion of personal privacy than do criminal
searches. Id. Administrative searches are not personal in nature and are not aimed at the
discovery of criminal evidence. Id. See generally Lacey, Camara, See and Their Progeny:
Another Look At Administrative Inspections Under the Fourth Amendment, 15 CoL. J.L.
& Soc. POL'Y 61, 78-85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Inspections].
9 E.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). In Colonnade, the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of § 7606 of the Internal Revenue Code which empowers IRS agents to enter premises
without a warrant to inspect articles subject to the liquor revenue tax. 397 U.S. at 77; see 26
U.S.C. § 7606 (1976). The Court noted that a long history of government regulation of the li-
quor industry indicated that Congress had broad power to enact inspection procedures to ef-
fect collection of liquor taxes. 397 U.S. at 76-77.
In Biswell, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 923(g) of the Gun Con-
trol Act of 1968 which authorizes United States Treasury agents to conduct warrantless
searches of the premises of a firearms or ammunition dealer. 406 U.S. at 316; see 18 U.S.C. §
923 (1976). The Biswell Court found that three factors justified an exception to the warrant
requirement. First, inspection was a crucial part of a regulatory scheme that served an
overriding federal interest in the regulation of interstate traffic in firearms. Id. at 315. Sec-
ond, warrantless, unannounced inspections were necessary for effective regulation of the
firearm industry. Id. at 316. A warrant requirement could frustrate the purpose of the act,
since a gun dealer could easily conceal illegal firearms while the inspector obtained a war-
rant. Id. Finally, regulatory inspections of the pervasively regulated firearms industry
posed only a limited threat to a businessman's privacy. Id. The Court reasoned that a per-
son who entered a heavily regulated industry did so with the knowledge that his premises
or merchandise would be subject to government inspection. Id.; see also Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
" 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
" Id at 316-21; 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) empowered agents of the Secretary of Labor to inspect the work
area of any employment facility involved in interstate commerce for violations of OSHA's
safety requirements. 436 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
An agent of the Secretary of Labor attempted to conduct a warrantless inspection of Mr.
Barlow's electrical and plumbing installation business. 436 U.S. at 309. When Mr. Barlow
refused to permit the inspection, the Secretary of Labor brought suit under a federal
regulation requiring an inspector to proceed by process if an employer refused to allow in-
spections. Id. at 310; see 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1977).
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rantless regulatory inspection provision in a federal statute is constitu-
tional only where the statute applies to a single, pervasively regulated
industry, 2 and where the federal government has a strong interest in
warrantless inspections of the industry. 3 In addition, the statute must
restrict the scope of the inspections."
In Marshall v. Sink,"5 the Fourth Circuit applied the Barlow's
analysis to sustain against constitutional challenge a warrantless inspec-
tion of a coal mine under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 (Act).16 Section 813 of the Act authorizes agents of the Secretary of
Labor to make routine government inspections of mines to protect
miners from health and safety hazards.' Federal mine inspectors at-
The Barlow's Court expressly limited its holding the Barlow's facts and OSHA's in-
spection provisions. 436 U.S. at 321-22.
" 436 U.S. at 321. The Barlow's Court stated that a businessman who engages in a per-
vasively regulated industry impliedly consents to inspection of his business. Id. at 313; see
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); Administrative Inspections, supra note
8, at 70-78; note 9 supra. Mr. Barlow's electrical and plumbing installation business was not,
however, a pervasively regulated industry. 436 U.S. at 313-14. The concept of implied con-
sent is a corollary to the rule that a person can expressly consent to a government intrusion
and thereby waive his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 330 U.S.
800 (1947); Administrative Inspections, supra note 5, at 67-70. The implied consent rationale
is that a person who chooses to enter an industry that is subject to a long history of govern-
ment regulation, or that is pervasively regulated, is presumed to know that his business will
be subject to government inspection. 436 U.S. at 313.
," 436 U.S. at 321. The Barlow's Court found that although the federal government had
an interest in enforcing OSHA regulations, warrantless inspections were not necessary for
effective enforcement. See id. at 316-21. The Court reasoned that most employers would
consent to inspection. Id. at 316. Furthermore, if an inspector was denied permission to in-
spect, he could obtain an ex parte warrant and return to the business premises later
without notice to the employer. Id. at 319-20.
14 Id. at 322. The Barlow's warrant requirement evidenced the Supreme Court's con-
cern that OSHA inspections might abuse their broad federal authority to search any com-
mercial establishment affecting interstate commerce. See id. at 321-22; Bennett, Search
Warrants, 7 AM. J. CRns. L. 79,81 (1979). OSHA's inspection provisions lacked the narrowly
defined scope of statutes that regulate a single industry. See 436 U.S. at 321.
In Biswell, the Supreme Court observed that a warrantless administrative search pur-
suant to federal statutory authority might be valid if the possibility for abuse was not great.
406 U.S. at 317.
Is 614 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1980).
is Id. at 39; see 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976) (amended 1977) [hereinafter cited as section 813].
Section 813 was originally enacted in 1969. 614 F.2d at 38 n.1. The Federal Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977 expanded the coverage of § 813 to include mines other
than coal mines and shifted responsibility for routine inspections from the Secretary of the
Interior to the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Id.;
see 30 U.S.C. § 813 (Supp. 1978).
17 36 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. 1978). Section 813 requires authorized representatives of
the Secretary of Labor to make frequent inspections of coal and other mines to determine
whether mine owners have complied with the mandatory health and safety standards
prescribed by the Act. Id. Section 813 states that an inspector shall not give notice of an in-
spection to anyone, and does not require the inspector to obtain a search warrant. See id.
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tempted to make a routine inspection of Sink's small coal mine.18 Sink,
who owned and operated the mine without employees, refused to permit
the inspection.19 Pursuant to the Act, the government instituted suit to
enjoin Sink from interfering with inspections of the mine." The district
court issued a preliminary injunction, and Sink appealed.2 On appeal,
Sink argued that the warrantless inspection violated his fourth amend-
ment right to freedom from unreasonable searches.22 The government
argued that a coal mine inspection fell within the pervasively regulated
industry exception to the general rule that warrantless administrative
searches are unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
23
The Fourth Circuit stated that the validity of the warrantless in-
spection depended on whether the general warrant requirement or the
pervasively regulated industry exception applied. 24 The court found that
a warrantless inspection of Sink's mine was reasonable because section
813 inspections affected a single, pervasively regulated industry.'
Although Sink's mine was not subject to federal regulation until 1969,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that his premises were not exempt from
section 813 inspections.2" The court reasoned that one who entered the
mining business had no expectation of privacy.27 The court recognized
" 614 F.2d at 37. The parties in Sink did not dispute that coal mine inspections are
searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 38; see text accompanying note
4 supra. In addition, the parties did not dispute that § 813 authorized warrantless inspec-
tions. 614 F.2d at 38; see note 16 supra.
"g 614 F.2d at 37. The Fourth Circuit had previously decided that Sink's mine was sub-
ject to inspections under § 813. In re Sink, 5 IBMA 217 (1975), affd, Sink v. Kleppe, 538 F.2d
325 (4th Cir. 1976).
" 614 F.2d at 37-38. Where a mine operator refuses to permit inspection of his mine,
the Mine Safety Act requires the government to seek an injunction preventing interference
with the inspection. 30 U.S.C. § 818(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
" 614 F.2d at 38; see Sink v. Andrus, No. 77-2614 (S. D. W. Va. Oct. 20, 1977).
' 614 F.2d at 37; Brief for Appellant at 11. Sink maintained that under Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533-34 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543
(1967), the warrantless inspection of his mine was an unreasonable search. Brief for Ap-
pellant at 7-14; see note 5 supra.
' Brief for Appellee at 11-13; see notes 9 & 12 supra. The government recognized that
the fourth amendment generally requires an official to obtain a warrant before conducting
an administrative inspection. Id. at 12-13; see note 5 supra. But see notes 9 & 12 supra. The
government contended, however, that warrantless inspections of coal mines were valid
under the fourth amendment because the inspections affected a pervasively regulated in-
dustry and served on overriding federal interest in miner safety. Brief for Appellee at 13; see
note 9 supra; text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
614 F.2d at 38; see notes 5 & 9 supra.
" 614 F.2d at 38. Federal regulation of the mining industry began with the Bureau of
Mines in 1910 and continued with the Coal Mine Safety Act of 1941, the Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977.
See S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3401, 3401-02; Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
614 F.2d at 39; see note 29 infra.
614 F.2d at 38; see note 12 supra; accord, Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d
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that mining is an extremely hazardous occupation and reasoned that
unannounced inspections served an overriding federal interest in the
safety of miners.' Although Sink's mine was small and he did not have
employees, the Fourth Circuit stated that the federal interest in pro-
moting miner safety was equally great in large and small mines.' In ad-
dition, the court found that the Mine Safety Act sufficiently restricted a
mine inspector's power to search because an inspector could not forcibly
enter a mine.0 If an owner refused to allow inspection of his mine, an in-
spector had to seek an injunction compelling the operator to permit in-
spection. 1 The Fourth Circuit therefore held that warrantless, routine
inspections of coal mines under section 813 do not violate the fourth
amendment.2
The court's conclusion that Sink had a diminished expectation of
privacy in his mine is sound.' Although Sink's mine was not federally
regulated until 1969, he must be presumed to have known that the coal
mining industry had a long history of pervasive regulation." Sink
693, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1835 (1980); Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry
Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1979).
' 614 F.2d at 38-39. The Fourth Circuit relied on three cases holding inter alia that
warrantless § 813 inspections are constitutional because of the government's overriding in-
terest in enforcing mine safety and health regulations. 614 F.2d at 38-39; see Marshall v.
Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Prepara-
tion Co., 602 F.2d 589, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1979); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F.
Supp. 45, 50-51 (S.D. Ohio 1973); see also Marshall v. Texoline Co., 612 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1980). But see Marshall v. Wait, No. 78-2345 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1980); note 33 infra.
The Sink court noted that Congress had stated expressly that § 813 was intended to
authorize warrantless inspections of the mining industry. 614 F.2d at 38; see S. REP. No.
181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3401, 3427.
Congress insisted upon surprise inspections under the Mine Safety Act to ensure that mine
operators would not conceal safety or health hazards upon receiving advance warning of in-
spection. 614 F.2d at 38; [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3427. Congress concluded
that a warrant requirement would frustrate the Act's purpose. 614 F.2d at 39; [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3427.
614 F.2d at 39.
Id.; see note 20 supra.
21 614 F.2d at 39; see note 20 supra.
s 614 F.2d at 39. The Sink court distinguished United States v. Consolidated Coal Co.,
560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 436 U.S. 942, judgment reinstated, 579
F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1978), which held that inspectors acting
under the Mine Safety Act could not conduct a warrantless search of a coal company office.
614 F.2d at 39; 560 F.2d at 219. Since Consolidated Coal involved the government's seizure
of papers from a coal company office, resulting in a criminal prosecution, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the case did not control on the Sink facts which dealt only with a routine
safety inspection. 614 F.2d at 39.
' See 614 F.2d at 38-39; e.g., Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693, 694-95
(6th Cir. 1979) (although sand and gravel industry not regulated until 1977, owner of sand I
and gravel operation had diminished expectation of privacy in his mine); Marshall v. Wait,
No. 78-2346, 159-61 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1980) (decorative rock business not pervasively
regulated and so owner did not have diminished expectation of privacy, but court approved
of Sink holding).
' See 614 F.2d at 38-39; note 25 supra.
1981]
622 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
therefore should have expected that his mine would be subject to inspec-
tion. 5
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that an overriding federal interest
in miner safety justifies warrantless section 813 inspections of coal
mines presents two problems. Although in the case of a large surface
mine an inspector could enter unnoticed and conduct a surprise inspec-
tion," in a small underground mine, such as Sink's, the operator could
stop the inspector at the door and refuse inspection." The operator could
then conceal safety violations while the inspector sought an injunction."
On the Sink facts, therefore, an injunction proceeding is inconsistent
with surprise inspections. 9 An inspector would save time and preserve
an element of surprise if he obtained a search warrant initially and
avoided the possiblity that the surprise inspection would fail and he
would have to seek an injunction." A second question that Sink presents
is whether warrantless inspections of Sink's mine are necessary to pro-
tect miner safety. 1 While warrantless inspections of larger mines may
protect many miners from health and safety hazards,42 the Sink mine had
no employees." Therefore, on the Sink facts, the federal interest in
miner safety is less compelling and may not override Sink's expectation
of privacy in his business.4 The Fourth Circuit apparently decided that
federal courts should apply safety policy consistently to large and small
mines.45
The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that the Mine Safety Act
sufficiently restricts its inspection procedure by prohibiting an inspector
from forcibly entering a mine."" The Act's enforcement procedure pro-
tects an operator's privacy by enabling him to present his objections to a
federal district court before an inspection occurs or sanctions are im-
posed. The Sink court distinguished Barlow's on the ground that OSHA
did not restrict adequately its inspection procedure. The Fourth Cir-
614 F.2d at 39; see note 12 supra.
In many cases an operator will not object to inspection, and the surprise inspections
contemplated by the Mine Safety Act will be effective. See 614 F.2d at 39; note 28 supra.
I See 614 F.2d at 37 & 39.
E.g., Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1979).
See notes 20, 37 & 38 supra.
'5 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1978) (ex parte warrant pro-
cedure after operator refuses entry will sufficiently preserve element of surprise); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967).
" See 614 F.2d at 39.
'5 See note 28 supra.
65 14 F.2d at 37.
" See 614 F.2d at 37, 39; note 28 supra.
,5 See 614 F.2d at 39. The Fourth Circuit may have considered the possibility that Sink
might expand his operation and hire other employees when it ruled that Sink's mine was
subject to warrantless inspections to protect miner safety. See id.
'5 614 F.2d at 39; see note 14 supra.
', 614 F.2d at 39; note 20 supra.
'5 614 F.2d at 38-39. Only a regulation promulgated under OSHA restricted an OSHA
inspector's power to search a business establishment by prohibiting forced inspections. See
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